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1.!:a.ny of tihe O!'.mtroverrUes i&olll!;J on in. th~ world toda.y 
M-e CQfiiCGx."ned with tht problt!ll of f:rud,QA• Iel!fu.ee involvin~ 
freedom a.re importa.nt in the t'i.Glda of tl>eolo~, law, govf.l.rn-
Jiient, l$tb0.1!', pld,loaopby:, a.nd educ<>tiotl~ :For e~ple1 in 
aaiHUUiin.g the idlllolo~ical. cliooU of the world, the ll>ta.ndai'd 
of tree41.om .ts the l!leuure use<ij, by llU.!l1 wee~ tern pql:i. tica.l 
obeervers to dema.:~?oa.te the totttli t\l!..:ri,~m. f:rotn i;h.e f:rea; the 
eme:tgence of new na.tionll! is of1al'rt de:t'emillld :l.n theory by 
appealing to t~ltll right of a poople freel.~· to dl!ltlill'lll.ine 
tneJntUtl"l'es;-the pr•v~:I.J.ing- Yitalit'.Y ot' .tbe-Negro-mov~mllmt- -----~ 
in /1.111er1ea 1m ill. ~Wmifest&Uon o:t ~ d!i!1Un."mination to olrtain 
g;rea. tllir freedl'!lll !il.nd equal:!. tzn the a.U111gi~mM of tlliJ.ny 
ptl<!!plli!l to a world. uourt ia with!Uiild beea.use '!,;hey f(llar that 
. 
U would. cuttaU their ru~tion's unl.'ei~Jnty imd. fl'e!ildOm~ 
In tl'd.taeation, il'lsuel\1 involviil$ t'reed~:~m a.r<! al0o 
ct:U!l.tral. ltmly ed.tAeatorli! ~m.d in:eti tutions Qf high'llr le<lU.'n-
ing are o'OnOA&rned &bout tktllt req,ui:t·e!ltent o.f loyalty oaths 
frol!l colleee s'tuden'till wno obt~.~>in fed~n.·&l ~&oholarl.l.hip funds. 
It could be <U.U~umed the.t hardly any eduoa.tn in Amedea. 
would dony the.t the dnelopm'llnt of freemen .is M. esiHimtial 
= 
pivotal poo:l.tion that t'roJ<(ldom playa in Atntu.•ica.•s life. 
Columbia. Unive;reit;r, for its bicentennial celebration1 
choae to emphaa:la;e M upeot of the topic lind published a 
work enti tl<~d, l£M• § &a"li l,g, ZQ;!o!fl~ sui !f1! ·•·ttru! TJI!le 
i'hereo(• St. Jolm1 s Un:i.vereity, in T:l;rooklyn, 1'f!C(;Ii.nd 1:1: 
2 
Qeors;e Vf&.shingti:m Hono:r :ll!eda.l rrom the Ii'J:fil~o.ill Fow.da.tio.n 
lll!.t Valley ll'o:rge for He publ14a tion. Qoi@stRt $.( J'l'$Hl4Sl'!>l• 
The. choice of these topics is int'U4.1a.t:Lve of the oonoun of 
. ·.· . 
. . 
some teachers in h.:igher edtu:I~,J.tion. wUh isa\t~~lil involvi.ng 
freedom. 
While i!ili!!UfUI involvin~ frelildoJll. ~• of O.l'uoial 
importance in tile cont$iipo:rt~.:t';r scene, d~oput~ntlll ~e not .. 
f'z-ee f:t'om diff.erenoea of opinions, and tha.:.l.:t' controversies 
are nat f:r111e froll'l confusion Wld ;ll:i.sund,erliltu<U.n$. Oerta.in .. 
ly'• in e. deomo<l:racy, onl!l would l:l'-'1 jullt:Ltiabl;v' t-roubled t~.t. 
attemptB to tmpGI!$!il C<'!nformi ty,. .But ti1.e ve:11y ~:U.f'ferenoe£1 
of opinion .do call fo:t:' a.tte1npte a.t underlltandinG the ia~ruee 1 
so tb.a.t intere:il"ted pa.r"tiaa 4ould be a.ffol'Q.ed evidence t(> 
make informed jt.u.'lgl1!ents of tlleir own abGUt tile aun.•its of 
conflictin« cla:l.me t.o t1·utll. 
Ige~~:a A~gut :Ji'rUS.§!tll :Jil:Ais.ed 
When expreasions of ideas about freed(.lm in litera~ 
ture appear to indicate a diffe.rence of opinion about th.e 
~ 
m~t.ning of froedom or the oonoe.ption of method fo:r det;~.l:l.ng 
with inqtd.r:l.ea inh. the problem of tree<tom. IM1 oooalllion 
:f'Qr ~ iuve& Uglltion prelilente itu.l.:r • . 1'wo f.llllinent thinker&, 
John Dewey ( l859 .. l.95l) and, Mortimer Ad.let: (b.., .. l902h a.re 
p:rahed :t'or the :l.mpol'ts.nce of tklei.r idea.li! about tl'llll nature 
of' f'reedma,. Sidnty Hook pra:l.el\ld Jolut DQWey !Wd Brand 
:al~M<ell.ard eOlllpl:I.J~Iented 11ortimel' Adl~r. s .:l,dne;r Hook, . .l?ro• 
rouor of !'h.i.loliloph.y at l~ew York Ur!:l.ver!fity, edited a 
aympolilium of Dewey's work, ~ ll!Weat:; .\'!GU.ot!lt:Eher .9.! 
~sienoe and E[ge~om. In his pret~e to the book, Sidney 
Hook: illxpla.ined why the book wa.e eo n~JU~l.e<h 
1'h.e cent:ra.l rea.1um :for the vitality of J)ewey1 e id.eao 
ie thdr conctu:n with tile two ~~lain tt<lii1nee whtoh &re 
tm:l.quely relll!.ted to the dia'iline;u:l.t~hi~~ fea.tu:rea ot' 
1£lode:rn <ml ture. They f.l.'re, f:l.:rmt• tll.e nat11re of 
uientific inquiry and ito implications for mllm' a oon ... 
oept:l.on of. h.illlaelf• and of tha cnlllino&; ndt iulcond, 
the I.UfPir&.tion for a world &t f'rec ;aen !Wd.. free . 
lliOehtillla wnioh denp:l.t.e tb.e triWilphs lilt' tota.lita.ri.-n 
:t'ee;imee in tl:te wol,'ll,'!. l'l.re s.tr.cuiger
1
in :POP"l~:r GOfllllc:l.oue .. 
n~S~sa 'limon ever before in histo:vy. 
Brand BlMii.lhard; l'rot'elil!l.\Gr ot Pb.Uoeophy at Ye.llii• informed 
hie readen th!ii;t Adl&1'' e :l.de~m o!'fii!Hd a. g&Ml'liill clarit'ioa-
tiOn or the Ilroblem ot' freedom. In rev:te.wir:~g Mortimer 
.Adler• e book, - .1m .f2t ll!tlllfdQ!!, h.& 'll'l'O't&t 
This h ,just. the sort of b1:H'l.i: need<~d s.t t.he present 
stage ot' tile ancilllnt oontronrs;r. It does not add a 
new theory to tht;a ~~~&ny €llrea.dy in the :t'ield; 1 ts a.im. 
~ 
-
l j 
ia. to c~t tb!ll field• ta dtaUnguil!lb the ifil~;ues into. 
whiGh 'the problem rua.y be broken 'llP and for ea.oh of 
thtlllllt to. aa:y pree:le!lllY' Where they dU!'!IIr. ':l.'hG .book 
itaelr t&kes no PQBiUon on any of these 1sau1nh It 
!lllilrely expla.ina, oompares• analyzes, alasaifies. • • 
tndud it is only fal.i:r to say that :U' one wanttil a. 
getutra1 clm.rifioatun of tll.e 1)rollllam of free\1<)111, there 
is nothing in English to compare witb this book. 2 
1\laQh J;Jhiloao:,Pher, J'ohn Dew<l!y ami Ntor·tb.lll'l' Ad.\f.!r, , · 
plainly lltlitted hill .method .for dealin" witb the .problem ot · 
fra!'ldom,. In his wo:t·k,. Fr§edelt! .~ aYJ.\M~!., Dewey emphe.-
~~Jillled tnat to li!olve, the problem ot freedom; pr:l.i:tlary con-
eidera.tion mJlst he directed to a new ap:protitoh; 
we artl concerned with the problem or .treedol!~ .:ra.tn11r 
than U.s liHllutiQru;t in the oonvhtion that solutions 
m.re idh until til¢ problem llaa been pl&OilHi il:l the con-
text of the elements that oon1:ltitute culture ~~s they 
interact with the ele.melltlll of na;U ve llull«il.n nature. 3 
In his. Wllrk, fhe X d$a. !.( FrMdy, A<iler lll:&prea 111Mi 
his ideas about the metltod he /1'1£\.$ uli:lin~u 
We have adopted the word ltQ.ialf.lCthal~* to designate 
the t&«!k ot\ ren{l.tlring an objective, impartii!iol, Md 
neutrally :f'l.ll.'lliUl&ted :t'fll1lllrt of.&. ma.ny aided dii:ICUlilldon, 
euCh &Ill the discunitU'I to be found in tne YolurdMtul , 
literature on freedom. Those who pla.y. the role l.l:f' 
obenverm e.n<i inttu:preteru w\11 sh&.U oall *'dialecUr.~iue"' 
we aiUI.ll Ulil$ ''diahctic.n to nue the metb.od t.lley 111mploy · 
in reconstruotin~ the eontrove:rey llilobout i'l'eedom that is 
2;ara.nd Blanlill:lard, "What. li!ak~e Men ll':ru." . '.rl~e ~rer 
Iu:t <gim!e ~ ~ey&er. S!bpteuiber 14• 1956. P• 6• 
3John Dewey, Ji'lt~es\~1! ,mu\ QttltM;:e (l'l'ew Yorkt G. P. 
l'utna.m' s Soni:l t 1939). P'• 2:3, 
~ 
--
~,!!! PrRQJ.fll!! 
The ,documents show two pb.iloeophere prai.Ud for the 
value 0f their idees &bout freedom. ]loth l'IHhltived ttriimte 
for the way they proposed to &.pproll\.ch th\'a problem of :f'ree-
dOln• The oonaepticm of method which ea.oh a.dvooated for 
underBta.ndiq tbe proble<ll 0£ fnedQ:Il 1e now to be 1ihmt1• 
fled. The elements of Dewey's pr~:tgmatio ntothod and Adler's 
di&ll\lotieal met!lod are to be exll.llli'llEHi. Then the elements 
of the CJt.>noepticm of eacb. li!J:'e to be oolllpared ~:~.nd contrasted. 
In other words. tile prooedtA:t'& or method which ea.oh affirms 
a11 :tndividual o:r dbt:l.netiVe ie to l>e identified, oompa.red 
and contraztea. 
More lllpeoit'ic~tlly, tmewera are !llougnt to tile follow-
ing quetttions; 
i. What :1.0 the conception ot .Jnliltllod which John 
Dewey ~vocates fo:r il:HJ.t~iries into :freedont? 
2. \Wbat b the oonoe,ption of' met~tod that Mol'tillter 
Adler advooatoa for in<auiriee into freedom? 
~, What simil.,ri Uea or dUsim:l.lii!.t>ithu~ are inherent 
in tMir view&~ (ll'l method? 
•h Wi'llttt ~-~~~ tl.le implie~•tio:ne of their viewe on 
' In .. liln li\ttempt to understand tn~> ooncept ion of metllod 
tor inquiries into t,reEldo.m which each autll:or prell!enta, an 
$&1Hiilltilll.l ta.ak :1.::; to be fai t!l.fUl to the illO!»llil'!gW Of .tl;.e 
words e!l,ch has lUi~'>d• Speoia.l uorunn.·n 1& t~en to oome to 
tll!:t'lll with theuslil wr.~rdfl. Several l"ea.d:l.ttl.£1! are :I.'~·Q.Uired to. 
get 'Qeyond the word~!~ of e41!.ch to llie ter.ulinology, i.e., .lv) 
thli! me&n:l.ng o:r the worde. JUI!!t as :tn <t1athematio111 Ute nuiiier-
al d.i:ffe.l"s from the number, tHiy in r:Hlding, tile word i.s 
distinct. from the terminology. 
!t h obvious that dictf.o.n~~l'iee ~\:te not fin&J. author-
iti Ellil for under~Stlmdins the a peeialhed voeabul~ry each 
employs. Therefore, ~t~peoif'ic care :ta taken tG a.rl'i ve at the 
precise .mea-ning of words uaed ·oy ee.cn. Eepecilll.ll:Y when the 
aathor indicates in his exposition tl'm.t be l:!Ut'erl'l to use a 
word. differently fro~~< othl)):r a;utllo:ru, then very careful 
attont:illm 1111 €;1 ven to the l!ltllW'ting he wiehee to convey. 
When tl'lo a.uthar' a mean:l.ng ill underl!!tood, j:udslllen ts are ~de 
about tbfJ propo~t~i tiona .ne is affirming or d.enying. '!'he 
reason!lf offllr$d for hili! atatementa are aougb.t. 
Adlllittedly, ne :1. tb.er the pllilosGllb.ioa.J. writings or 
J<:~.l'in .Dt'iW(liJ' nor thoiU .of M:ox•tillle:r Adler are easy to compre-
hend. The problem of llllders;tanding e!loh :1.$ rendered more 
di:f'fioult by dittt!imilari t:r in the mea-nings they give to 
simila.:r Wll!rds, a.e l'ldJ. as to the ooo~sions when they pre.sent 
siil'lUa.r meanings Wiling different words • Caution is used 
~: 
""" 
' ! 
J 
'l 
rwt only to tali:e note of nominal d!vergenei1Ht but a.luo to. 
a, void ~r:r!U' wnen a e imila:t>i ty or words hid, a di vergttnee or 
ll!eard.ng. · 'l.'o enable. the reade.r to eueok .. tblll acoura.ey , of .. tna. 
ittte:r:;p:retat:l.on• . source :ref'G:r~ucef:: a.re pres<mte<t. 
An un.d.l:lrl!ttu'lding of the eonception of t;~etho(l advo• 
oaiHlll1 by Jollrl Dewey ~nd M.o~·timlllt' .. l!.cUe:r :fi!lr :l.tl.l;tU:l.l'i.eHI! into 
the problem. of freedom ir; of oona id.€J>•abl.e vlfl.lue tod!'!Y. 
:ooth han some farrte ~m<'l. following i.tl the ctmtempcn:e.rr 
Meriomn .. and :mlU'O:lff<um llloenej ·both lm.ve: >Hlme influence in 
ph:ilosqph.ie<tl and l'lducational ai:rl\ll..!ll'lj !l(>th .k1a.ve directed 
their att,enti(ll'! to treedorll• It h of so.me value fo:r ed.uoa. .. 
tors to und~l"ntMd and b1>1 aware of' wrua.t a.g:teenHmtm o:r. <lis .. 
U1llilllX'll~l'lding of the poul.tiona of ;rohu Dewey and Mort:l.(!l.er 
Adler would 11ot con!i!t:L tute a meG achievement• ~ven if 
viewed only as a. tueorethal awe.remess without any p:r.aoti~ 
oaJ. eonsequenee11. Such ltndet•aiautding ;;:ou.ld .aasi11t tile 
educator to avoid an undesb·abJ.e intellectus.l Plllirocl'!il\l1sm• 
evl!n if he db~reed with the :poeition$ ~ttf one or the 
other. or iloth. 
Yet it$ value eould exten.d f'a:rther into the practi .. 
cal lt'e$lm. A atud;r of the views of Dewey and. Adl.«~r could 
help tile edue~J.hr to f'<:>rmulat~ him own ,ju<l.gouo~ntl'! <'>bOl,lt Me 
own conception of u1ethod for inquir:l.ee into freedom. ;rust 
a$ ,e~el:l, llducato:t o:peratelili with $.ome t.lleory of deiaocrs.ey, 
even though he mtil.y not b:plhi tly s t0.te • 1 t 1 Bo each 
edtu~ato:r. b.&s sol!U1l conception lilt a JU€ltho4 for understanding 
freedom e.nd noMe ai!!Hirtians to .make about u, An in'V'&eti• 
gation ot' the t.!:u);ughts of t~ae two intJ.u:entia.l American 
pl1iloaopher~a could help a per£~1!m reach a mor111 inf'oJ;'Illed 
judg•nent aJ:mut quel!tiona '<>f freedom, 
IV • ORGANIZATION O.F 'l'HE lllil<!AINJI!,R 
OF 'l'H:E 'l:11ESIS 
'!'hh con!ll!lud~J«:~ the first f>f the tilix enapters ·of this 
study. Chaptl.'tr II de~lill witll a l'.evin of the literature in 
question.. The thi:lrd cllll\ptor preaents Dewey' a cGncept:ton of 
method i'or hiS inquiry into freedom. Chapter !V presl!lnts 
Adlel'1 B conception of 111ethod for his inqui.ry into freedoill. 
'l'hlll fifth e!:~aptu offers a1. f.':Oillpa.rison and contraEt of their 
potd. tions. Oh~~>phr VI lllUf!lllmrbea the findings of tbe ttu1tlis 
and corltaitUil oanelusiona GontHU.'nins; the. illlplim:l,tionlil of 
their v!lllwm for edu<Jation. An appi'lndix <ltm tains solll.e 
biographical and b:l.blio,ra.phicllll. inforcm.tion ~bout Jal'm. 
Dewey and Mortimer Adler. 
·. ~= 
J 
Blnee thb s tuttr it! coneerlltld w:llih the iden t:l.fiua.• 
tion, co~rhon, and contr!ii.h of the· conception of the 
metl'.od y:rope>!Hild by John Dewey ti.nd Mo•·tilll"r Aliler for in• 
quiriel!l into tr.u1 problem af f:ree\iom a.nd thlil illl.l.llioat!Ona 
of their views for educathn; tne literature ia or~&<~t.nhed 
4T.round the major aapccte ot' the study. Oolllll1entators1 
v1ew1.1 ax'& prennted about the' method or process .advocated 
by e.ach pn:U.onpher for nis inquiry into rx·e<f!dl:llll• O<nllmertta. .. 
tot·s• ·ideas about the illlplioationa of the a1ethod ot' each 
:philouopll(lll' :f'or education (O.l"lll offerilld• 
Ollinil!ln. Their ide&e a.r111 a.rra.nged a.ceordingto the a•grel.l 
of 11:lle llHlr®teilt~~ttGr' ~ fa.vora.ble or unt'a.vora.b1e o:riticiuru. 
Fli>Vorable copinionu are ;jii:t'OlillilllltG<i first. An att.ew.j:rc is ~~U~.de 
to inolude a t•ange of o:piniolllh 'fhis p;roeedure iiJ dotHl 
tirsi ft:nt Job~ Dewey !il.nd tnen for MortiiiiGr J~dl1n•. 
I • SEVERAL COIDm!~''l'N.t'ORS 1 VIE \Viii, 
ABOUT .TOU .. "i DEWEY 
Thill section of the studY eete forth what no!lle 
collllllentatora h&ve wri tter1 about J)ewey' s poei tion. It 
PH&lilnte fl~M>e of the li tere.ttl.rJ~> that deals wit;h t.he oonaep.. 
tion of method which Dewey advocated fox- 11m inquiry into 
~ 
lO 
'l'h!QI:Y of Jlle'§.}lgg 
It would not be e:x~gera.t:l.llg to &fAY th~>.t Dawl!ly re ... 
garded his ideas' on logic ~till central to bill! ;plli,loeophi~al 
doctrines, '£he :t'a.et that l1e wrote on the subject over e. 
thirty-five year period indic~tes the great importlii.!lce 
which he a.tta.elled to it. He adopted <~. polilition early in 
his o&.re•~r. a.nd retained it with elll\i>orationa &a his philo .. 
Eiophhal thinking develo:(.le<l. Hi$ treatment Gf lGgio&l 
theory can be noted in five articles compiled in §JL~4l!i 
!!I ~!VM TAeou wrUtam in 1903; in the e:xpanll!ion of 
tne0e views thirteen years later in his ooolt, li!Biil§tJ!B j£ 
Jil!Jilerimen~al Loj'jii!lB in his popularill!athn of tbl!lm in 1910 
in m B tlli!!kt and finally in his tlll:l>ture, technical 
e:x,preuion of them :in 1\~313 in hie 49Bi@t J;h.e tJleqr,t 91:, 
ln9..1lir;r. This extended sequential treatrl!ent of' t.ne thea1e 
in Dewey• e n:t ting refle.ets its importance in hi!:> ttdnldng 
and philoupny1 ~md affords a.n insi~J;ht into llie eenoeption 
of rne thod f'or inqu:l.rien into t'reedo!ll., · 
When George n. Geiger was a :Profeuot of :Philnso~ 
at Antioch College, in Ohio, he wrote J;lew!Y ,in fers:MecfiiyJh 
He prabed Dewey' a cotH.leption o:t' thinld.ng becauee of what 
he considered Dewey's unique method of ce:r.tifioation. 
Dewey'f>l c:~e:rtiUcation of thinkine was unique because he 
! 
l ] 
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ma.d'll it d~J,~tmQ. u;po:n Wilt<,t l!l.Ot.tt&J;ly .happ~ned &1!1' a lreaatlt of 
the t.hinkhl$ l)lt'OI\l!llliU~>• '.t'his dif:r:e:r.·~ntiated Dtnrey' s aonoep-
tiorx of think1n~ from that of the trlil.d1tio:nal eiilpi:riaiat$1 
Md ra,tion.aliotlll' i.lonll"Ell,ltione.. The;r ooneeivl'!ld "SJ±' thinking 
I.UI lo~:l.ia a.nd. net behavior• mlil.ldng it a cor.apl~te lllJ"Ste:ry. 
. . 
:Oe111'fiY':; eo:ntu'lption unr.,velJ,e.d the !1:\Y!llteey., 5 Beoa.ullle at 
tht va.t·ious e on:f.'u:atng · eot!not$iticm: of th@ ter£\'1 "thinking," 
G~i,!&e:t' .. -~.-.ted toot "it ilaa beoome a sywbol for a.:Lm\H~Ct. IW.Y• 
ttkint t!la.t GOO!!$ 011 in our nea.d. ,.a In lte.lping tlle readur 
undere tam! l'eweyt Ill conception of th1nkill€h he re!'llrred to 
the fam;I.Ua.r ~htir1otion of r~>flillct:l.n r.~r c:ritifll<ll.l th:inkiae; 
:trom ima.gin$. t:!. ve i'timcy ox• eua tcllllif,l'Y uno:r it i.o~~l thinking. 
Ol"i tical th:l.nldn>J dit't'ued. troa da;rdr.ea;llin~ or ·~hfl blind 
:!'ollowin" of bai::lit ps,Uexnm • Cri thQl or :refleeti ve ttA:l.nk· 
ing Wia.$ gt;!ll\lth~lly <~<nd, l:l.il'\ to:rte&ll.y dstaralil1$d by a p:to'blem. 
~ w~ a:ugs~st th&.t w• ·think only when wOI have to. 
tlla.t we are fG'rattd out of h<lib:l.tu.a.l ~nd da.;rdrea.-ning 
rout;itt(;l by ... ~wall, a preyblem. C®rt/4inlY i:ly now thie ia . 
to l:le expeott~d. Dewey• s argument hne• afl in kno·l'lledge, 
truth. value, ll1.nd almost anything el.liH:I• b &Emill'Ue and 
hiat.o:d.oal. 'l."lle ar:l.gin IU!d thlil dirtletive pu:tpou of 
th:ink.il'ij)j <liltill what eononn hiill,. fo:r wUbout l.nitial im-
pulse an~ aimed &t soa.J., tllii:lkin~ would be wi tllout 
meaning. 
--·-----5Genge R. Geiger,-~~~ ill J:!:t't!!!i:l§Sttm (New Yarks 
Oxt'ord. University Proas. • ll• 85• 
1.) nu .• :v. e6. 
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logical forms in their origin and not in their impecc~ble 
syntax. r.o~ical forms were the instruments which were 
used to oontrol inquiry, ao that the inquiry ma.y yield 
warranted assertions. Geiger indicated thl!i.t thie tllemG wa.a 
expounded by Dewey in hili! 112.!; U tltir.!:!f, a.nd. developed a.gain 
with some qualifications ot his tern1:lnology in Jtqs;tg.a 
11All logical forme" Dewey insists, "arise within the 
o:pera.tio.n of inquiry lllnd are concerned with tile oontrol 
of inquiry. so that it may yield warranted auertiona.•• 
This mfilll.lll'l tha.t the formlll origin&.te in the operations 
of inquiry. (14:4) As a.lWa.Yiii,Dewey ie looking at 
origins. It is here he finds the fJustification 11 of 
1og:l.c1 ratllel' than its impeccable syntax.9 
n was the influence of Dewey's logical tt1eory which 
·3dger :round at the roots of Dewey1 u experilllenta.liam. 
Ex»erimentalism was the term also applied to Dewey•s logic. 
It eonnotated in Deweyte thinking not only the experimental 
work of the physical sciences but elilsentia.l.l.;y the eonnota .. 
tiill1 of actiVe and eemtrol:l.ed knowing. Thill type of exper .. 
imenta.Usm c.nd logic had a. universal application. It ought 
to be applied to every area. of expel'iellee. Indeed• Dewey'$ 
entire pb.Uoeopey had irleen direct<Ni to applying such a.n 
o.ttitude to everr area. of experience. 
'.!.'he 
logic. 
}!$ WI!UI 
Ilion. 
U(l.lllfl •'experimlmta.lit~~m11 has been ginn to :Dewey• e 
ll'ot because he h:l.mlllelf' wa.s a great experimenter, 
not, exceJ;r&• or ~H>Url'.le, in the field of educa.. 
Moreover, it hits been noted by even the lllol!lt 
8 ~., PPo 87·89. 
9~ •• pp .. \\1'7~98. 
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sympa-thetic critics that newey waa not exactly ,!!!! curan;!j 
in the matter of the latest experimental work in physi-
cal science--a. fact he was the first to awnit. But 
"experiment" is a. wide-reaching term, not confined to 
the routine of the laboratory or to tlle apparatus of 
technology, vi tal 01.e they are. •Experimental" carries 
above all the connotation of active and controlled 
knowing; in the s~e way it suggests a logic in whioh 
human thinking does make a. difference, in which there 
is an authentic reconstruction of experience. Dewey' a 
entire philosophy has been an a.ttempt1to apply such an attitude to every area of experience. 0 
Dewey did not discover the thinking process, logic, 
philosophy, or the soientifi c method, nor did he claim to 
discover them. :But as he understood those entities differ-
ently, he expressed wruot he eoneidered his understanding 
about them. He could not accept some other expressions 
about what was true. He made his own expressions on the 
subject. As exemplified in his treatment of logic, he could 
not be satisfied with any tradi tiona.! formulation of it and 
proposed his own formulation. His point of departure, which 
was partially a nineteenth century tradition, was scientism. 
Realizing the a.ohievementa of soienoe and wishing lJhilosophy 
to advance, he proposed to reconstruct philosophy. He wished 
to seek the meaning and evaluation of philosophical ideas 
in the institution of working programs. He wished it to 
progrese by the acceptance of' the scientific method of 
!zypothetical approach, i.e., as understood in scientism. 
Geiger expresses this meaning of experimentalism in these 
lOIQig., p. 102. 
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.What ·!i!JC]lf.l:t"i.mentlllliam signifies b a .game:t'a:t orienta-
tj.on, one o.f <ll:Xpeettna hypotheses of any natura in a;ny 
1~iel.d to oa.rry with them the eonditicm of !<heir Jueti• 
fiea~.tion 1;1r r&Jeetion. • • • . :aut ·if eaeh area· ot. o:x-
;pllir'f.1iml:H~ d.s:tlltt.Udl!l ita awn procedures, ;ret the on:t'a.ll 
tool ilil tb.e operational spirit• wnhn e:xpeots concepts 
.to a.cb.ieve 1:\it:Ul.ning and . va.lutfht! by We?J ot the: ins u .. 
tution or wo.x-kil'lg :p:rogr~ •. ·. . · 
The eoll.lllientlitor disouJ!Iilles tihe oGnc.epi;ion of a method 
tha.t he elaimed Dewey advoell!.ted for l$.ll inquirief!l• . An 
inquirY into t'veedom b ody onG pa:rt:l.oula.r inquiry. Uence, 
the oo®'f>li)ntQtll>r, at le!!Milt impli<.~!tl;r., W1l>S wr:l. ting about a 
method, which he tmd..erstood .D~&Ifl'fiil,Y' advoca.hd for inquiries 
into f'reed.om, 
Reflecting on the syllogism above• alternative prem~ 
ieee were considered for the majGr ~W.d lllinor but tney wne 
untenable. Tb<t evi.denee of the oo!lllllentator•lil at.atemeate 
could not support t.he a.eaertion that he dil'tcusaed a. mllthod 
whiCh he did not claim Devtey· E~.dVof>&ted for all inquil'ies. 
To lti:IIH'lrt that an bt{~ui:cy into freedom 1a different from 
otllu inquiries ~W.d net juet a. pa.rthul!!.r kind of inquiry 
l0 to Mt~~Wlte tha.t a unique diohotolllJI' :pe:rs.ililted in Dewey•a 
thinking, th~~t kind. of lilut.~.lilillll hill vms eo indatentl;v fight-
ing ag~'ir<st,. .M:Or(l;ove:r, it runs ~a:LnlSt tiM~ llta.in eurrent of 
one ot Dlilwey' a !llajor Wl)rka• hh l;p1Jil.lt ~ 'J.:!J.eory .Qt. ;tnQY!U• 
JoUpll L. :5lau. Asaoeia.te Profelllilo.r of' the Philoeoplly 
J 
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of Religion a.t Columbia UniversitY; presented a. pa.JiltU" about 
John Dewey's lh'>oial philoeophy. In the general <.~ontent of 
l!l.n exposition of Dewey• s eooia.l philot~~cphy, he )~resented a 
filubetantially identical account of Dewey's proceu f'or 
_recorwtruoting experience. While he did note that Dewey1 a 
reconstruction of social ·theory was r<H~inbctmt of the 
tradition of the ethics of aelf .. realize.Uon• .l.ik:e the etta .. 
oa.l philosophy of T. H. GrtHlln, the B:!:'itil!lh philosopher, 
J?rofueor Bla.u pointed out tlla.t Dewey's thiilory differed 
shliU'pl.y fro.111 thon ()f Grun and othere of the aue lilchool 
''in hi$ :l,!lliliBtl!ltlOO thi'l.t the tilllEl na.d QOlllEl. to a:p;p;t'O&.Cih 1\Hlcill!.l 
thoug;ht with a new ulethod•"J.;t Expresaod positively, Dewey1s 
metl'1od for :Blau was a method didinguiahed by i tfi noon .. 
cretene&s t:reua :methode used by !iilU'lier l\!ahntista.'113 E:!t: .. 
preased ne~«:U vely, :Blau ea.U. tlla.t Dewey was etre1111'1ins* 
•• • tile reJection of what he oalled ••tile loe;:l.e of 
general MtiGne,ll that is, the tra.diUonal l;ogic of . 
univereals under which we subsWA<~ tile concrete par'tio-
ular 111 ituationa with .wid.ci~ .we •~re 1•eall;ir conoerl10d• 
Dewey uaerhd that instead ot' dea.ling directly with 
p!ii;rtieularit 'the tra.diticnally aeo~pted logio at.H>~ 
stitutes diiHIUIH!Ihn of the mear>ing of concepts and their 
dia.hot:!,eal :rel;.o, t1onah.ip to one anotller. 1•U. 
I>rof'$$sor .Elau .did n!1ta that the ttllilthod · wtw 
-·---..;......--
l 2.To1Hipi1. :r.. Blau, "John D~nvay and. lll:t~eriolil.ll Social 
Thought, e ~!.!b@l'! Qollega, ~MRtfi:, 61; l27i, Dlii!Hllllbiill.' ll>W19" 
1aJ;.:W. 
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euloe;iet:ioally teri!led "soientU"io" 'beoa.uee ••we are !'lOt to 
utlderatand that thiS is the only ll.lethod \uo~ed by stHentietlil" 
or even tha.t "any scientist would explicitlY forl!lula.te or 
oonnious.J.y IU'Ie this i1.1$thod, ulll Dewey' ~J nll'lw lo~:l.e of 
soeia.J. .. so:l.erli;U'ic investigl!l.tion w~~;:;; aupQrior to the· old 
· phi losophi oiJI.l app:roa.on. 
lle thou~h't tlla.t lil!lOi'l. ~.>. l!lethod. was inevitably s to rue, 
U I&. !l'!!!ill!ad 2!. !i,i §!i!<>IU'l and in 1 ts .. pla<~e he . wished to 
lilubsti tute a logioi a.t inquiry, refl«letintt fihfll p:roced .. 
url!ls tlla.t a laboratory inve!lltiga.tG:r might u![g tn tM 
study of' a question in any of the tH~ieno•u1. 
While l?rofes!!lor Bla.u in this section of hie <.\rt:l.ole 
made renrenoe in ai,;. of his footnotes to Dewoy•e :fiuon .. 
. . 
!J.;~ructi.9.n .!l\1. :§'fiiloeoph:l(, he does not lecwo the u~dt:r wi.th 
the 1mprt~lllaion that tb.e re•rk; a.:re of only p~:~.l'tillula.r eig-
nifioa.nee in undnst&nding !)ewey1 e philosophy. He erx;plic,i,t .. 
ly generaJ.i~ed. that: 
What newe;r aa.i4 on MY eubjuot oam1ot be under&tood 
wi thol.\t keeping in mind hie di~>truat of 11 geJtera.l 
notioma, •• of abstr.aotions lllttde in tho oouree of inquiry 
~md thon a.IIHi>Ullled to e:dst in faot bllu!auu of tneb 
clarity .and dietineti veneslli in tbou$]!1~. Hill spoke of 
the l:13!'POI* tatUation ot• eonolllP'-S. al!l '' 'llhe ,~>b.ilonopttic 
fallac;r• 1' and ins is tenUy repeated . tb.rougnout all hb · 
wriUn~e the neH~d ror regi!<rdtns all idea.s aw k!1:£lotheaes, 
".to be ao1u1pted u b!!.f!lt'IB of «~.etiona wnioh ·teat them, ;_ 
not lMl finali ths.lll'l' 
15Ibi4• 
16~., P:lh 123·124. 
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Since Dewey's theoFy of logic led him to regard all 
ideiii.u a.u hypotileue a.nd. of i.nstrum~mta.l u·tU.il;y • he 
a.lM extended this notion to aooial insti tutiona. 
Oonluiquently, he conceived of uooial institutions u 
the sta;te• family. eQrpora.te busineu, and trade unions 
as forme to be tested anew in each concrete situation 
to determine their value in that specific situation. 1~ 
ProfeeMre Geiger and Blau were not disoulillling 
explioi tl;y the oono.eption ot· method used by John Dewey for 
inquiries into· freedom. But their ideas do show that they 
detHlribed hie conception of method or praoeu of' inquiry 
and explicitly held it applicable to all fields of inquiry. 
Consequently they implioi tly at•e deso;ribing hie coru1ept:ion 
of llUith.od for inquiries into freed.om. It ie not being 
auerted that .Dewey used thb method for :l.nqui:dee int<> 
freedom ( .thougn it would be eur;pris ing U' he did not) or 
that the commentators' ideas explicitly maintained that he 
did, but only that the oommenta.tora• ideas i<llplieitly oon-
tain tile idea tnat Dewey's conception of method is ap:pli .. 
cable for inqu:il'hHI'I into rreedon1. 
Ernest Nagel, who te;ught at Columbia Un:!.verai.ty from 
l945 to 19!55, proposed an approach to a genuinlil philosophy 
ot soience 1 ont thEOt aimed at a pai.ut~king <1na.lys:ta of the 
schntit'ie proceduro. 19 He acknowledged Dewey, a.mong oi;hers, 
leiW. 
l 9:Ernest l\la.gel. l;\oVI}.ta.il{n :tte!SQQt AM Qthgr ~.t!i!!lie@ 
J,s the fb.ilosqp1n: .9.( !i!Slie!Ce ( clleneoe1 The FrtrQ Prese, 1954) • 
j 
18 
T,tu +. 
~~--
he exp;resged hie diss.pproval of Dewey 1 11 analysis because 
he maintained that it did not ta.ke note of the dillltinct 
log:l.cal functions of scientific confltruction in determinate 
si tuationa and did not legblate to the scientist the 
''O methods or limi ta of his specific enteriJ:Irist .• "' He al.so 
oritiCi$ed Dewey's philosophy of science because it was 
inoompll'fte in that it failed to ana.l;ru all the details o:t' 
scientific procedure. 21 :Nagf!lfa analyt~h and criticism 
would aeem to point to a poadble weakness in :Dewey' e oun .. 
oeption of freedom if he engaged in extrapolat:!.nt; eoitmtit';f.c 
ideas uMri tically into philosophic disoottrse • 
Je:t•ome n. Nathansort discW!lud the geneti<!l method and 
cautioned about the geneti.c fallacy. He gra.nted that the 
1aethod ~d validity in peychoa.nl'l.l;v11lis and. other fields, 
but wa.rtUIJ<i that it was unreliable in demonstrating the 
truth or· falsity of a.n idea., 
By a.nd large it a.seWl!as t.llat we get a better under. 
standing of'persons and situations if we loo~ at them 
as »rocesses, seeking their origins and tracing their 
development for wlla:t.-light-they can- thl'ow on wltatever---
is beifti examined or &.na.lysed. In a. ltu>{te 1aeuure 
thill it\ the method .of psyl)holanl'.l.lysilll, Which ulUia dreams, 
the free aal!looie.tion of ideas a.nd meu1ories, and the 
identification with the doctor in order to bring to 
consciousness important incidents in the ~dult•s 
----·----20I'-i"' 4"' 4"' ~·, P:Po ...,~ • • 
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. forgotten ehildb.ood .. •tll.e anumpt.:ton b$ing .that i.t we 
can only l.\lee clearly the origin of porsonlil\lity conflicts 
we c~ put them in s. realistic eett:l.ns .and ~llllY neurot-
ic amcieths. The atu:1cen of the genetic method in thh 
and othb :fields b evidl'!nce that it can· yield tnU• 
ful results~ on the other hiiimd tl:lere is lil.lwuya the 
danger of ooflllllitting wba.t h o;lbd tbe genetic t'allacy .... 
that is• of' aUUllling that an idlil&. has or hll.a Mt valid· 
tt:r in the light of it.tl hietory. ,,. evid~ance of the 
truth or f!i.llili ty of an ide&. the l)ll'!neth method ta 
demonstrablY unreliable. By wa:y of illuetra.tion•. U' it 
oould be shown tbat Hitler was mentally unba.l~~mced 10 
·tut would not prove any thins !l4bQut one. of hilii ideas~ 
the truth or :falsity of the «master-ra.oe~!:)i's.ntasy would 
have. ta be es ta.blhhed an other srounds •"'"' · 
. .Nathanson's d!tseript;ion gf the genet!(.! method seer1.1s 
to reumble in IHlml.l J,"eapeots tlllil ;nethod or proeees that 
Geiser, Bl.a:u* and Na.~el dli.uaeri bed as proposad by Dewey. 
:But lfa.tha.11son introd;u,oes the truth. .. falsitY qU!i\lity of ideas. 
J!e demonst.rated the relhbilit;r of the ~er.u~tie method as 
evidence for th.e t:rutb or fa.ldty of an idea, and thie,. does 
not uem to be in flireement wi til Gdiel' and Blau1 s lUtder .. 
at!M'lding of the eertifio.,tion of uit.ieal .&r reflective 
thin.ld.ng. They had eilt:preuM the uni verintl a.p~)liuab$.li t;r 
of Dewey' I! theory, while Na.th~~maon would not a.ceept eu¢h a 
:position, lie, a.t ha.et impli(litl,Y1 would not EOeoept its 
validity :ro:r Judging th.e trutn &r. ralflity ot ide~ about 
treed~>lll• 
Jl.notlu~r ineonsbt~mt a.e@ert.ion ie present in the 
-------
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literature. This concerns the nature of Dewey's empiri .. 
cism. Geiger was insistent about the tv:I.U$ph of Dewey's 
logic over traditional empirioism and :ra.ticnal1sm. But in 
19381 Willi~ Gruen had expressed a reservation about 
Dewey's logical theory.. He acknowledged that his Jaog~g 
was a great pl'lilosophical work, out was eautioua about 
coru1eding tl'mt Dewey•a empiricism esoa.ped the deiD<mde !\If 
los:toal empidc:J.sm. This was hohn1oal but trivial to 
Gruen, even though :l.t was centrll.l to Dewey's position, 
according to Geiger. Gruen wrote: 
Nor would it be ap:propriate to raise here technical 
issues mach as Dewey's attitudes to the dootrinea of 
losioa.l empbhhm, to whion .... he seeme to the p:re1umt 
reviewer••l'Ul ie more <JP:POilllild. than 1e de~~Wtded by the 
basic doctrines ot his own logil!lal tneory. With auoh 
triv1a.l reservations one cauze"" 'lihat Dewey'$ M:!.f£1! is 
a. iJ'tl&t phi.loeophical work. 
1'he rllisgivinge to wh:I.Qh Gruen merely ~Allttdl'ld seems 
to have been explo1ted alllloe.t fifteen years later in a. 
work by Eorao41 s. Thayer. Thayer oon<Hlded tlia.t Dewey•s 
theory of inquiry prcuumted in hiS X.9S~I wa.a "u accomplish .. 
ment ot the first m&gni tude," and 8 e.e e. ~bur:r•-a.n intx•icate 
account of the proceli!s and all the eubeidial'Y details in"' 
volved.-·is a llltl'iking ac.oomplishment u can be f\lund in the 
23wulia.m \h:-uen, '*The lratur&~olization of Log :I.e," 
~ 1!&!9n, 147:427• october 22, l~sa. 
J 
enmtna.t.icn of Dewoy' z work revoa.led three· pr<:>blema1 ·f£t.ui 
"each pro\ilem illl located u:t the very lleal't of J>ewe;r's ao .. 
count> of the t~ee · fundwnent&l ~;~nd eha:INil.~te:dat:f.o rea;burtal 
of inq,uil'Y•"25 The three fea.tuns were located. in the 
initial, intermediate• and final ph:anl!l of tihe proo!lnls 
of inqui:ey-;. · 
lU.11 empirUal criticism of Deweyte statel!l.l!!nt ot' the 
ind<ttetminate situation. in thtl initial pha.ee1 r9sted on 
wW:l.t cn.•:l.terion. p$int o:t' view, or relative to what system 
of rillference was the situatien to be understood as ;poeaeslh· 
ing these eh&racteriattell of d.oubtfUllten, :pt:~rplexit;r, or 
oor1t'U$:1.en.,26 Dewe.v•a deurl,ptiion la.,ked opGra.t:Lona.ll;r 
determined meMine; or e~upirie&l sie;n:l.ticance for Thayer. 
!n eva.l:t.tating the ueoond funda.m&ntal c~racterilli tic 
feature (the intermedia.te phase) of the prooeu of inquiry• 
Th&ye:r i!howe4 tM.t "Ilawe.v puts fGrth the view that all in .. 
quiry containe a pra.ct:l.eal·fa.ctor on the ground of •what 
oex-tainl;v ooeur~J. • .in a.t least !.a!ll! ca.gu;' .,2'1 So l?.e 
21SI!l!!J1 
. . . , p. n. 
26.lll.U.·. ll• n. 
27~ •• »· l6Eh 
reworded Dew.fly'e posUhn to make !t <ampirtc~Uy. n:Ud 
and !1lXl)res!ll'it~1 it ae·. f<~l.ll)vm~· .. 
l!lW!n ,1. sit:uawuz hU. 1M !fha:dor!!il ang . staa.l. 
oM:at1l!!r1BUtl!! whiq!l ge!fit ,U. u n lilrme · e, ~ 
· wu · ~ · :yghe:t:;! .!!i !!!.Wwiutrl ·. Qi!'Ml!!!it~ . .tt' · . · t.} ·. ·. · 
initia.h!:! !. !:!!lb.MiU.i~ uUvUx QaUeg ~ngutr.tt. m 
~· aatt:t.U.t l!. ~ ~· .U. "U~~::t..nsa !!IR2lUl sgnnUhnl'!, 
At .1 i~I&tnJ. .~ '®UUa.J: ,u.n wbieb !letines .!! 
. df1itRlU®1i!+l JituEt;Ul.U!• . · · 
· The. ml!.jo:t' portion of' 'l'hq'ert e work was aimed fl.t 
anf.l.lyzins th!ll beuea involved in. Dewe;r• e formula'tion or 
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the third. l!'l>~e :l.n tho patt~rn of inquiJl'Yt tha.t of the 
for14lii.tiorl o.t hypotheses &f.J inH~a.l. plans of a.a.tion fol' the 
resolution of lit. problell4 ;.fter 11av:tne; ~a.l;vliled .Dewey's 
undlllrBtand:b:;g o.f e:x:iat!Jntial particular p:t>G~osi:tions, b.e 
noted that Dewey'~> etat.emliilnt tht.tt ;partiou.la.)l' prop(lsi Uons 
may be eitlaer al"~ mubotani>ia.ted or pred:l.et1one to bl) 
&ubet.a.nUo.ted• iOiila ~ainat eC~tua.l proce<l.ure, :Cha;ver' $. 
re&!iHHl. wu that .liltatelll£nte re.porttng the d~ta• the creden-
tial fMte of 1nquiry0 muat be tlllk~m ae fa.Ctli! !l.ttd not as 
prediotione. Mo:~:eonr. ll«:~ did. not r~gard pe.rt:l.oullilir ~~tl)l.te .• 
ments· u those. whbh,. eonto.ined. definite mera,tion of time and 
plaee as o.dequa.to grounds tor d:l.stinguieh1ng propolilitions 
asurtint£ f!a<llethina; about. individuals 1\\.t a. \1~ l!llld pleoee, 
and pro.;poe.itio.ns asserting something h l'HI the case about 
ela.sses at "nt;h'e co.llections of individual~:~ at a tb1e ~~md 
p= 
~ 
In addition to those several difficulties which 
Thayer found in Dewey' a analysis of propositions, he also 
took exeption to a more gener,al aspect ,of Dewey• a theory 
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,of propositions as such; ~.e., tb.a.t propoaitiona are not to 
be regarded as true or .falae.30 , Thayer contended that 
Dewey in hie Logic had denied the truth-falsity aspect of 
propositions. He realhed that Dewey considered proposi-
tions as the means for promoting the pa.fiHJage from a prob-
le{[la.tio si tua.tion to a determinate one, and tl:mt in that 
context Dewey considered the propoaitiona !i>fl effective or 
ineffective. He understood that Dewey conceived .of ideas 
a.s inetrUillents. Thayer knew the special distinction which 
Dewey introduced between propositions and judgments. 
Judgment may oe identit"ied as the settled outcome 
of inquiry. It is concerned with the concluding ob-
jects that emerge t'rom inquiry in their statue as 
being conclusive. Judgment in this sense is distin-
guished from propositions. The content of the latter 
is indeterminate and representa.U ve t'<nd is carried by 
syrnbols; while judg!!nt, as finally made, has direct 
existential import. • 
Discussing this distinction, 1'heyo;~r insisted that a 
29Il!!!!~' pp. 94-95. 
30ne refers rea.del' to Probl,ems . .2!: Men, p,J. 339-40, 
and to Lo~ic, p. 287. 
31John Dewey, Lof}ic: The 'l'heory Q,! Inquiry (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938), p. 120. 
-= 
CQl'ICl!lilion cont:radiotoz:;r to. Dew.;y• a waa WIM":~?~nMd • 
.. Whell~JVU l>l'H~ inr:a uiry employlil the co:t!<lllllll· ion or 
warranted. lMJse:rrUon A of SOllllil previous inql.ti)."y a.a 
·~ meQnf:l a:r. i.MtrWJumt .tor arriving &.t .··~A ~11fi,~.la~J1o:ai 
this wa.r:x'anted &IHlelt'tion A b.alil the fun<~tiona..l .role 
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. •d all tht .otM:tr tao:t:ru.:.rrali1 1rlli¢b Dew~y IM'3aisna tG · 
pro;posi.t.hnw... And the:t'e ucu~111. to be very U ttle reason 
why A$·. in lliuah m. ()ll!;l\11:, .~ M,t bo retta:t'd$<:1 <?.$· •!ll. true 
pro;pcdtion,. If th.:ts .iii! ll!.coepta'l)l.e1 howevn. it follows, 
as a.~a:l.na> t . Drewa::r. t~t :truth <~>.nd. t'aJ.tH ty a:t"e ;!lll'opo:rtielil 
of pro.PQI'l:l.t:!.onta. Or at l.e~~~.~Jtt. th111re is one more reason 
wl:zy- .pre>Xi!>dtionu U£11 b~s§2rega.:li'di~4 lil.l:l k2adr>..g the prop .. erties of truth-falsity. 
Thayer Obe to thb eoaclueion lHHUt.un hi! thought 
tbat be Blit.W the ino!llnshtenoy prettutnted when one .Pl'OP01li• 
tion in the initial stage of :l.nquiey became tbe warranted 
assertion ( oonelue:hn) in the final st~e a.nd y~tt the 
,proposition lat:iked 'the trutlt .. fa.leity pro pod tion, \fhile 
the judtiunt poes~HilUd the ;proplllrty. In his mind it was a. 
tfon·tradiction to a.uert that the 6ame etate.lfllmt can <>t one 
time lfe w1tltout the property it latn pou!UJae~.. If Dewey 
we:rl\1 oonei.etent in tne &:PJJlieatiQn t>f .!lis lelli:.ical tne.ory 
to hill! id!IIIM! abo1.1t freedom, they would l:le .open to the tJI'tllle 
eri ttdsl!l$ • 
J.WaUq§jiQm!. ·J:ti:. l'l4Uutllm 
:t'he divel?£~HY of opinion wh:l.ah w&a nid.ence in the 
presen.!m:tion of eolllillEint•rtorlll 1 views on the ol)noeption of 
metbot:l !or an;r inquiry into freedom iii! also pre111ent in 
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their views on the implications for education. The more 
impressed they were with the theory. the !Uore emphatic they 
would be about i te implication for eduoa. tion. 
George R. Geiger was impressed by Dewlily' s formula.• 
tion of the theory of inquiry. He considered :.?ewey' a ac-
count of the steps of reflective thinking a valid analysis 
and saw in them the continuity which existed between common 
sense and the moat rigorous of the .sciences. For him they 
represented an easy transition from lay intelligence to 
scientific. The scientific method of hypothetical a.pproackt 
with its operational or experimental tea1per and i tB i.ll<Ua-
pensa.ole spirit of tentativeness and hypothesis ~~rere needed 
in modern culture, He inconsistently proposed a dogrna.tio 
approach to end dogmatism when he wrote; 
·These are the only weapons which can overcome the 
suasion of allegedly final judgments and of dogma., a.r1d 
they .ma;y oonsti tute the uni~J!e .contribution science 
can make to modern culture.~ 
Joseph L. 13la.u, accepting Dewey's notion thl<t the 
hypostatiza.tion ot' oonoe.pts was the philosophic: fallacy 
and the philosophical corrective was the treating of ideas 
as hypotheses, maintained that Dewey's views possessed a 
special significance for edtwation today. 
Wl1en a la.rge part of the world ot' letters has again 
falled prey to the reductions of the "logic of general 
:33 • Geiger, U• 01t •• p. 106, 
26 
concepts,." a :r.•e..empha.raie of Deweyf.ll!,_li faith !!hould !lllill.''fe 
a.a av!lluablt <~orreoiive .. 34 
E:rtu.let :Na;gl!lcl's interest in a plliloso;plzy of sohnce 
led him to e,pprMiate Dewey1 s OQrttriln.!tion to the :f'hld but 
a.lao to vhw Dewey's philoso:pby of aoience ~u.~ inoOIIlplete. 
lie encouraged a. .tliOre tho:~.·ougn atu.dy of all th.e d.da.ile of 
eo ,.anti t U ~ oee<tu:re • 
.Jer~ Do !lHi.thlmi'.IOI:l t!IU'l'OW&d doWtl conl'li dt;:ra.bly the 
utility of the {!;eneti~ mothod~ Wh.Ue he conceded ita valUe 
in I'Hilnte a.rea.e. he was ·:hteililtent that thtll au1llll:Ption. that 
the truth or t"a.lai ty of a.n idea :h1 der;mmJt:rable in the 
light of Ulil h:l.!i!tO'ry, h dell!lon&tra.bly unreliable. 
Vlill:l.lli.l!l \lruen, viewin~ the ph:U!}!tlOJ?hioal dootrb1es 
wil.ioh Dewey ,ProJto.sed, would lu•ve nol'lsidered them Ill. oontriw 
button to the doctriniile of hsiolill empi:rioiJ>l!l f,l,t:ld. of' value 
wi til.in tlu~.t f'rlltniework. 
Horace s. Thayer• while e.oru!.!id.&:ring ·~he kfW~q a 
strUr;il'lt$ aocom.rili!!!hment Mlong ph.ilo!!!ophical works, exvressed 
very sariouB :r!llse:rV'l'Atiow.s about the tlantr:tbution. of Dewey' til 
conception nf roet!lod to the theory af l~>gio, <l.l'ld oould not 
b.a.ve ua:ign&<l Ulil doctrines ~ si~nifil1ant ~tatue in a 
philql!lophieal ec.I'M'illm'l with~J!It the !Jfl!."\'{')0t:tonr,l prr:Jpo~;~ed. 
34
.:roeeph r,, I.llll.u• 11 .Tchn Dewey ':.nd 1\ltt<ll'li.a~t.n Sooi110l 
Thouibt," 't•I!!Ullil?;:lil Qgl;&Slfjlft Ji!liH>t!i. 61: 121$•7 1 Deae&l:>er l£159;. 
This eeouton of ~e s tudf sots f'orth what some com-
mentator Ill hlll.ve wri ttl\lln a.J:>out Mortimar AtU.er1 s ideas. It 
prEieente eome of tne .U teraturo tt1.a.t deals with the oon-
oeption of' method that Adler advocated tor M inquiry into 
:rre•dcua, Then it deallil wi.th the commentatora' views on the-
imPlit:aUons of .Adler's idear.J f'o:r education. 
'lite general prooedu.re whioh was followed for John 
Dewey has been followed here. Since the ideae which 
collllllenta.fH>l'lil expres11ed were not free t':t•om differences ot 
opinions, their id~s.s are s.rra.nged aooordina to the degree 
ot' the eom•uentator1 1i1 t'avorabl¢~ or unfaVQX'I!l})le oriticililm. 
Jl'avorable opinions ue presented fix-at. l!lituUa.r to tile 
;previous ap;p:roa.eh, an attempt has be~m ma.de to include a 
wide range of opiniQns,. 
XhiU'\! ot Mj)}thg!& 
It ie AA assUIII:pt:l.on of thi.a stud;y that Adler• o con .. 
oeption of dialectiC! is & centra-l idea. of hh dootrines. 
The tact ·Mmt he wrote on the subject over a. thirty-year 
period indicates tbe gr!ll&t blport.ance wh.icb. he attaor~ed to 
tt. He adopted a. position ea.rly in his eareer, and l:.'etained 
it with elaboration as his ph.ilo.sophio"'l th.inldng devdoped. 
llis treatment of dialect:l.oal theory crumot be miaaed in 
~ 
-
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wi tb Jerome MiChael in the 'IJl'i tilli of grime, 1.t!aY! ~n,g. S.gc~a.l 
Scienjt!, and in the study made use of the theory to dif• 
ferenUate the~ nature of philosopllioa.l. and ee:tentifio 
studies in the!!ie fields, !!!!':U Ji!!&n uas ~!!!! ·.21'. •• pub-
lished in 1938, atterl1pted to point out that in the two 
different t'ields of knowledge, the psychol..,giou and .Pb.il-
osopll:f.oa.l• because or the two apecifical.l.y diBtinot levels 
in tneir a.pproa.ohee to :rel!!.li ty (their considerations o.t' two 
different aspects in existing things) two different explan• 
a.tions are del'!IMded, and the distinction between tb.e two 
eaaentially diverse obJ E!Ots to be gras,Ped in rea..U ·t;y xnu.st 
be understood by the psycllologist and the philosopher. H:La 
A :!2li~egt.l.q .21'. Mu:ra.le: '!'gwa:rd Jtlle l..<?J"*~ .ef J?oJ,t ti.Jl!l: 
.Ji:W,loep~hy displayed in l94l the functioning oi:' hb did.ec .. 
Uo in understanding m.oral d:i.Scusf.lione and problems. Al'l 
a.lllaec:Late editor of tile !l,rea.t Jl.Qok!! U tilE~ 'fle§}ers worJ,!., 
and editor of the two volume li\Ynl012"lii!UW.t Tile (!:re§!.t liteS.!!! 
.2! the weeuz.:n llldd, published in 1945, he made extendve 
use o:f' dilltleot:Lc to sort out the great ideas l!.l.lnong the 
great books a.nd also to pree;er.lt an analyiiilh of vru:ioua 
ide~M!i tre&tlild in et!i.oh. o:f' the gre&t ideas. In 1958 thre\'il of 
hie worklil were :published: with Louis Kel$o dialectic w&s 
applied to eoonoJJaia-poli tieal theory :!.n the wol'k 1 Ih! 
Oapi~elhi Ijl.!'l;j,f'estcn with Milton Mayer dialectic was 
-X, 
applied to, Eiduoa.Uon t;hecu:hs 11'1, 1),\evoliutJ,_qn in l!td:u.o.a.tion; 
a.nd as ed.i tol' with a team at tile Ins.ti tute of J?hilosopniea.l 
Research hit! two .. volumed wol'k, .nut .tW ·.sA: l!l1~, wtMil 
:J?UbUehed. V(')lume I ·.vtMil subtitled A ;Q:I.alegj;Wl, EXMlina-
!i..2.!l At !he ~Utl.Qn! . 21 Freedom. Volume II was sub .. 
titled A Jt~fllloitA!Il<b 1£ili~Url 9.!, !!a! Ooq~,rox~t!;i!s ,About 
theme of dia.:l..eotio in Adler's writing re:t'lee,ts _it.s importance 
in Ilia ttl:l.nking a.nd phiblllophy0 a.n..d. af:f'Qrded insignt into 
hie theory ¢1' ~eth¢d for an inquiry into :tr.eedom. 
J'lrand 3lMshard35, protesaor of ph:Uo.sophy &t Yale• 
after lla.'vins made the observation that on ·the .iseue of 
determiniEHn versus freedom, one would t!aink everytnin~ that 
could be said had been sa.id already. He wondered U a new 
work on _the eubJ ~tot. wa.s justi:f'hd,. l'Hlali:i\:l.ng tlul.t l!t! t,de§ 
!.( Efeesoll! wal'l! 689 ~g_es and only the nrat volume in a 
two nl.ume t;;1Hldy • hfll still considlllred tlle undertaking JIJ_st:l. .. 
t':l.ed; 111.nd ntledtd at the present stage or the eontroveny. 
This h Jt\st the aort of book needed at the .!{rennt 
et~t!l of the ancient oonh'oversy. 1:t doea not ti~.dd a 
new theory to . tJae many already in the . fields i te l!tim is 
to ohart tlla.t tiela, to distinftu:leh the iasues into 
which the ;pro'blem _1ll8;Y be broken up and1 for e~teh ot' 
tb.esill, to sl/i.y what the diapu·ta.nta have in common a.nd 
wb.ue preci.aely tltey differ., The book itself takell!l no 
position on any of these issues. It meri!ily eXJll!it.ine, 
---------------
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comp<tres. ana.lfzu, cla.asifhe, • .He threads his way 
through a 111a:ae o:f' heads and subheads wi tn a.dmirable 
patience, thorouikii1Us and l1.1eidity, Indttt>dt it is 
only fair to say tbat if ems we.ntfll a $11!1Hl:/.'4l.l. olari:Uoa. .. 
tion of the prob.l.el'll of freedom• tll§it> is nottling in 
English to compare wi til this book,' 
Profasl>~:>t• !3l.a.nlllha.rd til.en ;proceeded to <'~:JQll.ad.n ·tha.t 
Adler' e !llli.in tlleldlil wa11.1 th.a.tr Philolllophe:rs .hiiiov-e ml'i$11.t by 
freedom three funlilf1intirrtally Q,..iff'l!irEmt tili:ll/:iW • l!'or :Profnaor 
BlalUi'lhard. the three :really are dif:!:'e:rent and the difference 
il\lc flll.irlY e.wy to IUil!lt~ Someti~t>es fl:'tactd.\im was Ul!>llld to rnean 
.. an innlllr freedom beyond the reach of uutward Gireumata.nees 
(the treetlolll of self .. pe:r:rection) • .At other timee it has 
meant ~ fx•eodo~~< tb.&t depended on the13e dl'cumat1113loes (the 
froedoal Clf' eelt-rcealhation.) ,. And it . .!.las allilo mel\U'I.t a.n 
unoQnlltrained power of t.he ulf to ol<ooee a. oourse of its 
own (freedom ot l!ll'llf .. determ:l.n!il.tion). :l?rofeuor :al.~nllllil.rd 
then pr<>lilen tH!Id several l'lXamplee to ind.iea.te II ollie o.f tile 
autnors whn !'tad lliX:i!1'CHHHHl the pa.rUeu.la:r;• mea.ning"' of' free .. 
dom. 
'Bla.nlllh!U'd ended !'lie revililw Vii th a ger1eral M~M~ent 
Q.n .the impartia.lity Whioh !il0rt.imer Adl111r d.i~i~play$d :l.n 
prct!IH .. nting .the various fill)eeiea an.d auosp@oi<U; of tlle dif .. 
rennt th<~~orieil on freedom. and ., t~>~.tad two minor eoiupla.in te. 
I1!11 doubt.ed tba.t the l\lpaee ~i ven to medieval ,wllilc~>.ophillre 
wa.a quite .juatit'ied by their interest or vte:l.ght and a.lao 
l 
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little or nothin~J mentic;med about W4 D. Hos~>, J. Mo 
l\l!o'.t'a!,u~art, A. u~ Dotze, Jamu Martineau• and canning 
Schiller would be remedied in the next 1/('l;ume ot· the wo:r~, 3'~ 
Leonard :Krieger• 1; &:rtiele3S offered m. rtnriew o:t' 
tl:trEHt books o.n frud~;~m, He eimult!meottlllly conai\lered 
Mo:l.'t:l.llle:t' Adbr• e di&leotieal app:roaall, Ch.:ritl ti!>..n HliW' a 
ps;rohologieal, 1\l,!ld Theodore s. l!lillllnlcr&w1 e h.i!:lto:rioal Bit,J? .. 
p:rGaoh. 39 Witl:un~t dhto:rting hil!l idlllalil~~c the :remarklil whieh 
a.:p,Ply to A<U.e:r• Ill st1;4dy will be presented. ;r.eonill.rd Krieger, 
dUcWilnin!l Adler's tb.eoreti¢al analysb, termed it pioneer-
ins and sylll.po;~be~:l.o 1 in tl:1e nensa that the work broadened 
the .ll.tlilti of villtion ollm.raoterillltio of tbe discipline into 
an un#JreetHil.ertted :rnee.ling a.pproaoh to the ~ol>lll)ll! of' free .. 
dQ.IIl and Ol'gani~e~Hi t.lU~ several. fidda oi' treedo11:1 under this 
enl.!\U'a;ed vhw. ne e:;cpl<i>ined tbe work in these ter1111h 
'l'llue ~he t4l!a.m o:f' pllilouopherB who wo1·kllld under 
Mort:l.mlftr Ad1!1lr to pro<S,uoe .lb.! ~ .$l:! Jll:e!}do!§ take 
.liihili'Hi!opb.ioal nothnlll of freedom. as their material,• 
but aubjeet them to adi:t>ittedly, "nonphiloeoplaioal" 
and 11 comprelU!rtt~i ve" approach, which li.lschews the 
----------------
37~,, P• 37~ 
:sa.r,eon!U'd Kl'ie~Jer, "Freedonl: Theory and Practice," 
~ ~Yil!IW~ 48t292, December 1958. 
. 39M!'>rtimer J.d.ler, -. ~ .f!! Jj'tUd!M!liJ Ohr.hUa.n Bay, 
l.b!. ~tlUQ~ •.!.! Jil:t.UiAAm; and Theodore Ha!'lllllerowt b!U2.m• 
~~ ,&lVolyti.!f\ Ji§Sationf Eeonot!lilllil jj!::ttd ~!oli ttce .!! 
Ge:rr~ l&)Ji .. .J.a • 
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tro.di tional philosopllioal search for val.idi ty in favor 
of a. "nonpar .. t:i.~.um n reaons truction of ·the .historic and 
contemporary theoriee_ of freedom into a few fundamental 
attitudes toward 1&.40 
Krieger ft~rtner found the work to be thor'?ughly 
honest because it embodied the aoholal:'ly qualities of Jll'S• 
cision and self-oonaoiouaneEHl• and at the sa.;ne time bold 
and imagin~J.tiVe beoa.use ita a.uthor as an intellectual as 
well as a scholar did not lose sight of the rueaning of his 
f'indin,c~s for the total shape of freedom. He ex1Jressed 
these opinions acknowledging tlw.t Adler•c work exl)licitly 
confined itself to abstr<)l,oting the ideas of' freedom from 
representative theories of 1'reedom while avoiding any 
inquiry into either the historical connections ~c1.nd tkle 
existent ia.l conditions outside these ti:leoriee or tile reb.-
tiona withthe other values within them. He further re-
emphasized tbe erudite characteristics of' the work: 
Indeed I cannot reca.ll ever having seen such a cle;tr 
self-revelation of the a.s1ounrptions and methods govern-
ing an analysis and such a. willingness to [Jay t;he price 
of' re:peti tion for the sake of co!llluunicabili ty. 41 
Lyman Bryson was also complimentary in his appraisal 
of the sophistication of' the dialectical method and the 
construction or various issues involved in ttle ancient and 
contemporary writings. 
4
°Krieger, .Q.:Q• cit., P• 292. 
41I"id. · 29"" ~·· p. ,,. 
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'fhE~ dilllileetical ruet.hed. !!.Ill. used buU.'(\1. ie no mr::re 
eompa.:riun of texts. '\Vi th aueteri ty or· p1u:poee lil.lld 
ri$orous e.;ppl:toat itmJ J\,dler .and. 11:1~ , C)Qmpanilllns. eree.ted 
the ea.tegoriiUl into .. whioh the elements in all tMi:r 
variety of phi.l..oll!o)?hical exa.mplee 1\lould be fitted ••• 
The rnt~t·ie a bra.cin~ outline of what ha.$ been be-
liend. . · . 
While I.,.Vnum Bryson adad,red the Uholaxahitl that went 
into the work Mli the e.rea.tin anw.lyl!lia whioh roote.d out 
tim tertlla and. e.lemen ts of di±'i'erenoe MIOng the great number 
of ai41tnU'iaant wri term on wt~at tbe;r ell.lJ. freedtHilt lu1 did 
not thj,nk that tlle dialeotioal method W'li\1!1 neut:r{:l.l in the 
eemu!l timt it did not imply Judsmenta ff!lr or a.gainst. the 
doetrinelil ana.l.ya~ed. 
Some re~dera, like ~eelf1 will find t:racee ot Platonic rea.Uem in the ~a.tegol'ielil &.l:l.d in the discueUon 
of defini tion:e. Th.ie. b. an ancient .~HI. powerful trad .. 
ition ~nd ~ be the most ueefu!3etandpoint fro~ wh.ion to wol'k, but it it! not neubal. 
:rn s:vUe !)f his &li!IH:ll'tion of the non-neutrdity of 
the liia.lectic111ol method• Iir!llan .Sr;raon indicated., 11 \Vhether 
or not my atatement ie true 1a~ee no dift'er11tl'HHil. in th.e 
value of tho an&.lyuis" and "1 t would. not dil~aini~Jb. the ao:Ud 
str1Ui!ture of tn.e. diliu)v.ssion .• n4.4 
narvey Swadoa ~e not e.atisfied with tlae aeope of 
Adl.>tr' s l!r~;>:rk and might have been 111a.til>fhd with a. less 
-· . _ __... __ _ 
4.>l~n Bryson, "Wkla.t Men Will Die Fo:r •" sa.t!l:rd§.'t 
B!'fl!m. 41;lS, Septe1Ub1!!1" ()# lll58, 
4:5.t~ .. 
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monoy goine; into t:i'l.e $tt:tdy when he fb:Lt that it oould b.avlil 
been· cont~ibuted tG p11oplll f'igb.t.ing f'or t'reedo.l'lJ., 
· Ha.n ·it been urutl.erta;.kllln by one determined man; tnb ·· 
ef'i'ort to uta.bUs.b. points of concordance betwll)en Joh..'l 
Dewey nnd Duns Sootua, :S€l:rtrand. :auuell a.nd ]).quina.s, 
might be tM;aa:ht to be u a.cc~;~mpli!i!hment both enter~ 
tfdnin.g 1;1;nd in !'lome degree mfltdtodoua; 'but tt~!\l:re ca.n 
be thtHie• C$11 there not, w'no are given pauiH11 b~· the 
very ma&a i YeneneJ of' the te!Wl'a orash pro~~:.:ragl du~ing 
the snen-ye~ period wlMiln othe:rr pbilollloph,ers in other 
lands .... enin~t Spa;in, I~un~J&.r'y 1 P.olana, Ihtsai~~; .arnong 
otl!wJt.'$ .. •W<ill'e not cml.y lea.:tnin~; 'but demonstrating in 
their Plil:t'IU.l~Ul what .frelll!iom and itt~ ll!:nsenee could mean. 
A fraet.ion of the rfJlsourets se•utl.ngly Jlloured wi tllout 
stint ::tnto the aettvities .d the Itust.itute of I'l:liloeo .. 
J?hioal :Reaea:t'!h lllil,illht na.ve dotUl mon to sudain tno~:Hil45 dillitm.n.t libe7fta.r1anll in. tne:l.r tl~Ol"EE pr~ga;a,tic !lltud:l.es. 
E., M. Obole:rt a Utrrs.rian a.it Id!'OltCI Stiil.te O"llege in 
Pae&telh; wilih offering the sb.ortellt :review ( 140 words) 
ef thost.l mentioned he:re, a;lt~0 ~:txpr\llssed the JIU)I!t dlilrogatory 
and unintelligent cri tieittlll.o Pie wrote thh about .Adler• s 
work .•. 
• • • thil p:ro:f'(ll!lll!led object wa!ll ;;, nonllie tori!lal 1 
ml:npniloiHl])hi.oal, nonPl!l.rtb.m• eom.p:re.b.ans he, "inter~ 
;pretative aMMl cont'itructive" work on ~*the ~re~Hllcnts 
a.b<ltrt freedo~ tlua.t exbt a.roong tllose wllo dJ.sagree on 
that llluhjel1.1to 11 'O'nfolt'tU!ltl!.t~tlyl the re$1llt is a ilioholar .. 
ly ;nons trod ty, overilaposed w th its own methifH1oloQ, 
and likely to be :pE~l'll!Mently V&,i;gll.bl!ll only a.s a. wide-
l"t'l.tlS ing b i bl:Logra.plli,oal aouro•• 
4l:>nw:-vey Swl.t.dos. "'fhirudng J:aonine. '' f.!Mism, 187:362• 
Novelll.ber 15, 1958• 
46 E. II!, Oboler1 X!i brAa .i!J:!.rutlU\:&, 8$: 2294• ~la:ptember 
l. 1958. 
.... 
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Implications tor 14»9!litn 
The diversity of opinion wldqh evidenced in ·the . 
presentation ot' the comruentu.tors t views on t11e conception 
ot method for an inquiry into freedom is also present 
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in their views on its implica.tiGn for education. The more 
impreseed they wer• with the method, ttua 11.1ore emphll!.tio they 
would be about its illlPlica.tions for educatitH'h 
:Brand ijlanl\!hard W4l.l> am~.re th~~tt men h&.d been diaeuils• 
ing freedom for twent;v-fiw h\U'ldred years. As a scholar lle 
was acquainted with the !1W1Y pl:lil()li!ophioal tluloriee in the 
literature and he welcomed a work that attempted to dis~ 
tinguiah the issues to which the writers ~~d addressed 
themselns &l:l.d ·to point out wlmt they had in oollll!lon and 
where they differtu1.. The intellectual cbri ty and neutrau .. 
ty or imllQrti&li ty with wh:l.ch the various epeeiee and s.ub-
epeoies of the different theories wert preslimted were 
helpful. Ewn with fJ:l.e resl'n·vatiGn he had exprensed eon• 
eel.'ning the inclusion ot too much matuial on lJUidioval 
Illlilollolmerf! and tbe omblllione of >:I!Qterial on neveral other 
writns. he eUll affirmed. that for a. gene:li'al. clarifioation 
of' the problema of freedom, there was nothing in Englillh 
resembling tlie book. 
Leonard Krieger praieed the new &.speet of tbe 111tucy; 
the pioneering Mil synthetic qualities whi<l.h wen ma.ni:f'est 
i.n tlie non-phUosop!lieal Md. comprehensive appro&ch to the 
problem, He col!llllend.ed the ach.ola.rl.y qu~li the of p:r.eeision 
1 
and self-consciousness and was specifically appreciative of 
.Adler; s. olari ty and explici tnesa about the (~ssumptions 
and met.tloda wl'ti ell guided the analysis, a.s well as the 
repetition of points for the sake of oommunioabili ty. 
;cy;nan Bryson thought that the usefulness of Adler's 
work extended to professional tb.inkers as well as to t!'le 
thoughtful citizen. Not only was the dialectical examina-
tion of the conceptions of freedom useful, but the task 
should. have been done long ago on every ma.j or topic of 
moral and political philosophy. 
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l'he immen.ee usefulness of this a tu<ly to professional 
thinkers is obvious. ·Adler ill justified in saying that 
this is a kind of work whieh should !lave been done long 
ago on every major topic of moral and. political philoso· 
phy. Ita usefulness to the thoughtful citizen depends 
partly on his appetite for hard worl<, partly on hie 
pleasure in lucid and awesom.ely exhiit.uati ve analysis, 
and partly in how much he feels responsible for know!~g 
what he is talking aoout-~and possibly fighting for. 
H1;1rvey Swados found lHtle merit in the work. ~rhe 
at"teru:pt to ·ea.ke stock of what most of the significant writers 
in the woot 1s heritage wrote about freedom could obt;dn ilis 
approval. A simple concordance on the idea.e of several 
philosophers might have suff'iced. Tho Jlloney saved could 
have gone to help those fighting for t"reedoill. 
·ro E. ifi. Oboler, the schol&rly 1uona tros i ty was likely 
to be of permanent value only as ""' wide-ranging biblio-
47 .. Bryson, .QJ!• cit., Do 18. 
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This chapter presents the thinkitlg of .Tohn :oewey 
lil.bout the coneeption of the metl:l.od he advoeated for inquir,. 
i,es into f:reedom. Piret• the genero.l 1>ou:roee of informa~otion 
a.re presented, along with the :reasons :f'o:r their po.rtioul&J:' 
meleo·Uon. Second, information is studied to identity the 
method used by Dewey in develoP!~ his ideas on freedom. 
Third, Dewey• s t¥1eor;v of freedom is presented. La.stly • tll.e 
implications of his ideas for education are preuntett. 
:Because Dewey enJoyed a lengthy oareer ae a philo .. 
sopher and published prodigiously, the investigator was 
faced with the tuk ef uleot1ng information that wo1.ild 
a~equ&tely reflect ideas about hi!! ooncepti0n of uaethod for 
~ inquiry about freedom. To tre.ee an l'ivolui:J.on of hh 
thoughts on f:t'lUJdamt tl:u>ugh a valuable experience, would not 
han been essential. for thbl study. lt seemed 111ore aui tai>le !!iii 
to present hh thoU~hts in tile tom and expression which he 
most ~H>naiJ.Jtently a.tfirmi:ld• :Beoauu of thiat the obsest 
attention was directed toward hie mature works. 
Thb auumption see111ed valid• since Dewey himr;;elf 
had testi:t'ied to the grli!>dttal but radiCal change in his views 
Willili~Jll lien:ey Werlcmdl!lter. collll11enttng on the Sli~Jlle point, 
obae:rved. that during the Firat World war- and its aftermath: 
• • .hta philot~.l\lphicui\1 pod ttl. on underwEmt t'u.rtller 
transtorma.Uon and clar:l,ftoa.Uon. .A turnin&~ poi.nt was 
thue reached in 1925 when, in Ji!¥1l!U':hfUIS !D.£1 AAtyrt• 
it beca111e evident tha.t, for Dewey, prob1ellll\l (}f con• 
temporM-Y realiam reoeded into the ba.okiJrol.md while 
&.t t.b.lll l!!a.llll!l time the pllU"se>phiea of' Plato a.nd 
Artatotle receiVed critical lli.Hention.. Delniy th.en 
heolll.llle convinced that "in the l!llC!llents. ot' <lreek thought 
ca.1•r:!.ed a.l1.mg :ln the modern mind are to be found the 
generating causes both to the probltll'ltll that have e.logged 
&md stultifiltd modern pl:lilot~~ophic intelligence, and of 
solution& :wn1Qh have wepeatedly been proposEui,. often in 
&beet intellectual del\lpe:ratbn.,. li'ollowing this turn 
in his thinking• Dewey wrote tl•e llllll:ries of ma.Jo:r wo:rk0 
ill· philolllotlhY which, togethe:r, ell.lbody his ma.ture 
tb.inking aond which must be baste ~~ MY adequate evaJ.u .. 
ation ot' his position as a whole. 
C.oneequGntly, it is m>t in spite of the profound 
clr.u:mges that Dewey' a thinking had undergone, but rather 
ueoa.use of th~tm that it is neceesa.:rt to di.:re<Jt the study 
to the ma'la~;re express :lone· of h:l.ill tb.ollli£htl1l on freedom from 
h:hl tnllltrwuenta.Ust pertoli. Dewey's dauihte:t' sel.®oted the 
tntrol'luotory essay which he wrote to a monogru.m o! ·tne 
_philosopb,y dep<~.r~nt 1 ott the occasion of the Decel'lnia.l of 
the fomuUq of l'Jhic~o University, 1/U; the c~mtribution 
---------48George Plim~ton AdQme and William Pepperell Mont~uc. 
eds._ QRntempgr§U JW,ettcap ~hilos~umt; f[fMI.M\:J. fltat;~ments 
(New Yorlu The Ma.cm:I.Uan co., 1930) u. 2 • 
49
wUl:l.liiJA H. l'll!lrkau~tater, /;. Ui!l!tqu At ~qaopnis~ 
tdeal !! 4meri!! (New Yorkt The Ronald Press. 1949), p. 14. 
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which mal'ks hie ":f'i.nal and compl(:lte break with his early 
Hegelian idealism a.nd launches his instrumental theory of 
reflective th.ought." 50 But the change was not an abrupt one, 
for Dewey in a. letter to WilliatJt Ja~~~es in 1903 remarked 
that the roots of' his new theory go back about a dozen 
51 years. 
Morton G. White in his !llhdy of. the origin of' Dewey' e 
instrumentalism finds a crucial juncture fo·r Dewey's thought 
it1 the theory of' conflict. In 1.894, Psychological ,a,eview 
carried an article in which Dewey wrote: 
To me it appears as sure a psychological as biologiM 
cal principle tha.t men go on thinking onl.y because of 
pra.otical friction or strain somewhere, 5~uat thinking is essentially the solution of' tension. "' 
The funda.IHmta.l insight gained through the notion is 
the point. in the o:pinion of \Vhite, at which Dewey breaks 
with previous philosophers and veers ot'f into his own theory 
or logic. The role he assigned to tile problematic situation 
was to constit1!te the central motif of his logical writings. 
The work of the next forty years does not t'ind a substantial 
modification of his instrumentalist theory. Rather his 
-----------------
··. 
50 Paul Schil:pp { ed.), '.!'he Phpgso,Ql!Jl: .11.£ ~ Dewey, . ,,. 
Vol •.. I .oJ.' l'ij.e Jtibra:rx .QI.f J.iving J?hiJ,o!l,..OJ?hersf Me. nasha., 
Wisconsin: George Banta. Publishing Oo,, l939J, ~. 33, 
51Morton G. White, The Origin si Dewex's Instrumental. 
ism (Ne'ir Yox·k: Columbia. University Press, 1943) • p. 99. 
59• 
"John Dewey 1 "Social Psychology," PsychQlogica.J. R!.!.!!!!t 1:401, 1894. 
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theory concerned itself with developing what was latent in 
hh und.erstandin!if of his orisinal notion of cont:Uct or 
tem;ion, which cllara.oterillles hlllllan behavior in lit. problematic 
d tuation, hom Hesel' s concept ot' confliet, and Darwin• s, 
plliloaophy ar:d. vee ll.t Dewey• lh 53 
Yet once it was fixed, John Dewey's theory of 
instrumentalism controlled &nd govnned bill ,Philosopb.io!ll 
outlook. 'l'he evidence of the attention which hl!l eone:l.stently 
and continuously devoted to hia lo~ical tl:utory bear thia 
out. This is also made clear from the pul:!lilllhing history 
of 111ome of his most important ell.l'ly w:ri tinge. Ire does not 
sum .to have gone beyond the :J.nstru.mentelirst stage, for 
many of hie early articles were later reprinted without 
ob.ange in ooll.ectione of esea.ys for wb.ioh llewey wrote the 
preface. S111vera.l t1 tln &rruged ohrono.logioa.lly subs tM• 
tiate this idea. Two articles on Rena.n written in 1892 
show up in Qhvagtere Mil ~v~n:lfs publ.iahed in 1929. ~ 
;eedgggg!g CreeS. (3.897) wa.e reprinted !leveral time~a~ once 
as recently ~ttl 1939 by the National Eduoatian A.l!laooiation. 
Hh ~tlliea.i, ft!nSlUl!!l'l lJQdei![lx;!n~ Jii4ueiH91 ( l697) provided 
the framework for iifsu:al I'l'1,nc1,ile~ 1a EfuMl&ljiQQ ( 1909). 
Hie Jl!UlQ!lS.~C\~2Jl. .11! Ph!losglll!;IY. ( 1920) Vtt.l.lil brOU!ll:ht out in 
an enlll!.;rged. edition with a new introduction in lw4a. 
"""' 
·.II> · OONCEJ?TION OF Wi:THOD 
l!illlPi.ft!i!ll ;\{!~~!\; The,ou; of PhUo§OAAiaal..lru:l,l.\il'.J1: 
To gain an insight into the oonce:p1;ion of method 
Dewey advocated t:or a.n;v inq~iry into freedom wM.ch would. 
' ' 
be faithful to Dewey's thinking ol'l the nbjeot; it was 
conl!!idered nuese&ey' to ap:r;:re.a.oh tt trom the OQl'l'!Hit:ltt of 
hie philoaophy. Aocordingl.y• a.n m~alysbl of the salient 
' . 
ideas of his Jll'lilolllophica.l doctrines h.! und.ertaken to shed 
light ol'l hia conae:vtion ot• method fo:r an inquiry into f':ree .. 
d.om. 
'l'he reason tor app:ro.aohins; the probl!llm from tlll<.t 
;point of view res te on the a.uumption that pllil<HHlJil:tlu:•a' 
oonoeptualiaa.t:!ons take sb.a.pe from their Ol.mtr(J.l tntu1t1ono •. 
J\lSt as an understarlding of Themism wh.iOn t&ke111 cognizance 
of the prilllllt.Cy of exil'!tenoe and of the intuition of ex:ls• 
tential billing o!Jlll com• to grips with the pb.Uosop.by of 
<txistenoe and existentie.lism of at. Thontam of Aquinaa, 
while an un<Lerstani:Ung which e:rn:oneoudy conoeh'ee of his 
pb.Uoaoplly of bebl& as a philoeol;lll.y of euenoee or a 
d.iall!loth of essences QOI!lpl.etely distuts . hill t&aohing• u 
an at te<npt is t.l'l!ll.de to ,peru'lt:rate to a vital undet-s tandin~& ()f 
Dewe;y•s philoiHJ>:Plly. While on,e 111&?/ l:le willing to concede 
that the philosophicl!l.l writings of St. Thomas e,:re lllore 
underatlll.nda.ble and intelli~ible when his central intuition 
of existential bein13 :!.s gra.~;~ped• one lll!V wonder wherther 1 t 
I 
I j 
18 not l!lt:retch.tng th\11 :po:lrr& ,to !llUll: e-:11 anal~oua po:iJit llf 
view in John Dew~yt a w~ritinge., Joli>6Pl1 IH•tne:r l:l$eill$ to have 
o:t'!ered. an inm1~ht intt~~ DeWflJI''Ill phil.oeo:Ph1 when, coneurrillil 
vlith mu~h M id€1!a, he wrote: 
Grant thlt\t Dewey• e ~mal.yeia of stU.enilit'ic expert;.; 
mente.tion is :tn !tu principal oontent:tone .sound ~nd 
valid a.nd you will have to grant pretty'muoh everything 
else fundruu.ettta.l in hie philosophy is $otmd a.nd val:l.d.M 
Expe:t-i~ttce• for Dewey, constituted the l'!ub.ject .. llflatiau.• 
of phUoso.pby• Experience i.e bo.th of and in n!'l.tu;re. He 
telle us w·e l/l:~tperbnee n~•:tul'lh "Tl::lin&tt~ interMU!li in 
certain wa.ya ,m;:!. eltperienc~:; tt1ey are what is e;!tperienced. ... 55 
Philosophy be!iiriS in &nd. with ezperhnoe., :Y'or l:l.im. e~per ... 
ienoe is the ati!!.I'tins point of .Philosopb;y. His initial 
d.:!.stinotion is lilefrwesn grol'ls or i:Whii'U,'Y expe:denoe and re .. 
fined. or reflected e:~tperience. "The dist:l.netion h one 
between wbe.t ia l!lxperience>i as the result of e. lllillim!.UI or 
incidental re:t'leet:i.on a.nd w~t h experienced in consequence 
of' continu~ui ud reguJ..ated n:f'lecti ve inquiry." 06 In lll'll"ery .. 
day life the obJects of pr:t111a.ry experience a:re met. Oonceptt~t 
thous;hts. wishes, d.ree.raa• :I.Uusiona• t:ill eonstitute the 
subJect .. atter of primary exper:l.euce,. ?hey :rtu!ul.t from the 
"'== 
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aU:bje.et•m.&.tter of primary experit;ince does not tu•ise within 
, the ~Ullltm organililua Ul\leU. · · The objects of seeorul.ary 111.nd 
refi.ned l!l:ltperienoe are those. ,which come about t'l':ota primary 
exper:l.enoe bec~uae of tbe intervention of syatemll.tie think· 
in~" These J.attu l~re proper to the tlulllli!.n drga.ninm, 
fly using the data. of primary experience the .hu.ma.n 
organhm constructs the uootuiary objeeta. The ideas, 
belie:t"l1, theox-hst or h;Y'pothetu!a of the aeoondary objEH'.rts 
whiCh. resulted trow reflection upon the prifll4l'Y axplllrience 
are teeted or verifhd by a. return h the. things of crude 
experience. By means or the objects of refleotion primary 
sxperienoe i& Ubdetl\1 t<!)od better • Prifll4ey experiences are 
no longer isolated detaUa but tHe o~:~ .!lieaning frou1 being 
related withil:l a whole ayll1Hillli of rlillateli obj eH.tts. The 
oo.nt1nuwn or ex,periet~oe ts uaainta.ined, fpr now the thinge 
of prinm.n experience a.re "rendered continuous with the 
rest of' nature and tul\l on an import of th(l things they are 
67 
now seen to be continuous with•" In DeweY's notion of the 
cont:U:mum, ,Pl,"im.ae~y h ,iVen to its anity, . J.U.a notion of 
oontinUU~a implies the primacy of unity ~~Jv-n bf.ling. Reality 
:I.e one. It 1lil a <lontirru.um in \Vb.ieh th.ert~ is no real din .. 
Unction between things in nature. This intJ~tgrated. unity 
57,.,4 ...... " ·~ ~·· .t~• v. 
J 
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is with. this principle tha.t he sidewteps the aotua.l amount 
of .real differences th•re lll:ra between things, ili·.g.;, the 
<iiffe:tence bet~en .subject and object, mind and Jl'latter. 58 
While the eubjeot l!llil.tter of pltilosophy can be found in 
experience eo eM a Jll.ethod of phiJ.oaoplli:dng. · He tells um: 
Experience presents itsel:f as ti'le l!lllthod, and the 
onl$' method, for .. getting. at natur111, Qen«trating its 
seorillts. and. wherein nature eQirioaJ.ly dililclGselil (by 
the use of emp1ricll.l lltethod in natural scilllnce) daepent>t 
enrichuand directs the ru:rther dne1op!llant or exper-
hmce. · . 
EXplllrhnliU'~• tor DeW>~~y, is firet of e.ll a ruethod 
wili~ ie syno:ny!lloUI!l w;!.t~1 the !llllltbod of ~£eienes.. 'l.'hill ia 
the !ll(l tcheH:i he wililhea to tntrod.uce to ph.iJ.oi.lopny.. The 
etll!Jliriea.l !lletb.od determines the nature of his pltiloaopcy. 
What empirica.l !llettlod exa.ete of pllilosC:r.Pl1Y h two 
ttlilllf:illt First• that refined. methods and :products be 
tr&<Uid 'back to theb• Ql'igin in primt'l;ry exper!enae, 
needa and J?l'oblellls out of w:!lich. tneya;ril!itJ and which 
t~1111y fJa.tisty be ucknowhd(iJed. Secondly, ·that the 
secondary !llethods and conelus1o:ns IJG broue;ht back to 
tho things of ordinary experience G8 aU their coa.rst~• 
ness and erudity for verification. 
Charles w. Morris offered a s1lllll!lllrbed insight into 
the two different meanings of Dewey1 a ideas of experience 
a.s subjeot-sw.tter 111nd expuience e..s method. 
5ihh1tt ~·· 
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it do•Hl nO't seem ur!:fair to ;D@wl!!y 1 !! thought to, a tate 
tll.lli ·fitter in tnU way: Ex:perien<Hl aa aubject~mutte:r 
alw~ttys :l.ndh&te& M appea.:dna character within ar1 event 
field o:rgaonhed around and partly coneti tuted by an 
orga.niam, tll.lt a.ppea.ring Cloil.lpol'len ts of tilie field being 
"there'' to'/.' the organic o1uater of tm.e field although 
not rul!eeui:l.rUy known to be therer experience a.a method 
:requ:l.ree. that knc.nvledge be6Ioncerned with Wld res pillet~ ful to that wnienappear~;. 
'l'o verify the theory of the cMt:i.nuity Q:f' expon>ience 
Dewey invokes &n ev·idene& the theory of evolution preunted 
bY the ;peysioal l!hlhnee of biology. Thil.l biological tMQry 
b.e.e philouptliclil.l significance. The th.eo:uy atreesee tll.e 
oontinu:l. ty of the more complex cn·ga.nil.lm m~U~. from l!!impler 
Mil less complicated orea.nisms and ultim111tdy f:raJn lil!ll.tter. 
Tl"~e interaction between organhm and environment, indeed 
the evolu.Uonary process developing within and because of 
the envir<>nmEmt, bear out Dewey1 s contention that the logi-
cal or philosophic enterprise ab.ould he 1.;umtinum.w with tho 
experience out of which it ha.d originated.. 
It is aetonil.lhing th!$t. in the faoe of the a<h&.nolil 
of the evolutionary method in na.tul'&l science, iiul.y 
logiCian can per~:~ht in the &eaertion of' a rigid. differ .. 
ence betvnltin the );).roblem of origin &nd nl!l.turel between 
genes:h and anlll.lysil'!; tlliltWI!lert hietort and v111.lidit;r. 
Such asaertion simply . reiterates am final a di~ltinetion 
which grew ttp in pre-evolutionary science. It auerts 
&.gainst the most J~~arked adV'&nee whiel'l lHilhnt.ifio meth<>d 
has yl!lt made a survival of a cruds period. of logical 
aoientit'ie prooedure. We have no choice save either 
to ooneei ve of thinking 111,a a response 'lio a specific 
lltiJllUlus. or else to regard it ae somethin' "in itself," 
having Just in and of itself certain traits, elements 
61cnarles w. U.or:riaf f'>i;z& 'gl],eoriee 9114~nd. (Chicago: 
'l'he Uni verlli ty J?reu, 1939), Po 292. 
. ~nd laws. !~ we give up the last view, we must take 
the former. 
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The force ot' D.ewey• s argument is directed at preserv-
ing the integrity that exists in experience ttself. 
Erolutiona.ry tl'leoryha.s accounted for the integrated inter-
action of organism (!l.nd environment. It does not iJOsit a 
ga.:p but an interplay of different types of forces in ac-
counting for the equilibriUIII of organic energies on the 
organic side and the presence of satisfying conditions in 
the environment on the environtllenta.l side. Wllat is so on 
the organic and environmental level is so on the level of 
experience, On the level. of experience, self and object, 
organism and environment are "functionallY united. 1163 A.l'l 
investigation and an understanding of experience which 
makes use of the products of reflection--distinctions 
( subjeot and oi.lj eot, knower and known)- .. muat realize that 
these originate in experience l;l.nd must be reintesrated with 
experience because in nature the organism and environment 
are one. The function ot" knowledge and the knowinga of 
knowledge are understandable only in their inUrrelatione 
with one another in the whole organic process of interaction 
02Jotm Dewey, S,:t,udies .. in Lo!?iic§!,l ::£heo:r;;v: (Chicago; 
The Univerdty of Chicago Press, 1903), .PP• 14-1~5. 
63;rohn :Dewey, •IE:x:pe.ri.ence, Knowledge <~.nd Value," 
The Philoeo~h~ .4!. John Dewey (Vol. I, of T~e Mibrary 4! 
Living Philgso·el!ers, ed., Paul A. Schilpp: Menasha, Wis-
consin, George :Banta Publishin,.~ Co., 1939), p. 584, fn. 51. 
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b~tween organism and environment. 
Dewey's re!iQnce upon evolutionary theory to buttress 
his postulate of the integral continuity of expe.rierlM hae 
a significant O()nneotion with the whole atruoture of Ilia 
,ph.ilosephy • It influences his theory of' l<no~;!ed.ge and 
deter1nine$ the epis tetaolo&v .he preeents. 
Let us tu:t"n from thia conception of the mea.1nu·e of 
true knowledge and the nature of tru~t philosophy to the 
existing practice of kMwin(ih !!owda.ye if a tll!iln 0 say a 
ph.jreiciet or oh.emist, wants to lmow sometning• the la,<.~t 
thing he does is merely to conteiJlplate. Ue does not 
look in howeve~ earnest and prolonged way upon the 
object expeotin~ that tt1ereby he will detect its fixed 
and characteristic form. He dou. not expect any amoul'lt 
ot aloof sorutil'l.Y to reveal to him anY' seorets. He 
p:rooeede to do somethillih to bring some energy to bear 
upon the substance to see how it :reacts; he pl.acn it . 
under unusual conditione in order t? induce I!IOJne ohange.o4 
AnW'!ling that Dewey understood what the· epietemologi-
ca.l theodes of past philo&ophers JUEll.!.nt, we realhe that he 
ela.imed these thelu:ies to be invalid because th.ey did not 
pro.oeed in their investigations the way DewliJy understood the 
oile!llU t or peyl!ietst proceeded, and the WfM! hlil ola.illlf;jd the 
philosophers should l:u"ve proceeded,. 
For Dewey, knowledge a.rieee in inquiry. "That which 
ntisfaetorily terminatee inquiry, is by de:l'ini tion 
I 
1 
J 
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knowledge."tJ!> ' :For him the es!l!lilntial difference between pru .. 
vious ph~lolilo:phica.l accounts ot knowledge a.nd hi.s account 
:rea til! on the ~filsumption that llilii con textual account of ll.:now .. 
ledge considered it as the outcome of inquiry while the 
others d.id. not. 
Theories of knowledge tlw.t conl\lti tute what is now 
called epistemology have ariuen beoa,u<;e kllowledge a.nd 
obtaining irl:tori!W.tf.on have not been conceived in terms 
of opera:Uon by whhht> in the ~:~ontinuum of expe:r:ilillmtal 
inquiry • establhhed beliefs are lll"ogreuively obtained 
and utiliJUtd. Becau1HI they are not eonetrueted. upon the 
grounds ot o;pera.t:tone and oo:aed nd. in te:rmt> of their 
a.otua.l :Prooeduree &nd eanl!!equeneu. they are neeeua.rily 
to:r"'ed in terms of preeonee,tJt:l.onl'! derived from various 
sources, uinly oo«Haolo(iiel.lJ. in aru:.hnt &nd mainly . , 
peyehGloghal (directly or· :l.m:Ureotly) in .tucHiern th.eory •06 
Cotnishnt with beth. the evolutionary and. empiri,oal 
oharaeter of his tllinldne:. he ba.sed. Ilia ·theory of logic on 
his theory of tlle soienti:fio atet1lod of inquiry. Tb.e defi• 
nition wllieh Dewey otfe:rell a~a the moat l:ligl:lly generalized 
oonoll!ption wtd,eh ean be Juat:l.fiably t'o:rmulated waa: 
Inquiry is the controlled ox• 1Urf.!cted. :t:ra.nafo:rlila.tion 
!l)f an ind.ete:rtdna,te ei tuation into one tl'lat b so 
determinate in its constituent distltlotions and :rela;.. 
tiona ali! to connect the element~7of ·the original situation into a unified wllale • 0 . 
It h&e been pointed out previously tha.t the point of 
departure tor Dewey'lli a.naJ.ylllil!l !\If reflectivt.'l<hinking is 
tH'lJob.n Dewey, l.!~a!s, the tnel!tY 9J: Ingui;r;y: (New Yorkt 
Henry Holt !'l.nd Com.pany t 19 38) , P• 8. 
66lll.U •• pp. 534 .. 5, 
67
.J:.ha •• p. loth 
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th!!i eon:f'lict o:r tenlilion whieh ahM>acteriaes hUI!Ian behavior 
in a probll\!lllatie situation. Tb.e crucial point in hie theory 
. is the e~ietential stattUI of the indeterminate situation 
which .:be eo:noei ve.e of' llllll dhturbed1 troubled, oanfusEHlt or 
obscure. Since knowing ill oonQerned IVitll doing, witll 
wa.to.hing reMtionet with U1e induction of onange• the resow 
lution of' the indeterminate situation will. result from the 
overt a.otiono Jll,lld ope:ra.tiona of the orga.nhu:u in the prooiiHiW 
o.f inquiry., 
It illl the s1tulliLtion tha.t has thei:H11 traits. te are 
d-oubtful beoa.ui'Hll the d tuation is inrte:rentl:t doubtful. 
Personal etatea of doubt thlltt ~:n eookad up by !l.nd are 
not rela.ted to sotne e:xdstent:l.al aituation tore pa.tllo~ 
logical; and wh.en they. are extre1ne they ooner&itute 1:.'.111 
me.nia Qf doubtitl$• Co.nnquently, ei &ui!!.tiona that are 
d.ieturbed and tro1~bled, Ol>nfuud ol:' obscure, cannot l)e 
etra.ightened out,. oleared up and put in ordiiltj~ by 
lllt\ni,pulation of: onr pmrsonel ah~~nrtdQ.,.:.""'-~~---
SinCII the notior:t .of :problemtic eitua.tion is at trtto 
llea.rt of ilia thto.ry, :1. t W!>Uld be helllt'ul to lilbta.hl. a more 
exa.<Jt underetand.ing of his conception o.f situation. Situ .. 
a.tion ie eynonymoue with objects and ev<Hlta in a. contextual 
wt~ole. A. dtua.tion doet.~ not dtHiialnate a e.ingle object or 
event or .even sets of events. 1/hell :Oewe;y 1 s notion ot 
experie!loe a~ subjeot-matter is reoalled, llie eonll!eption of 
H . . . . . . 
X: bid., PP•. 105·6• It .should M noted tlla.t J.n 
~ol(.J.eme .st.! m ,publiahecl in 1946 Dewey came to diatintuieh 
doubtful trom indeterminate. The significance of the later 
distinction l'E!eted on the .interposition of an inquirer. 
whereas· tlle above a.sfler&ione posited the doubt 1n the 
s:ttu.a.tion. 
1 
51 
matter indioates an appearing ohllf.ractei' within an event 
field organized around and ~rtly constituted by an organ~ 
islllt the appearing elemente of the field. being the1•e for the 
organ:l.c cente:r of the field, although not neoesearf1y kru>wn 
to be there. The over-all pervasive field furnished obeer~ 
vations of thh or that object or event determined by the 
ht.1.01&n orgli!.n:l.sm' a a.oti ve Maptive rea pons e to be .atacl.e in 
carrying forward a course of behavior. In disc:nu:uaing tile 
object or event Dewey observed: "Observation of the latter 
ia l'liM~J for the $Uiil ot' finding out what that ti!l!l. ill! with 
reference to some active adaptive respon~;e to be made in 
canying forward a course of beha.vhr • .,Gil The deter!llin~a.tion 
which ia being ~~~a.de about. the object or e'Vent is what it 
si&nifies concerning the way the enUre situation is to be 
dealt wi tn. 
When tlle initial pll.a$& of the recognition th.at a 
situation requires inquiry h01.s been re01.lizedt the ne:x:t 
phase in the inquiry process is the under&tanding of what 
the problem ill. Then the deter~ination of tlu1 prob.lem .. 
eoluthn beginm. 70 !dea.e, judgments• reaaonins. and obur .. 
va.tion are all bl'ough.t to bear upon the problem. Idea.s, 
judgme.nts, reaeoning, ~We t:tll e~ployed IMl tools ·to transform 
J 
'J'ua t ii4$ the behavioral ohru:'e.cter of th.e or~an:l.em 
ol)ntrcrls inquiry• so sensations are eltpl.ainod as signals 
f'o/1:' tile rea.d.justing of behavior., Sensatiem opera.tes as a 
piVot of readju!Jting beha.vior.,'11 sensations brini the 
organiilma into confrontation with the prt>blema.tilii situa• 
tion., 'l.'b.ey t'unction in a rtQrt .. cQgni tbte eapa.ctty. '!'he 
organ:tsm•e a.djturtillent is interrupted by the stimulus of 
rumtul.tion and it ll1fi:1 trigger a readjur,rt!llent ·to its environ-
ment., lt is bf llli.IMS of the stml3e organs tlul.t the organism 
comes into cont~~;ot with nature. In tile interaction betweon 
orga.niamliUld environment there is a participation and 
communication. 'l'llia :reruu;,per; tile 1\lnvironl!lel!lt and oondi tions 
the organism to make it more sui ta.ble · f'o:r futul:'e aetion. 
'i'he modi :t'ieatiol'l of' the orga.rltsm• which gi vee ~.>ome mo:re 
dei'in:tte d:h:ootton to the future action$ of the org&nism1 
h what :Dewey merun1 by habit. 
An idea in :Dewey•e ·tbeory of inquiry is a. augc~eation 
of' sometl'ling to be dane, Gf a poal!libUity of what might be. 
They are "antici;pated oonsequenoc;e {foreoaete) or what will 
lmPli/On when certain obnrvationf! arl!l executed under Md with 
reepeet to observed conditionl3,n 72 
l 
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The total field or si tuatio~' ill the strict sense of 
the word giVes the datwn or date.. Just a.s there iB no doubt 
about the existence of the total field, so there is no dmlbt 
about the existence of the datwn or data. What is doubtful 
is the meaning or eignifioanoe of the data.. Tile idea a.e 
having s:i.gnifio&noe ill the mediwn through which our thinking 
ha.fl to go to gain the idea Ill?! meaning. Ideas are instru-
mental for arriving at the J!leaning of ex.istin!t things. There 
is not a li!Pli t between the meaning of the datum a.e such and 
tlle Qll!lil>ning of the idea ae such. Ae a reeul t of inquiry • 
the lllEHmin~ epec:i.fiea.lly a;:rbee in both datum and idea. 73 
Since ideas are instrumentalities in ·t;he Ji'l'OO€li!JS of 
inquiry, their intellectual ohar~oter consists in what is 
done with them, how they are used when they occur. Thought 
HseJ.f beool1les ililerely a.n instrU1llent of action. In trying 
to make this point forcefully; Dewey come a very close to 
denying the existence or the mind. 
So far as tllou@!hts in this partioub.r naea.nin~ are 
concerned• it is true to say "it thinks" (as we say "it 
rains,") rather than "I think.~ Only when a person 
triu to get oont.rol .. of tlle 1!9&$!1 tions that detertnine 
the occurrence of a suggestion; and only when he accepts 
what follows from it• i1; is significant7to introduce the 
"I" as the agent and source of thought. 
Dewey has !;!, narrow connotation of· the function of the 
-·------
Co., 
75 . 
~ •• p. 112·3. 
74John Dewey, ~ n! think (Boston: D. c. Heath & 
1910, revised edition 1933) • p. 41. 
I 
intellect. He sternly limits the are!,!. of intelligence. He 
also conceives ot' rea.IHm as the proceee of verification of 
an idea or ideas. The meaning of ideas is erubodied in some 
symbol which :repreeenta the idea.• such as words or p:ropoa:l.• 
tiona. But not every suggestion is an idea. For a suggea• 
tion to 'be an ide1;0 it must be checked. Its functional 
ca.pacity in resolvins the situation in which it arose must 
be undertaken. The process of' checking the suggestion is 
'75 
reasoning. 
Just a.fl ideas and reasoning have their origin in the 
probleznatic situation. so do judgments. Judgment is identi-
fied a.s the llettled outcome of inquiry. The subject matter 
of Ju<tgment is "concerned with the concluding obJects that 
emerge from inquiry in their eta.tus of being conelu:!li ve ... 'Ill 
The judgment hQs direct e~istential im~ort for it is distin-
guished from other non·e~istential propositions. Proposi-
tions are indeterJllinate Md instrumental pouibili ties for 
a future course of action. Propositions <~.re composed of 
symbols wnioh nave relation to suggestions or hypotheses 
that migtlt blil used in inquiry, When they are tested. in 
action, when they existentially dli!termine the actual outcome 
of the indeterminate lilitua.tion• the propositions are judg .. 
ruents. Within the process of' inquiry of all the prior 
75
newey, SLQ• ,!i.ll. • PP• Ul-2. 
76~., P• l20. 
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Jttdgm~n·t h only l'@~ll':t'ved for tnne ';p:ropoii! :J.1;ions wnicb. 
settle the outof.lme of .the .inqu~:r.y. They.a.J.one effectuated 
the definite !.ixiatl\\lntiOil s:l. tl~ation •. 
~rhe .J udgt11en t :l.s. composed. .. of subJect• . predicate and 
copula.. The mubJect is constituted by the d!i<tUm tba.t !lt<>nde 
out in a. s itua.tion in reference· to the ,rJX"ob.tem.. The predi-
cate is c<mG~ti t'j.\tlild by the ideas which antioip~~te possible 
solutions. 
Apa.r·t :f'rom a-11 int.!lu!llive situation wnioh detel'Jllinee 
!a corren!J!Bdence !.U.ll ea.ah !!l.Jihtt:t the materi!i!.l thQt 
oonstitutlila the olllilerved singul.a.l' thh and the kind of 
ob.a.raote:r:hin,g Ji)rediQa.te applieal:IJ.:e..,~o it9 predication 
ia totally arbi tra.r;r o:r ung:t"ound.ed,. 1 . 
The copula. h aons.'l!itUt!ild by U:;~ functional oor:re~­
pondenoe to the subject .and predicate. ll'or Dewey, tile sub-
Ject tnattera ()£' the !lubj eot and predicate a.re det<ll'lllined in 
oorreepondenoe with eaoll other in Md by th>li ;\lrooesa of' 
" • thouSllt, • that is- inquiry • .,78 
In Dewey's oonoeptiorl1 fll(bstanoe ill! constituted by 
the intll>reonru!leted diatim;ttiou attributable to it by it;e 
specified funetion in inqtliry. . li'or hil11, tl:.te stllle oondi tion 
that has to bl:l ~>a.tiefied irl order th.D.t there •nay be sub·· 
stan till!.li ty, "U t~ t a<~~:rta.irt qua.Ufieat ions . .WWg toaetner 
a.u d>:!pendabJ.e si~,tne t.n. ... t certain OlHliiEHlUi'H.tae$ will follow 
----------------
J 
when certain interactions take :plaoe.-.'19 
This is wha·t: Dewey means when he says . that subs tan-
tiali ty is a logical not a ,primary ontological determina-
tion. Being a substantial object is synonymous witb. the 
specific function of' standing for the consequences of 
certain operations. 
When the indeterminate situation has beoorne deter-
56 
ruinate, the satisfactory outcome of the doing xuay oe called 
11warrented assertibility" or knowledge. It must always be 
kept in mind that knowledge can only be conceptualized. as 
a generaliaa.tion of the proper'ties diecovered to belong to 
.the conclusions which were the outcome o1' the inquiry. The 
·warranted asserti bili ty was an act (action) whi ell conferred 
upon noneogni ti ve material traits and potential! ties of a. 
cognitive nature that did not belong to them. Viewed in 
the light of the continuum of experience and the pr ima.ry 
integrity of the unity of experience, it ia understandable 
for Dewey to e.eaign a. priml!ilry position to the interaction 
of the organism and environment and a secondary one to 
knowledge which is "intermediate and instrumental; it comes 
between a. relatively oa.eua.l and accidental experience and 
one relatively settled and defined."80 
Balch 
79Ibid., pp. 128-9. 
80 
John Dewey •. Q.u)"ilt.· for. certainty 
and Company, 1929 , p. 295. 
(New York; Minton, 
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mente in his theory .. .;.aellStll'Y data, idea.a,· preposi tioi1s, 
jud./j;ments, rell!.atm-•&1'0 :pointers to aotion.· ThG ooneeptu~:~J., 
as an ol.'de:t>, is not rdeva.nt to the real order of existence, 
but if:l relevant to the hypothetical, the poa's:J.!)lo. In 
reality, 1'l'he conccptUI.i.J. and • rat iona.l' oon tents are 
h'tPo!jjloees. ~ 131 :rhey <ta:l:f to •nind wl-.at might be done with 
:r>eal.ity, and 1111a111t be checked experimentally IA>lld be ola.pab.l:e 
of being recheol!:ed experimentally before being considered 
as age;regated to a body of kno·wledge. All l!:nowlodge tlil.kea 
its origin in tH>me probletll,.tia situa:Uon. to change the 
indeterillina.te aituat:l.on into a determinate unified whole. 
~.it gf Trutn 
Since M analysis of Dewey's theory of method would 
lack an important element if it did not disousa his theory 
of truth, it will now be pre~sented. It could ha.ve been 
treated in the section of the study abovt~~ which eunaidered 
the Judgmentlil which were wa.r:ra.nted a.sse:r.tions of the out-
oOlite of inquiry. Hia notion of truth has been treated 
sC~tpa.:rately beea.u!lle of 1t111 importance for tllill etudy and it 
would Jw.ve aeetlled a digression from the uquence of ideas 
presented. 
\' 
I 
Dewey's philo~t.Cphy of tru1lno, The J)arwi.ni&n theory of 
evolution deeply :l.nflu.enoed his philosophy of nature. · The 
findings of tnodern soil:lnoe · fund.amen tally a;.l terect the 1141. tu:re 
of truth and made old epistemologies obsolete. · Knowing 
ooneisted in doing; it was the result of the controlled 
transfol"lllation of a.n indeterminate e i tuation into a deter-
i 
l j 
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A merely ~ental eenerenoa without experimental veri-
fica. tion does not en.at>le us to go beyond ttte realm of 
cypotheaia. If a notion or theory makes pretense ot' 
oor:ref>ponding t1> na.li ty or to tl~e ;f'&ett>, tllia pretense 
cannot be put to the test at~d confirmed or refuted 
exa.ept by oa.using it .t;o pae~> over intc1 the J:oa.lm of 
a.etion at~d by noting t.h.e results wnieb. it yields in tile 
form of the ooncrete ohllerv&I:>:J.e factf! to whieh thiw 
noti<m or theory leads. If • in a-cting upon th:l.S notion• 
we are brought to the fact wl:d.oh 1 t i>llplhs or which 
it demands, then thta notion is t:l:'ue, A theory oorrea-
I/Onds to. th~ f<,,l,'ftlil Vlhen :l:t J.ead<1 to t,h.., facts which "te 
its consequences, by the intermedi~ry of experience.s4 
However, even while the theory or notion ilJi1f3' be true 
in that it lea.ds to the facts a.e verified by experience, it 
can still only be held hy:pot.hetioa.lly since it is always 
subject to oorreetion by unforeseen future consequenoea or 
by observed :f'a.ets which were overlooked. For, qlogioe.Hy, 
a-bsolute truth is an idee.l which cannot be redbed, at 
least till &ll tile f<>ets have been recognized ••• and until. 
it ia no lonser possible ·t:o makl!! other obaervationa and 
o th.lllr e;Kpniences."as 
Thi.a iii! tne un,i.quenei>a o:t.' tlle eu;piriC<l..l. .method which 
DE~wey advooateu fOl' 11h.i.l.osopey. J'hilosophioa.l Mnoept ions 
must be submitted to the control of experience. In the 
:prootUlfl of verifYing the.m truth will be found. lie too 
opt1miatically OQnolud"d that any pllilosopb.er wb.o iil.p;;lies 
this empirical method without the leas1;. p:rejudtee in favor 
--·--------------82J!)lm :rJewey, ;eail.oaomi and Qiviliz<~.t,iqn (r~·ew Yor.lc; 
Putnam1 a Sona~ J.93l), p. :13. 
S3J;b:!.g. • ,p, 1:4~ 
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•means' Vli!l'ification, or if one prefer111, tlwlt verif'iCOition, 
d the:r: a.ctue.l. or possible, b the definUi on of truth ... d4 
Yet fifteen years later, in answering Rua3ell 1 s 
critique of his theory• Dewey a.ft'irmed his theory of tru·th 
as a oo:rreapondtJnce theory of truth, 
:~ own view takes eorreepondenoe in the operational 
senu it bea:rs in a.ll !!lases e:xoept .the J;miquG epiateru-
olegioal ease et' the alleged relation between a "sub~ 
ject" and an ~o.b.jeot"·; the 4lea.nirll!&1 tHwelY Gf anlilwelintl: 
as a l!;ey answers to condition~} imposed by a. look, or as 
two corresp;mdenta "answanr• ea.oh other; or in general, 
a.s a. reply is a.n a.deqt<a.te answer to a question or a. 
e:t.•itieism .. ,..aa, in ehort,. a SQl<&tiQn &.nswers ·the require .. 
mente of a. il."oPlepa. On tilia view• both. ~rtnera in 
"eorre!li,Pt)ndenoe'1 are open and &.l:loveboa:rd. inatelld of 
one ot' them being forever out ot' experience and tht~~ 
other in !t by wey of a "peroeptK or wb.atev101r. Wonder-
ing a.t how somethins in exl)erienoe 'by d.efini tion outside 
experhne.e. wtt:!.cl:t it is, upon t.b.e l>a.sb of' epiatemologi· 
mal doctrine, tb.e sole meli4ns of "knowing." is what 
or:l.gin.a.Uy l'IUMle me aus:pidous of tl.i.El whole ep:l.atemologi• 
ea.l industry. In the sense ot' eQrrespondence as o:per* 
athnal ®ttd behavioral. (tbe meeing whiell. has definite 
parallels in ordinary experience), :r hold tc~a. t !ll.Y 1t.I2! 
of theory ia the only one ent:l.. tled tra be called 
correeporuienoe tlleory of' trutn. 85 · 
In DE!wey 1 s mind, his theory of trutn as developed 
in hie I&d!! essentially resen;bled the theory preaented 
· above. In lliS ~mgic, he ~indorsed the no t:l.on of' truth as 
·expressed by o. s. Peirce, 
The beet definition of' truth from the logical t~~tand­
point vrhiel:.l h known to me h U~a.t of J>eiroe: 11 Th!,'! opinion 
84,J;.W.' p. 23. 
85new<~y, PrGbJ.!ms .!Ut .i!J!! (NeN Yorlu l'hiloso))hiaal 
Library 1 Inc., l946), pp, 343 .. 4. 
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which is rated to be ultim~tely ~greed to by ~ll who 
investigate l& what we mnn by truth., and tb.e object 
represented by this opinion hl the r,eal .• " A more com• 
plete (and more suggestive) sta.hment b tito following; 
urruth is that concordance of a.n abst.raot statement with 
the ideal limit toward which endless investigation would 
tend to bring IH.lientific belief • which concordance the 
abstract etate~nt may poseese by virtue of the aonfee• 
don of its inaccuracy ancl. one-sidednesa, and this6 confession ie an essential ingredient of trutn." 8 
Without developing the .impliea.tion of Dqwey' s ex-
pliei t avowal of na.ving found in I'ei:rce the beet definition 
ot trutn, it is possibly more underatanda.ble to on this 
acknowledgment as lilymptoma.·t.io of Dewey' e &nau.mptiona con• 
earning the natur111 of aoientifie knowledge. Without going 
into that analysts, it suft'ices to note that Dewey doea 
utilize J?eiroe' 11 conoeption of t:r.u·'-h within his own philoso-
phy, and considers it CQnllistent with hb ideaa,.8'l 
It tnua t be recalled that within the proet'I!Js of 
66:oewey, LQgigr '~b.e :tneorx .sa! ljnquir:y Orew York: 
!Ienry Holt & Company, 1938), P• 345, fn. 
8'1 
Denton L. G~Jyer, The :Pf~tlr.!!J.!trf lh.t~gr.v of :cr'ath .i!!, 
;Q!!velgget,l k. P!it~l• Jyl'ls all Dewez llinoist Univerlll. ity 
ot Illinoie, 1914 • P• 43.. He concluded hie study with an 
alternative (iH'lt\t.:rary to Dewey' e position in thie matter. 
Ire wrote: 11If we believe th$-t Dewey .does not ma.ke a. correct 
deduction from the pragmatic method in this development 
1H!)W&l'd truth. thl\ln we are confronted with the alternative 
er either accepting the Deweyan theory of truth or reJect-
ing the Peiroian theory of olearnesl:h Tha.t h, u· we 
begin with l'eiroe on method, we !!lUSt go clear to 1)ewey or1 
truth. And if we reject Dewey. while believing that Peirce 
gave a. correct deuription of the method of ecienee 1 then it aeeme that we must conclude that the method ~;~f aeienoe 
~tnd the method of philosophy are not the Batlle.n 
process of inquiry things are considered. in· their inte:t'• 
relations with each other. 'l.'hings or events are true in 
their application to exiatential lil:l.tuations. Truth h 
oons titu ted by the use to which the idea h :put: 
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• • .in the pn.q'tlee of inquiry verification of an 
idea. or theory io not a. ma.tttr of t'inding an existence 
which answers to the demanQ.s of' the idea. or theory, but 
· h a matter Qf the systel'lla.tio ordering of a. complex Bet 
of data.6 by means of the idea or theory a.s an instruruen~ 
tali ty, "'8 · · 
Consequently propositions are not true or false. but va.lid 
or invliil.id, i.e., true or :f'i'l.lae consid.ered in :t·e~a.rd to the 
settled outcome or inquiry, 
Tht "truth" a:f' any present .vropQdUon is 1 by the de:f'inition, au.bject to the outeorae ot continued inquir-
11\llll; i te 11 truth" • if the word ruua t be uaed9 ie pro vi .. 
sional; a.s ne111.r the t:ruth a.s inquiry he.s ,!!!:! ~ come, 
a llllil.tt.e:r deterad.ned not by a IJUelils lil.t eome future 
belief, but by the om and pains With Which inquiry 
hae bun oondueted up to the present time. Adlllbs:l.on 
of t!~e neceee&ry eubjeotion of e1Tery preeent pro.,posi .. 
tion to the re111ults to be obtained in future inquiry 
is the meaning of :Peirce'$ :referenee to 11 oonfm:H~ion of 
inaccuracy and one-eid.edneas" as te ingredient of' the 
truth of the present pro:poui ti,m., · · 
As ltu been lJU!Intioneo .• id&!il.$ 1 conupts• propoaitioml 
are instrumentalities. Instrumentalities may oe fit u:r 
81lro!4•, :P• ..ua •. 
139John Dewey. "Experience. Knowledge and Valu.e," '!'he 
PllilQiilOJtbx ,gl ~ !{ewex (Vol. I of T.Qe J41.2riNY .W: LitiJ:!.l 
Illailol!lo!J:!etf!.. ed. l'a.ul A. Schil.pp: Wiseonsitu Georg(! 
Banta Publishii'Jg Co~, lS 39) • .v. 573. 
unfit for the. task, efficacious or inett'aoicioua for a Job, 
but they a:re. not true or false without possibility of error 
or probability coefficient of a.ll pro};)ositiona. Truth or 
tala ity apply only to the final outcorae of inquiry. In 
order to be true in the sense of useful, an action amst be 
r:~ex•tinent to the solution of th.e parUcular r;roblern from 
which it aroee. Vihile Dewey intendeC the utilitarian 
criterion of his theory to be concerned with the oontribu-
tior• to the reol·g&,niza.tion in experience, and not 1vith 
purely personal profi.t or caprice, he has not provided any 
norms, absolute in themselves, whereby truth or falsity, 
right or wrong ma;r be deter;:u.ined, 
TO&QrY of Freegom 
Dewey's w1·itings ex11licitly contain certain dis-
.tinotions <lbouc the nature of freedom. ThiA section ana-
lyses his oonoeytion of fre<:ldom in the J.igl:lt of fundamental 
distinctions or principles in his philosophical under-
standing of the subject. 
Tho startir1g; rooint of his exposition is his attri-
buUon of a, 11referential action to a.lJ. na.tu:ra.L things. 
"J>.:t•eferenUal action in the sense of selective beh.avior is 
a unive;L·eal tx•ait of all things, atoms rmd molecules, as 
co 
well as plants • animals and man • .,!:! 
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Dewey· asserts the reality of pref'eren ti.al a.o'tion 
att,ribut<able to all natural things to unoer.line the con~ 
tinuity of man with the rest of nature. Yet it is not the 
only qual.i ty of differing naturQ.l things·. Ina.nima. te 
prefererltial action (stnne) lacks capacity for changing 
its ;uode of conduct. Animate preferential a.ction (dog) 
\ill lacks the a.otive role in initiating and direct:i.ng ctumge. 
HUman preferential action indh;putably imnl ved. an ability 
to choose among pref!'lrences, a. capacity for actively and 
pur:posefulJ.y c!langing :i. ts mode of conduct. 112 
Preferential •wtion with choice otmracterizes free 
hUlll&l1 ~.~ctiom,, Pret'ercnti.al ~:wtion without choice is not 
free a.ction. If men performed pr e:f'erenthtl or fH~leoti ve 
actions which did not involve choice, these aotionll! would 
not be free bec~•use then these "Lotions would be the same 
as those of other natural things that do not act freely, 
.A further refinement of hie doctrine of human free-
dom involves his distinction beti'I'O<>n native and actual 
freedom. The potentit'l.li ty for freedom is a.. native gift or 
part of" our constitution in tllat we have the capability for 
93 
self-direction or choice.. Actu!:l.l or positive freedom is 
91 John Dewey and James H. cl.'u:rta, EttJ.iQJ! 
Holt,IUnehart and Winston, 1932), p. 339. 
(Hew York: 
9 ~ewey, QJ2. cit .• , p. 276. 
93 Dev;ey a.nd Tufts, ~· cit., p. 340. 
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not a. native girt but is acquired, 94 
The locus of lllan' s pot en tiali ty for· freedom nsidea 
in the :power of htunan intelligence to anticipate the future 
and project different courses of oonrluot together with th.eir 
95 probable consequences. In line with his behaviorisms, 
Dewey affirms the two esc:ential constituents of cnoicea as 
freedolll to consist in the individual's variable life his~ory 
. 96 
and the self's intellige.nt insight and foresigrlt. 
The individual achieves the actuality of freedom 
when his aotionc are guided by Jmowleclge which lllttkes fore~ 
eig~!t possible and seoureF; intentiomJ.l prepara:tion for 
97 prob~•ble consequences. Conoeqt<ently he rejects the con-
ception of contingency in the will or freedom of the will 
because for him: 
The lmeinesE of "will" is to be resolute; that is, to 
resolve, under tne guida,nce of thsgght, the indetermi-
nateness of uneertain si1metions. 
Such choices constitute "true choices." Dut choice 
for Dewey is not merely intellectual because the signi .. 
fio1>~.nce of choice lies in He taking effs.ct in outward action. 
Dewey a.ffirm!'l "an intrinsic connection between choice as 
95 Dewey, ,EgJJ.oso!Jl:l[ atld Qivilj,~ation, PV• 275-6. 
96Ibid., P• 276. 
97 Dewey, ouest for Cer&a.!nty, p. 250. 
93T'•' d ~-
freedom and power of a.ction as freedom. 1199 
When facing the problem of contingency or indeter-
minateness, he rejected the opinion which posited the 
indeterminateness of "free will ... He considered the doe-
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trine to be a desperate attempt to escape from the conse-
quences of the doctrine of t'ixed and immutable objective 
being.100 Dewey insisted on the need for insig!1t or 
knowledge in actions to preserve preferences. Preferential 
actions, 
, •• become true enoicee under the direction of' in-
sight.' Knowledge, instead of' revealing a world in whictl 
preference 1a an illusion and does not count or make a 
difference, puts in our possession the instrumentality 
by means of which preference may be a.n intelligent or 
intentional factor in constructing a future by wary 
and prepares action. Knowledge of special conditione 
and relatione is instrumental to action which is in 
turn a.n inetrUIIlent of production of situations having 
added eignifiaanoe and1grder. To be capable of such actions is to be free. 
Dewey's insistence on knowledge a.s a.rl;instrUIIlentality 
and on the necessity for the employment of such knowledge 
to achieve free actions is central to his position. He does 
not conceive of man•s natural freedom of self·determina.tion 
as a distinct kind of freedom. Nor does he think man•s 
circUIIlstantial freedom of self-realization to be a distinct 
-------,, 
99 Dewey, Philosophy !A!lS! Civilization, p. 285. 
lOOibi<\. 
l011Jd4.. 
kind of freedom. For him both are aspects of tile individ-
ual's acquired freedom of self-perfection. 
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Choice reveals the present self (self-in-being) and 
tlle future self (self-in-becoming). Man~ a in tellectua.l 
delibera;tiOI'lB, viewed on the ~!Urfaoe, are concerned with 
values of particular ends of self-in-being. In telleotua.l 
deliberations, viewed below the surface, are concerned with 
values of particular ends. of self-in-beooJning. This process 
of self-becoming, of :progress! ve rea.liaation, Dewey calls 
growth. Growth is freedom. 
It is from such a vantage point that Dewey can come 
so close to denying freedom as an essential and permanent 
quality of man 1 e na. ture when ,he ea.ys, "We are not free 
because of what we statically are, but in so far as we are 
beoollling different fro111 what we. have been.n 102 
Cons is tent with the evolutionary ele111en t in his 
thought, he counsels that attention ehould be directed 
toward the process of evolution instead of tc;~ward some 
ulterior goal. Growth is the final goal to be sought not 
other sta.l;io goala. 103 
aut in proposing growth a.s the goal for acquired 
selt~perfection, he ie not denying the individual's ability 
l02Iill·, p. 29l. 
103
:newey and TUfts, ~· cit. 
J 
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to live as he ou(!;ht in conformity with an ideal befitting 
human nature. His conception of self-perfection is devoid 
ot' ~lY goal which equates self-perfection with conformity 
to llloral laws that are concretely the same for all men. 
If we state the. moral law as the injunction to each 
self on every ooca.aion to identify the a elf with a new 
growth that is pouible1 then obedience to tile law is one wi tb. •noral :f'rtutdom. 04 
Dewey is very absolutistic about his own conception 
of growth 11.s the only sui table goal t'or mlim' s acquired 
freedonl of self-perff.lct:Lon. Ue notes that: 
••.• ;practically a.l.l. more.lhte have made much of a 
distinction between a lower and a. higher self, speaking 
of a carnal and spiritual, the animal and the truly 
human, the sensuous and the rational. selves which 
exist mif85by side in man and which war with one anothtU."o 
But Dewey does not accept eueh a, distinction ilecause 
he insililtu 
The only distinction that can be drawn without re-
dtAcin€1: morals to conventional! ty, self-rigil'l;.eous com-
placency, or a hopeless and harsh struggle for the 
unattainable,. is that between the attained static, and 
the moving dynaraic aEilf.l06 
It Bhou.ld be obvious by now that :Dewey does maintain 
tha.t freedom t'rom external restrictions oa.n be actually the 
illusion of freedom. That actions not directed by intelli-
gence ma.y well be aoUone of caprice and not to he preferred 
~ 
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ove;r thoae guided. by wie!iitr coun•H~l or colllllt<'W\1 •.. :!!'or DQwey 
cucte:mal o1' ;(ll'lysical freedom is not an &nd in i tiH11lf but a 
mea.n\1! to freedom wbich lies in the trained power of growth, 
in the intelligent exercise of preferiUl<l&lil • The indi vidual• s 
natural freedom or self-deterlllina.tion and. eircum111tant1al. 
freedom of selr .. realization are aspects of the acquired 
freedom of self-perfection. a.tld not distinct kinde of free@ 
dom .. 
happiness. ~l'he na.ture of real freedom ia essentia.lly re· 
lated to the nature ar ha.wpineu. 
• • .an individual is not hee.d.ed for freedom unless 
all hie plana and purposes aim, not at some .statio or 
final goal• bUt at the continuing process of growth 
itself, through which he will find at once botll his 
freedom and hill\ happiness. To whl:l.tever degree a.n in· 
di vidua.l a:[8fin~:~ them. he attains the111 both dmul-
taue ousl;r • 
He.ppineee oonehh in a deaire fulfilled, :Even 
whil~t deeirn ee:n involve oppoai te things desired, <>ll the 
dedre to ;zin IIIO!lll'l m<:mey to the poor and the d.es.ire to 
po~&aeaa money and not to tti ve a.ny to the poor. neYerthelesa 
both snare in the oomtllon quality of' being fultil1menta. 108 
But while tM raateri.al content of both.. d$e1re.a is different 
theY a.:re alike in their formal aapeot. 109 
_____ , __ 
107Ib~ •• p. 340. 
108
:tbif. •• p. 270 .. 
l09llW\• 
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eimultaneously attained in the same act it must be under-
• toed trta.t not evelly act of fulfillment of a desire (formal 
haoppitteaii) ie an irtstwce o:f' real t'reeciom. It .may be a. 
:f'u.lfillment of illusorY freedom bt~oauae genuine freedom 
was ba.l':l.ed on 1iW intdliiEII'l.t preferenUal a.ctton directed 
a;t growth. So the miser attaining his desire for more 
illotuly, achieves formal ha.ppineu.. He hail fulfilled his 
desi:ru. Hi$ deebe for llioney may grow and grow. Yet 
hie desire a.nd choices are mere illusions of freedom and 
al'e merely illu11ory hap:pineu. Hie eharaoter is in the 
praoeelil of Pl!o~ress:l.ve deteJ;'ioration, Dewey subordinates 
the attainment of' deSire (in aotion) to the goal of dynamio 
~enuine growth. 
It does ~u~em desirable at this point to relate 
Dewey• a conception ot method for inquir;r and his conception 
of freedom. surely, it b1 being lll.t>sumed that Dewey con• 
oeived a:t' philoeoph;v as a. rational explanation or reality. 
Like other philosophers, b.e presented hb rational explana-
tion of reality • Like other philosophers, he h.a.d hh 
conceptions a.bou t the nature of ph:Uoaophic:u~l a.rgumentati on 
Md pt•oo:t'. Like them, lie corudde:red hie poai tion superior 
to their pressntatione. !,ike them, he atteuupted to be 
intellectually honest in presenting his 111ews and in hia 
presentation ot their views.. 
.~ 
;g~egy,er;hrm Bf:j,aJi!i!tl . 
The. adaptation of the empirical method to philosophy'. 
orienta.ted Dewey's outlook. It form~Hl h1o; oonot~~ption of 
phUoaophiea.l method. ~00. influenced the course of nia 
epilltemology, logj,o, etl'lios, and metaphydo1;;. That it 
should not have informed his l'lonoeption of method for Jim 
inquiry into freedom would havli> b<;en e!!Xtremely Ui1Hke1y. 
Deweyt a notion of inquiry • a.a baa be 'ill o i;u:;erved, .wall 
primarily cont.Hilrned with extstent:La.l a.itua.tiona .which e.re 
eonfuliled. An inquiry undu euoh oon(Utions seta out to 
resolve the iilitue.tion •. When the situation is resolved, 
the hypo'l;h.etioa.l proposi tian which dete:rmi.nated the ai tuation 
h the jude;ment whicb. ts valid. If oonflieting hyl)Otl'teUca.l 
p:ropo$1 tion$ .were onoe entertained in Mle inquiry 1 when the 
inquiry is terruinated oonfl1oting propositions fore irrelevant. 
What is most revealing about l:lll!weyt s (!)onoe;ption qf' 
freedom h not so muoll tlte nove.lty of muthodology out 
rather tl:ecnoveJ.ty of hit:; eonoeptiorl ot· one di!iltinet free-
dom Wtlicll hsw two aapeots suoordinate to 1 t. ·In. thilil :ra .. 
lliPeot ·be is influ!!moed ·by lliil, own logioa.l thoory 1 a 
dep~Snd.enoe on evolutionisUc interpretathn. l'hat prinoi• 
ple leads him to J?Oilli t growth as tlui ideal of human freedom 
~11d to deny the reld distinctions between the freedom man 
enjoys by virtue of hie intelleotua.l na.ture, tile freedom 
he ponessea when oi:raumsta.noea enable !lim to fulfill hie 
= ~
wl~h.etJ~ ""~'~d tile freedorJI he p()o,;;e~Suel'l .by ;rirtue. of hie 
a1t.b:tli t.Y t·m a.ot in &Coord.. with an idea.J. Ql'lfittilli!S b:uman 
! 't is wo:e'th notin,g tha,t this in. not. taking aeo.ount 
or tll~~ knowledge ooncern:h>g. the philolllophioal idealiJ ·thlillu~ 
eel vee "rhi.cl:i lJhi:toeophorlli lmd. J)ewey' s logic o.r theol'.Y 
of inquiry wae not atte.llpting to point ou.t or dil'ltin{~Uilllh 
·the way we come to tt;l'I!Ulp the mea11ing of anotner' s ideas 
on a supjeet. He felt he knew wh~t some previous philoao-
pMrll! meant and thst thie: did 110t oonstitutll the main 
probl~Hil• 'rklill im:oort,ant thing .for him wa.s to find ~> way to 
determine which or tlleir ide.a.s .wl'lre tl'L<e t"o:r. tile present 
set of e:trouml'! taneeilh 
So i.r1 1mderstanding the method he advooa.t;ed for an 
inquiry into fl'eedo~n, the important qonaideraUon for nim 
was not the metholi for dettrtl.lining wkt<~.t. philoaophere meant 
by freedom but tt1e x!!o:re im.por tl>nt rn!JOtter of de aiding on a 
method to teat philoeophioal ideas ubout rreetlom. 
III. IMPLIOATIOUS FOn IIDUCATION 
SchuHUc At!Ut.u%! 
The schntitlc method was the inspirlii.tion for Dewey•s 
pragmatic philosophy. When he turned hie attention to 
eill.tn:sational questions, it iS not eurp:rising th.a~t it would 
influence his educational pllilosopny. WHll con.lliistenoy, 
he insisted upon the scientific attitude as indh!peneable 
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cJ!o:r~l. ::~Snda.te llll.id u:pon ·tbl\l vublio aQ.hool· had to hoW$ tili!i 
l!fe:i.<Hltifia. attitude. G:rlil.~ting ·&hal; ehe problem of the 
aon;~!O!l ae11ool in. a demtlCrll.oy h4d M cotttHI:t'l'l itnlt with · 
prtlViding, txni,raraal oducat:l.on, tltet'¢ WKklil ar.oth.er Jll01'lil 
wej,ghty Ct;rnaideraHon. Wb<li.t na~\ to h¢ decided we:t'El WAAt 1 
and 11ow thir<ge al:J.o~tld blfl t!~:Ught and how theli(!) were to be 
d~termined. For Dewey# 
until. wh!l;t a1'ltiloll be taugt~t a<.nd how it is taugJ:1t i~'> 
settled upon tl!e ba.e:l.e of fomation of the Boitllntifio 
at"\H tude, the l!lOl"Ca.l,l.ed ed.uoa·l>ional worll: of the school 
h a. doogerously1~0t-or-mifile affah" as far ae democra .. ey i~ concerned• . 
Dlill!I!Hil'Q.CZ, 
Addition~»l evidence indicative of the interdependence 
in Dewey' a mind between demtHilraoy and aohntific method was 
presented by Marc Belth irl l'!.ie doctoral dist,el'tation for 
Columbia. Uni versi t;y • 
In the lii!,Yth of the Group tne ded.i,oatiOn is to <~on­
t.in:uoum eonverl!laUon and e;;!;eru.;,nglil of idee.~J until !'lome 
agreement is reached. For. it ie held, so long as 
:oeople .continue. to taU: to e.aoll. othar, it is inevit!1.ble 
that some ooncensua will be arri vod at .and thua progreu 
~de. 'l'ha:t. Dewey oont1'ibute4 to .tM.s lllilm h<~.rdJ.y be 
denied. :.aut that he hue written against. tilts, also, ita 
a.n tndil\lation of how da.ngereum he thqugnt 1 t,. Here he 
has vn-itt en: "'J.'!le idea. tlla.t thl) conflict of parties , 
will.• by mam'!.:.\1 Qf public dh~uasion, br:!.ng {)Ut neeelt®lll.~'Y 
public trutna in a dialnt:ic ot pol! tical. w<~.tered·dovm 
nrm:i.l'ln of' the :H;ee;elia.n dia.lt'!etie, with. He sy.nthlHlis 
-------
a:tl'rived a.t by a union of antithetitlal eoncepl;i.cne. 
The method has notb.ing in eof411lon wi tb. organized 
competitive inquiry whioh has won the triumphs of 
science in the field of' pbysieal n&ture.,ulll 
The erroneous a.pp:Uo!i<.tion of scientif'io cri'teria 
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as the ultimate nGrm o:r va.lid .ll:nQwled($el.l.2 J.ed him to 
restrict the roality of inllllinent tbmAght as the i:ntelligi .. 
i;lle objeot:l.vha.tion of a tra.na..objeotive aubJeet. The 
a.daptive beha.vi.oral relilponse of the or{$aniam (hb Watsonian 
assumption~~>) determined tile character and content of vaUd 
knowledge. ConiUH!uently, he insisted on the absolute 
neoeuity c:f :pilysieal activity for valid lctH.Iwledge. 
All controlled :f.nquiry and all institution of 
grounded as•ertt-on-ne.eT~rartiy()olftlilns a. p:rag~ig§.~. 
factor; an a.oti vity of doing ~nd utaking which reshapes 
antecedent n:zstential material which sets the problem 
or inquiry. 
Qriticism q{ ~ise~c§tved §2Qo!§St!c1sm 
Tk1is operative eha.:ra.oter of Js;nowledge became a. 
eorollary in his theory of the learning process and pro• 
vided the aeaumptions with wh.ich he can cri tieise a 
111Marc Bel th The ~ncji!pt 21. DempelJi\fV£ !n I}ewer' s ln.uu:. ,!lllfbtct.tiq,n !N!Ilw York: Columbia. Un1vers1ty1 1956), 
.P• 342~ ( Q,uota.tion from Dewey' e "Lil:>era.lism and social 
Action," p. 71.) 
USJohn DliJwey, J!luonm~ruotioflJ.!l J'hilqsQphv (New 
York, The New York American Library, 1925) 1 PP• 112·3• 
113
newey, ~og~o: Ihe theq~ ai InquirY, p. 160• 
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Blis conceived e ohola.s th oone!llpthnJ 
The 
W:lum. ed!loation, undn ,, tn.$ influentut d a. echolastic 
C.O!lCtai>titi>n of knl\lW"ledgei! whiCh. ig!lOl'Oijl eV,er;ythlng but 
schntifieall;r formulated facts and truths fails to 
recognize that primary or initial subJect matter a.lwa.ys 
exi1:d;t~ as matter. of. a.n ~ctive doing, involving the. ul'le 
of the body and the handl1ns ot the !Jla.terial• the subject 
~~~&tter. of' instJmction b bolated from the needs and 
purposes of the lea:t"ner, and so beoo111e& just a. thing to be 
memoril'led e.lld reproduoi!Hi upon derui:U'lli.o Reoosnttion of 
the natural course of develePI!lent, on the contrary, 
1il.l:ways set!} 4 out wi tb. s :ttua. tions Wllioh hi valve lEl£U'fJing b;r do:l..ng, .L 
C1LAP1'ER IV 
This chapter presents tlle thinking of Morti111er 
Adhr about the metllod he advocated for an inquiry about 
freedom. Firat. the writinga oonaulted to obtain Adler's 
ideas on the subject are presented, alons with the :reasons 
for the particular selections. Second, a presentation of 
hh conception of method h made. Laetl;y, the implications 
of hie ideas for education are shown. 
A perusal of the published books of Adler reveals 
a. consistency amid their variety. While dif:t'erent areas 
of investigation are explored, the same guiding principles 
can often be seen at work • .U.I3 TtLis can be _partly exempli-
fied by a brief consideration of several of his works. In 
1937• when Adler was Lecturer in Psychology at Columbia 
Univerd tY, he liJrersent.ed in pia.leqtig an exposit. ion or the 
role of' dh.lectic in controversy and discussion, He 
attempted to understand the kind of thinking which takes 
place when people enter into dispute, or when they carry on 
in reflection the polemical consideration cf some idea., He 
----116 A stmili\!Lr insight ms.v be obtained by ret~rdng to 
the appendix which briefly presents some biogra.phic~l and 
bi'bl:togre.phical material about ?l!ortil:ner Adler. 
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e.ne.lya:ed a threefold description of dialectic <OS empirh!Al, 
lo~ical• and aleta;pbysical,., He presented an interpretation 
of the possible function of dialectic in philosophy. He 
also indicated the poa$1 ble subJect matter of a SUlllma 
Dialeotica.. 
In 1936, he applied himself tey demonstratins that 
much of the controvere;r in tb.e ;peychol.ogica.l. sciences 
resulted from trying to answer philouophioa.l. problemB with 
scientific metnods. For Adler, in ~· .~ H..U )lade ,g! 
Man, th.e llorde:t'line bliltween psychology and llhilosophy :1.6 
overstepped when it h blurred by a lack of underetanding 
of tne m\ture of aeienoe •m.d philosophy. For example, he 
showed that Freud denied man's natural freedom of self., 
determination • 
In his work 11s Edi to:r-in .. Chhf of The f},ref\t ;tge§s; 
A Sxntoptieon .IU: ~ Qi£SM J3QOk!il .tt m Y!'EI@terl'!. world,. 
he continued hi$ dialeetica.l work. These two voluraes . 
constituted volumes two IM'ld three oft the fifty .. rour 
volumed work lQ!· (f:£0!! ,igg]Sq. What .he hall ind.ieatfld in 
more general ideas in )~ili&l!U'!tig, a-ttained more 1\lpeoi:ric 
and p:raotioa.J. exprealilion in the essays he wrote for tiA<UHt 
two vol:mnes in 1945. ·AI'! expreued and underlying auump .. 
tion of the work was tll.a.t in the tradition of westot:~m 
thought 1 the bes.t binds of ea.oh period and persuasion 
!IIXpreliHsed their views on common tn.tbjeots of dhoU.~ilion .. 
I 
~ 
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lnstitu:tfl ·of· PhilosophiCal, nesea.:roh in San FranciSco. 
He was edHor of the first publilshed work of the in~tHute, 
~ ;Idei £l1. Frped.om. :l'he stud)" wa.s conllerned with th.e 
twenty• five oiilnturies of· controversy lll.bout the :ru~ture and 
mea.ninQl Gf tree.dorn in \ll<esterri 11 terature. :tn the tirGt 
volume ef the study, publililb.ed in 1958• · an e,xplanation of 
the dift'erent we.;,s in whioll fr(l!edom nan been l1l1dfl:rllltood in 
the We a tern tradition wa.0 undertaken lil.nd II.· di.alecti cOlil 
construction fJf the ialt1lH1S and to:pioe ~~~ol:>out freedonl was 
presented• The secGnd volume, publish~li in 1961, contained 
the dialectic&l examination of' the ool'ltroversies themeelves 
and the debate of disputed qu.ea tion:a, It preilented a 
dialeoticlll.l oonllltruotion of issues and the debli.te in the 
twenty .. :rive centuries ot th'@ recorded disousdon about 
t'reedom, 
While Adlel' t<&.a J!latu:red as a writer and a tl:linke:r, 
it ought not to be assW!&ed that ·the ideas of hill theory 
of dis.leoUo h<!.ve .eo clumjied .'that he lui.~<~ aontra.dhted his 
iniiial id.ea.s. He has l'fllfin!ild hie theory of dialetlltio and 
applied it ttl otner tQp:l.ce f'o:r study• but it dGU not seem 
to he.ve aubetantial.ly changed,. Just a.s Joh.l:l Dew~y' a 
the$ry of logic received intellectual eoruHderation through 
the Course of .!d,e career a.nd did not eubli1tantia.J..l;y ehtm8e, 
so neither d.id .Mortimer Ad.ler1 s theory. Hefinement ot' 
did npt .. conetitutal contradiction of doct:rtnes. · 
While !Ul. a.rl&lysia of Adle:r'e theory of' dialeutio 
Qe>Uld be 1nade fro111. hie earlier works and ·the development 
of h.J.s ide·&s traced through 'his la.ter works, this etudy · 
concerned. i tselt' with the .ma.turfi e:ltpr•al!l<ion or h:ta theory 
in ru I<&ea. 'i!f zrudom. This wa.a done. beo~use itl th!ii.t work 
hill hlli.s, made tb.e i'ulleat expression of hili\ th$o:t;y ...nd be 
explicitly e.lilPloyed :t t to oonetruet the "conversl!.tion" 
whioh. \V1illl!tern niters hil.ve had about ft'eedom irt the past 
t'lll$nty-five hundred yea.:rs. 
II • COUCEJ?TION OF iiEl'l:WD 
To gain an insight into tlw conception of' method 
Adler advocated for an inquiry into tre;allom• Wllioh would 
be f.a.ithful to Adler.• fl tninking on the I!!Ubjeut. :1. t WOii.s 
eonsidered neoes1uoey to approll\oh. it :f'l'Olll the eon text of 
hi& philosophy. Accordingly an ane.lyeh of tM salient 
ideas of his pniloao,ph:ioe.l doctrine iS undnt&ksn to shed 
light on his <!oru;epti.on of meth@d ~·or an. inq.Jitiey into 
freedom. The re...ao:ne for !.OP:Ifl.'O~?>oh.ing the l)roblem t:rmn 
thll.t ~int of vh!w wna previously men'Uoned before t.he 
salient ideas of' Dewey' a :philou;ophioal dootr:i.ne were 
4ilHIUSf$ll!.ll and are sttbsta.n'Ually the s~We now 9 
l!'or ~~dler .lit :ph.iloeo~Jllioa.l invt\H':i tiiat ion is eonc(;)rned 
= 
!Iii 
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with the pursuit of truth. It is a knowledge of tile 
subject thought about. The truth of a. philosoph:l.oal 
statement d0pendlll on ascertaining the f'a.ots concerning 
ao 
the subject 'l>hought about. A philoeophioal doctrine* when 
true, gi vee knowledge of wl'ta.tever rea.l:l. ties are the objeota 
of inquiry • The truth of a philosoph.ioa.l statement con-
cerning the 1\!Ubject thought a.bout depends on the ta.ote 
about the subject itself •. 
For Adler, statements about reality involve concepts 
which are primarily the mea.ns of knowledge, not the obj.ectv 
of knowledge. 'fhlll concept is not Vlha.t ia aotu111.Hy under-
l'ltood, but that by which the intellect understands. Ideas 
ha.ve no being eJtoept as perceptions of thought a.nd are 
inst:ruments whereby re&.lity is known. concepts (intelligible 
IIJileotes) a.rise from the intellect's power of abstracting 
theat from (iljtl)erienoe (sensible species}. 
Ph:l.lE>sophy arises from common experiences,. The whole 
set of experiences which men have ooour naturally throUGh 
the ordinary operation of their senses, their memories, 
smd illlti!.gina.tio.ns, These ordinary experien~:~en present the 
immediate eouree of induotionl.l, of genara.lhie:d knowledge of 
the world of experienca.ble objeotE~. Ph:Uosopb,y illl regarded 
a.l'! the continuing PUX'SUit ot' truth• and the divergent 
opinions a.re :regarded as voices in a continuing conversation 
in wli:l,ch truth hi at e take • 
--··-~ 
l 
81 
l'hil<>so:pb;y for Adler is in one senn a.n individual 
ta.sk and. :l.n ;,\notber nenl\le a collective one., A phil.osopluu.• 
"can pursue in comph·t;e isolation his objective of' knowing 
wba.t hi or should be the cal!Je• "llo In a.nother sense it 
ca.n be collecUve for: 
•• ·.philosopl::un.•a tuwe addresBed fjklellleelvee t0 ttle 
opinionlil of tlle:l.:r predeeessorlll or contempor&:ries; a.nd 
in the preeence of a tU.verfl!ity of vien about subjects 
on which they have formed some theory, they han be<~n 
concerned to ori tiehe the poeiUQns tQken by others 
as well a.s to defend tndr own.ll'l 
Adler does not intend to undervaluE~ ·tt~e im~1orta.nce l!lf 
tile ind.i'Vidu&l contrii:lutiona of grea.t pk<Uoao~lhers by 
pointing out the oontribuUon tll.t~.t accrues to plJ.ilo$O:l)hiea.l 
knowledge when the oollecti.ve task is performed.. nis con .. 
cern is that what is esnntial to tile collect! ve tmsk ma:y 
not be done or .ma.y be done poorly. He contends tha.t 
philosophy ca.n be a colbcti ve eJ:ideavor only if philosophers 
confront one another in the light ~at ttnar differentuae• or 
conduct their inquiries &ga.inst the background of the 
total plliloaophioal divert~ity to whic.b. tluey ct:re contribut .. 
irlg, To wm.tever extent divf.n.•sity involves genuine dia-
as;reemen•ts 1 con trove:rsy a.nd ratioti!J\l debate oe,coule an 
essential p ... rt or the ph.i1ot~opb.ica1 ente:t•p;dae as a whole. :ua 
York: 
1115 Mortimer Adler 1 The ~ sa: Freedom, 
Doubleda-y and Co., Inc. • 1958) , P• 61. 
Vol. I (New 
ll'7 ~•t PP• 61·62. 
11~~. 1 P• 62, 
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Dia.le(!tiqal.• ,;.,s@WlU~I;!ona ~-R~t;l.qn~l Debate 
. !J.'he ratitmal el:u~x-aoter of d.eba.te presupposes agree• 
ment a.ml dJ.I!!&Ii£l'eeant• The. meanings or agreement or 
di&a.gnement are used very precisely by Adler. uc 1\l.tarts. 
wi·tn . tM oolllil:ofi een~:~e idea of agreement ordinarily ueed, 
that men are said to be ,;i;n. agreement when they anewer the 
ar.we quution in the s.r.we way;· and in disas;rsernent wru.m, 
to the ll\\>Xtle question,· they gin ooilflicting or inoompa:t;.tble 
answers. He refines the notion and for him; 
:M:en a.s,:ree mum they al'l)) or tme mind on a lla.rtioular 
eubJeot !lind affirm the er.we vroposition or subeortlle 
to till$ ea.me sta.t,eme.nt about :i.tt k\tld tb.at. they di.llla{!;l'l!le 
about .a. particular subJect when wltiii.t they think or aay 
about it coneistll! of Judgment"' or etatawtents that t>u·e 
e:l.t;her oontra.dhtory or 1noondetent.ll.9 · 
When the things they respectively IMHHilrt a.re either 
contradictory or inoonsietent1 both Btatementa cannot be 
true.. When tb.e tlli:ng.s t.hey reeJ.'lectt vely a.f.lE1tlrt a.re contra-
d.iOctory, both cannot be false. 
It must be understood t.IJ.at one peraon ma;y olaim the 
truth :fol' the v:l.ew he holds and ela.itll that it ret.J.uiree him 
to cleny a similar cla.in> by thllt otnel' t'or the posHion b.e 
takee, but i:r l:l~th st.atemente can be true, then the two 
!!len differ; however, so far ~s theil' sta.tllimente go, they do 
not d:i.Ga11ree. 
The insight into the preohe respects about whieh 
j 
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men muet ag:re~~: is ment~oned explie:ttJ.y. QY A!Uera 
N'er ila it. ~e:nera'llY. .unders tlil od t}la.t tlll~ two stages 
ot agreement. whiolll are prerequisite .to disagreement 
are Ml!IO prerequiaite to agretlnetr!i.; . Olfla.l'ly1 t~e 
:Qil!lfeg~ !iij&:£t!!Sl!l'!i!! differ 11'1 Idnd :f'ro11.1 ns Qgree .. 
mente ( o:r disagrtuments) they lllall:e. l>oaeiblth .~ 
The point that ne is l!U!.king is tha.t the prerequ:l.eite 
a.gx•eememts • (tlwot the men M'e oi' ~J>nco mind on a :pau"ti<lular 
subject) differs in kitld tron1 tlle:tr .agreel!4ent tha.t tlley 
aff'il'lll the same :propolili tion or $ubscr:tbe to the aame eta.te.. 
ment about it. so. to disa."ree, the prerlilquisite agreements 
(that th¢ .lllfltt t:tn of one lllin~ on the .Jillll"tinul.a.r aubjeet.) 
di:tfera in ldn<l from. their <>gr<nlment that in t.beir diaa.gru .. 
mont what they think or say about the aubj eot cons is ta of 
jtU:i{l;snenta or !lb.tements thlat are eillher contradictory or 
inconsistent. 'l'.he l!l.bove ideas 11\re what Adle:r oa.lla india-
pensa.ble <i.ialeeticll'!.l prerequis i teth 
Ua.vinl a Cltil.lllmon subJect under dis.c:~uasion and baving 
a common understud.i.ng of the question to be Mswered 
a.re the two indispensable oonditionlil for do~~iin&.l. 
ag:re$lllent aa well as doci>orll.l cU,l'lagreem.ent. · "' 
:poqUiMJ!. N!;ntment and Disyreament: 
He dis.Ungubnes between dtalect:tqal and dootrtnal 
(categorical) llJ.Sreemen'!>a or diaagreements. An ~~t~rUlll!!llt 
with another a.beut wut h tktEI r.igb.t Mswer to a pa.:rttou.la:r 
-------
l20I!li.i\•, p. lo, 
12l.I., !d·· •.. ·• l' "' p. .... 
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question about a pa.rticul.ar subject is a categorical 
agreement. A disagreMent about wha.t is not true or is not 
the right answer to a p&rticula:r question about a particular 
subject invol vee categorical dililQ$reEHnent. The reason he 
presents is: 11Sinoe whG~.t an a.uthQr holds to be true Ulilua.lly' 
depends on his Whole theory of the ma.tter or doctrine, 
oatego:rioa.l agreemtsnt and dieagreement o~:>n also be called 
'doc trina.l. t "l22 
In Adler's theory, both pre~,!!,)luieiteltl are essential 
•-;;,.' 
for :real doctrinal agreement or disagreement, When they 
are present, the men are in a position to agree categoric" 
ally or doctrinally by both saying "yel!l" or by both ea.ying 
"no"t ol' to diSagree by aa.ying Myel(;" mnd the other sa-ying 
"no." Tbie is so t'or contradictory propositions. In 
addition, if one of thlil tuen asserted the truth of a prop.. 
osition and l!tllother auerted the truth of.~~t contra.ry 
proposition, doctrinal dilla.grEUllllent would ~:Llso result. 
It' d ther of the two di&leetical :pre:retlUbi tea f'or 
1\greemen t or disl\grtH'Iment are absent, then the parties in 
a disousaion d.o not doo1Utinally agree or disagree. Theil.' 
agreement or disagreement il!l apparent, not real, since 
they ca.nnot Join iaaue or side together aga.inat others 
unless there is a meeting of miml.s 1 in the liltttiU that there 
--------·--------
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is a common eubJeot or ooflllllon question alJGUt thl!i! !i!Ubjeet 
truo'l;. they undertake to discuss. Ooneequently, Adler calla 
the 114tlree~nenta tha.t oonst~tute such a meeting of minds 
"to pi cal.," ll23 
He dbtingu1ahes between complete and minitilfkl 
topical agreement. Com11lete topical agreement "oomriste in 
having both a oo!lllllon subject and a oommonly understood 
question about it. "124 Minima.l topical agreerJUirtt "oonshte 
in having a oollllllon subJect of discuslllion but failing to 
l!lhare a common understanding of the question about it .• "lll5 
The diatinc:!tions that Adlet makes originate neceasar~ 
:Uy from the ta11k of getting behind the language used to the 
thQugb.t the J.uguage intends to express. In penetrating 
behind the a.:ppe!ii.ruce of ag%'11Ullltent and disa.greenmnt between 
propoeitionltl or eta.te:nenta, there a.re I:UIIITerE~..l poesible logi .. 
cal relations that w~ exist between the propositions and 
the dootr~nal positions of wen asserting or denying propo• 
si tiomu ( l) determinate relevance, ( 2) inde terJnina te nle• 
vance, and, ( 3) complete irrllllevance. Deterlllinate relevance 
consists in ''actual <loetrinal 114l$reement or disaguement.nl2tl 
-----------------
l 'l"' 
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!ndeterll~inlll.te 'l't'lleVl!J,nOI/i oGneht15 in "the p!)seib:l.lity of. 
doct:finli!ol l!.gt'et'lttltilnt or dilllag:UtHllillent."1:n Cotaplete i:r-
:f'elevanoe .uea.ns ·that there ·is "no possibi:U ty of doctrine.l 
ag:reemen.t or d:l.eag:reement,. n128 
Adler assigns a prerequiei te condition for each ot 
theee st.a.tes of propos :I. tional :l;'elationa. · l!'or determinlil.te 
rel.eVll.nce the pre:requisi te · coneiete ot' 11 oomplete topical 
&.greement• <l..e., tile same subj eet of d.iecaseio:n togetller 
with e. OIJl!l!llon;J.y underetood 'lueliltion ~\bout it."129 Deter-
minate releVMOEI l'equirea tbe prerequiai te of' "~ninil'lllfl.l 
topical o.sreement, i,e., ( 1) the same pa.rticu.ls.r subject 
of d.isouasion.or (U) lil CGmmon general subJect that 
elllbra.cee .the different. pa.rtioul.ars being dilllculilr,ed.. ,,130 
For complete irreleiTance thoprerequisite is "the total. 
absence of topied <i!.gl"l\lll!Uiilnt; i.e., two diaUnct Md 
logically unrelated subJects of dbcuslilion • .,l3l 
A 'eru¢ial problllim• fo.w Adler, is whether tiiverse 
ana were to the slilJUe quen tion oQJ!l constitute genuine dis .. 
a.greelll.ent U' the answero t&ke the form of definitions. For 
unleu .there h aQlll.e Wfii.Y of id<.mtifyin{l; tlla.t which is the 
Col!Won subject of diverse definitione, the m.nswerl:l do not 
C<Jne'ti tutt · dise.greeo1ents but ditferenoe111. :ta there a way 
12'1~., 
l28l!W!· 
129~. 
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of idl\lntifyin€~ 114 subj111et of diaouesion without defiuin~ it 
se that. with the lii<YJI<ll e.ubJut CIC~mmonly uralililra tood tr1 mind, 
diaairce~M~nt c&n llltill ex.ht about how it should be def:tned.? 
Ue sta. tes the problem. in the following cU. lemma.; 
Either { :i} t.wo men employ tl1e e<W~e det'ini U.on to 
identity the subJaot &b.ey a.:rlii dhcn.liiHil1ng 0 ill whicb. e&&l'l 
they oa.!UlGt disagree abl)ut its dd'ini ti<»!li o:r ( ii) tney 
un different det'initiuna.- in which case they m.re not 
diSC11UIIIBing tile lll~M~e suhjeet. &l.rui cannot tUuagre~t <>t lli.J.l• 
On either alternative, liin~:veelllent about d.ef"ini.tions 
would. seera impoesUlle. · ' · 
:fie notes til111.t Pl!l>to, in Bi, so:o, sta:ted a similar 
dilelllllllll. cottoernin~; learning and dieeov·ecy and Professor 
Iiudolf Oa.rn&p p;rQpolllliHl a.n 10newer to the dil4i!illilla in termr.s 
of explica.t.l.ol!l in hil'l work, klli§§J. Fpun,Wi,!.&!on~t At ;\;!'!:OR~· 
bili1fY• Carna.p lllll!.intli>.ined that the proOI;Ullm of expli<l&tion 
cotll!lilil ted in tra.nei'tlrming a giVen iiii.Uifll or loss inexact 
concept into a.n exact on<~., He ea.Ued the given oonoept or 
the term UliHiii f1lr it the explie<~.ndwnJ the ex61.et concept 
propose4 to take tlle ;vla.oe ot' the flr~Wt or thtll term pro .. 
pos•Hi for it* 'the expJ.icatUIJl. l:l:e 111.lU1> m!iiointa:b<ed tim t Uut 
p:rroeess or explLo&tton lltll.de :f'or u:.l.entif'ie vrogrelis pre-
cisely beeattu t.l'Ae oris:inal <wnoept wa» re;plaoed by a 
better or !llOl'fl ~uet 1me. So e:xplioat.ion w~1:1 :!.:ruiia pentJable 
in tt~e d..eveli)J;Unant ot' c;. ~tdonce. 
Adler obr1H~.:rvet1 that "Thl\l sQllle :procGss ocottrs in 
-------'---
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philt:~aopbyil"l33 He! noted. t1:1a.t.; 
{}!ll.:rna.l,) :ref'&:t'e to l!ilitllttltd Huas•l('li a ¢h~&:rva.tion tl~•t, 
in the development of ,v!tilol.'lopnioal thought, we pa.sa 
. :t':rom a !l()nf'uae(l• Mn ... ~Uoulatd FH':.P,ee of <tn o bj eot we 
are conllidering to a dhtinot, IU'Uoulated sense. 'rhe 
latter HU.I!I!i'HUi'l calls the "lll:ii:Pl1kat11 of the. forruer, 01.nd 
rega:rlis the two ae united in a nyn·thet>is of identtf'ioa .. 
tion. One would ttot "*llt:v.Uoa.te .'lihe otllef3!t' both .w~;~re not O(HliUI:rned with· an id@nt;i,oa.l ol>jeot •.. · 
AdleJt a.llllo noted that i.larnap :rdel:'X'iiHi to l?NfesliH>r 
o. :11. l.a.n~rd' s exam.inat:L.on Q:f' G. :m. J&oore' a .notion of 
ana.lysil:l and stated tl'J.&t hi~J conception of e:~tpl.ioandum and 
explieatum wam to e0111e exttmt miruihr to wlu.t c. :rr. Lang .. 
ford. called aru .. lysan<iUlll {that wb.ioh ia to be analyzed} a.nd 
anaJ.ysane (the analysts fit it). The dJ~~ila.rity reeidtH.'l in 
the fact ttmt p¥lilosoph1ca.l analyda, according tie P:roft~tH!Ol' 
La.ngford, pr0oeeded by subsU t.uting an im,Proved formulation 
for a hu sa.tilllfaotory one. l':r:ofe~sao:r Langford wrote "when 
it h the pur,Pose of a.nalyiUS to iuue in a dd"inition, the 
motive h uauall.y that of suppl!i>ntina a :re.laU nly vague 
idea by a tnore preoilUI on!h":U.it; 
For Adl.e:t'• the rd&t:l.on of S!(~n&tn4ws wld definiena 
ie comparable with the ~•l~tion of ·~~li~~ and explioa-
tum• or of analysa.ndwn and ane.lyi:!Ms.. As he t.ttlderstood u, 
133 ~· 134 llt.!i.. p. 19. 
135c. lt. tang:t'erd, "The Notion of I!J'll<l>lyeh in Moore' a 
:Pbilosopey," .·~ &)b:t.#HMHlllJI; .g1 il• l• IQpr,t (Vol., IV o:t: Th.e 
Ul?lY:t: .2! Uxtng li'!l,ilQ§c:Pljen, i'fiseonsint Georltll Banta. 
PU:blislling co~, 1942), P• 329 • 
which is to be d.e:t'ined, (i.e •• the defin!eJl.dlAfi) w:l.thout 
employing this o~ that definition, each a definiens, to 
accompl:bh the identi!icatiort, 11136 The solution to the 
p:roblem must show now the subJect thtl.t is identified in a 
eerta.in w&y ca.n also be defined in a varil'lty 0f ways w!lioh, 
while dU'fning from Qne anothel't all ah!U'e the elements 
of .meal1il'lg whieh. ~Served to identU'y the eubJeet in the 
first place. 
It h Adleao'e contention that in the proceu of 
defini tiont which h dlllila.r to that of explioa.tio.n and 
analyeie, the mind Pti.IUJElfl fron> one underata.nd.ing ot an 
obJeet. to MGther a.nd better underllltt~ondine of M1e iil&lla 
tiling. 'J:'he ident.:l.t;y of thtl objeot oa.nnot be deaonst:e~~tted 
for it ill lmown by the mi!ld in the very act by which it 
eeeu that an obJect it be.lll unduetood i!la.thtqua.tely can 
al.so be understQ!ld with gre~ter pree:l.sion. 137 For exwnple, 
a llll.l.n ay realiae that a girl is walldng tOWi!!.rd h:l.lli and 
later recognize her a.s his d&Uihter. 
00nsequent1y• b,r ha.vin& .in mind the 1uwe subJ&et, 
by be.ing in to piaal agreement 11.bout the ll!Ubj ect to l>e 
defined (i.e., the identified definienQ.um), 1:\aterminat:ton 
--------
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idl$n~iftca.tion of a gtini>nlsi.ya• lili:~J .. ~ .. st~tement of its 
de:Uni tion• senes to denote th.e object billing eons ic:lued 
•e~ well. ~t~.e. teO connote its llE~<ture or ch!u•aeter., !!:Both .a,n 
idflin.Ufica.tion and a definition point to ~ Jhil.!b !.§. 
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b&:i,Qi !!,li!nl!!ide,req e.nd oi'f<u: some forslltal!l.Uon of Wbl>+l .U, .!!f.•~lSS 
Thll! deno:ta;l;ion of the initial :tdenU:t'ieti-Uon ( dt~~fin­
ill!nd\wa) embra.(les the: conflicting dei'inUions ( eaeb. of tb.e 
d:U':ttuu'llil) • The fact th&t the confl:tcting: det'in:l.t.ions 
embocly the content at' the iden.tH'ying formUlati>:~n d.ellGt\lls 
something w;hich b comlllon t.o them bothl i.e,., the su.hjeet 
s.e. identi.fie.l.il, Each definition also goel'l beyond the iden.ti• 
tyi,n' fo:rmulat:l.on by a.ddillS thi~L~ or t:l:l.ii!.t definitive ,point. 
Each d.efinithn as ... whole abo. den<>tell li di:t't'erent object 
of thou.&rht wilile being a ctollllllon subject in th~ ini tia.l 
identification.. ':l~h~~t collllnon ill'ubjtot b d'<~n<>ted by oppolili:ni 
defini tiona, t'or the ide.ut.U'yir±g t'ot•if.lulation dfilnoteG tna.t 
wllieh oonf':Uct.ing. def1ni'tions Mntain a,a part Gf thelll3elves. 
EMh det'inition b a more def'inite formulation ot· tl:1e 
idl'mtifyins fowmul.a:t,ioll'l.'l connotation. l'JI.a eompllU"ed with 
aaeh of' tbe divngent ddiniUona tha.t ~ be Ginn to it, 
the identif.iaatiol'l. or a. nubjeot expr~lUllilli:l a. ooneeption of 
. -----~- --- ---- ----------- - --- --- ---------
it that h- rel<;;tf:vely vag1.n1 and ina.deqU¢l.te.ul:SII ... 
'1Vmna thia h a'-'G!t~hdft$d,1 t.b,e i,niUa.l i.dentif:tea .. 
tion Md the i!lttba'!flqttent di\lfini tiona oo·th .point to thlll !!lUll 
ob4 eat, wt ll11i ide:nt:tfic&tion ia leslil predrH:l' or epecifh 
thil>n the defirU.tioniJlt both dt~notl\i.tinly 1;1.r1<l' aom'lllta.t.ivaly., 
Oonsequt!~ntly1 fl:run the ~~ta.lli.il rt~la. tively Vlli$U<' or g\\lnlilrio 
ident:U'ha.tion of liltl obJect um1el' eonsider&ti0n, it h 
posl\\:l.ble to p:retJent ineom~ttibU det'i~iUons whioi'l (lom>ti-
tute dilllllli$l'eement, wi tllin tll$ tilJhel'e of l!liniml topica-l 
~:reemen:t. 
trutf.l o;r li'i"lBitx gf :£1!fi!lHiP.U. 
In dil>tiiUSili~ the truth or falrrlity of definitions, 
Adler dis tin~uieb.es between ver·ua.l a.nd real defini tiona • 
:Both are different kinds of d.l.lfini tiona., Verbal defini"' 
tions meM defini Uoru1 which ~e not intend~d to do aJ.ore 
tb.a.n a.ntto\Ul<ita how a. writer or speakor propneil to uae a 
o•rta.in word; a.s• for eMJ!lple• when ill.l'l author aa.yel 
lterea.fte:r I lifha.l.l use "ciemooraoy• to mea.n liluoh and 
mueh • · '!'he resolution of one .a.uthor to ulile tha.t word 
in one tllllnl!l'e does not Mntri.\d1Qt tu resolution ot 
anothe:t> author to uee 1e in a cLifhrent usnee• Su.orl 
detini tions engender no. proble111 af bow men disa.gree 
by ot'te,.-ina d.itfertmt conceptions of the l\ll!lollie thing. 
It h only a '~ford the;y are talldng •~bout and there is 
notl'l.ing 'par&do~hal a.bout · tlle lllat~le word' e bein€; uaed 
in dift"llli'Eint nueee by diff'IU/'OI:l'~ lllliUl, El!!l.Ol'l for l:!ii'S 
own ;.>w:'lJOii!Elfh 
139~ •• p. 23. 
l4o~., P• 25. 
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a(i:t'lHI<Mmti\i a:llQUt d.&fiilitionl!l can involv® .oppol!led !ii.OfJ'Il.rtiona 
cotuilUning whillot h true only it' '!>he oppci!Jti(l de:tini tiorla a.:re 
o:t·rared !Mil :real r~tthe:r than verbalJ i,e.,· a,e, attetnpte to 
undentand the reid n&ture of things ratlllilll tkJ&n e.s indica ... 
ti ont~ of the meuiill!llll men winh \o <i.t tach to words. 
Merely verbal det'in:i.Uons are neither t:ruc nor 
talett ~~md allow for diffuenoes of opinior• aa to the 
utility or oonnnienol1l of oompi1ititliii detinitiQnl!l, · Hea.l 
dei"initioluiil dhagnements are true or !tl.ll!le; i,;e •• not 
offel?ed merely to :i.ndie~~te t~ow a. word a!lall be under~tood 
but a.l111o aa a.ss&:rt.ing l.'loilletlil.ing about the nOtlture of t!le 
aubJ<>ot being dl.$1\!Umeed for wh:i.ob. tl:'Uth. is claimed. AU 
:i.sllnl& about .\ietinitio~• existlll only { l} wlllilll. thl!i :vropon .. 
ente of thfl ae!:l.ni ti~:ms ~:~.-u in th.~~Jir ide.ntifie$tio.n of 
the objeet being <!Oil$ide:ved; ( 2) U' the defini tio:ns 
j 
proposed are such that both gg,nnot be t1:ue of the sa~ne 
obJ eot.142 
In addition to or.mceptua.l issues which <ii.:t'G concerned 
with quut;:l.ona about the "na.turf# of tile subJect under con .. 
s:l.dera.tion, or by questions a.bout its kindl!l and properties, «143 
Adllllr also distinguisbes between oxilltentia.l ~,<.nd norma.t:l. ve 
illlaues. E.'tis tentia.l islSues IU'e <:~onoernsd wi tll the reality 
or existence ot the t~UbJect under CQnlliderlil.tion; 11 (1i1.) whether 
it does .or 
1 t lll>ote or 
Olil.ll exist, (b) how or where it exists, or (c) how 
l44 is acted. UPOJ'h • :Wornw.rt:.i ve :l.liliH<tHI are raised 
by "questions wllhh el.\ll. for j udgaen ta of Vll.lue roother ·than 
of f&crt, ".'1.45 Tb.ey could be termed i$!!Ulillll or pol.io;r. 
In all three types ot iasuee there :1,$ .a joining of 
issue tb.roU81:l. the Euwe id.entit:l.aation o:r definition of the 
lliubjeet under com~Jiderat.:l.on. '!'he poaition thM is taken on 
one type of issue c~n ~ffect the position t&ken on the other 
types. Argumenta e.pp:rop:rti(;l.te to one type of iailue would 
not be a.pprtrpdate to the otber types of illl!II\UH;,. 
Of the three typn, oonccptual isatvas have a certain 
z,>riori ty over al.l the otMrs; and &lllo.ng coneeptu&l 
iillllues di~~~reoments about de:tin:l.tiona have an obvi.o\Ut 
:pritii:Y. 4 . 
For .AJ:.tl.er, there ilil a. difference oetweliln an :l.l'.l.sttl!ll 
l4a.nu •• p. 26. 145 l.la1!!•' 
:1.43~ 
•• 
p. 29. l46!.RU ., Jil~ 31. 
144~., P• ::so. 
and a. contrcven:·sy •. An :Lmstul ~>derivee 
topica·l a(;tre~ment whicb. undo:t'li<UI its 
its unity ft~<Jn! thl'l 
14'7 formation.,• · A 
l!lingle isaue considers a coll!~Aon au.Oj et;t and a eoitwon under~ 
ate.nding of tile question raised about u. 'l'here is colllplete 
topical ~e&lllEmt. The unity of a otmtrovlilrsy "derives 
from a eeill!lton aubjt'H'.lt; i,.e,, a.ll ita component in\tes !llue'!! 
rela.te. to tile llli\lll& subject,."1413 Tll<~.re ia r4illim.al topiC!iOl 
qrfUtmlmt, i.e,., s.greem.ent about tile liHI.bjeot a.lon¢• 
.A cerH>roversy; ia .more complex tno an iss.ue.. It 
involves a niAlllber of iss;ues whioll are l'd<~ted t);y l:w,vint;t a 
oollllllon subJect .\U'ld lll.ls!.l takes a ce:r'ba.in fo:rm or struotu:t'e 
tram the other wa.y111 in wbiell theee heuel! JlUl¥ be rii>late<i• 
one ot' its conetitaont iuttelll lliaY be logiea.lly dti!JiH:mdent 
on a.nathn.• in: th1$ aenee that f1. :PQd ti ~n taken on o:ne iuue 
in il1 some ••nner det.el'l'ldned by tnll! pod thn tli!.ken on 
MOther; or two bsuoe llla.Y· be logically· intel'de,pendent in 
'the stmtH~ tho\t the :poeition taken on either o.ne is in some 
!Almn<>r ~~~offechd b'y thlil posititi>n t~ken on tb.tl other Qne • 
. !Jut even if· two heues a.re logiel!l;lJ.:Y independent, they 
a till belong to tht e~ ec;n troveruy it' tb.e;y h<we a c.QfllJ'.l!on 
subje.et,. 
!f a unit of oontrove~ay involved a aingle a.(lt or 
l.4'1 ~. • P;. :!.12.;, 
148J:!!:ld. 
J 
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is !lues, that ~:~et .w:oul.d eoneti tute the ecyrtt:rove:rtay a,bou.t 
tl:!tl unit. 
95 
:u: a. unit of I!H,nt:roverlly inv~>lved a. mingle li>tat of 
ilisuelli, that rout vtGuld oontltitttte the oont:rove:rsy a.ilout tM 
ur11t. If the' ul'lit of oontl'ovt~~rsy eon tained .il®VIilr"'l die.t!not 
seta of i!a!lluee, t:twn ell.oh o:t' tho r<H!IVe:ra.J, unUs, of. oontrt~ .. 
ve1•sy would be a·ogardeGl as l'>ne of tho cont:roverl!liea .of the 
unit• 1~Mh· hafil Ull:l <nm un:trying attbjeot1 ~~IH<~Y. identt .. 
tied by the minimal topical a.g:reemfJlnt. 
The l)lil<rtioula.r iaamu:l. that are d.:l111tirtot llubJe<~ta of 
eont:roverey ·are !l1llt tot!i!.llY unrelati!ld., l'b.ey. 1.1.ll .tall under 
tile aubJ ect of tJoe gl!lneral contronrlll;.n Vlh&t uni;fies tlle 
whole O.O!l t:'toversy itil a minimal top:f.ca.J. a.g;>U!ll&l'lt on the 
nl:IJeet of tM !ll&neral controvll!rllly. Tlle mini!ll&l tl.\l:)ioaJ. 
Q,g:t."illl!lnlent ia implicit in what enl'y one of the ll!pecia.l 
bslHiS tt111e<~~rt111 about the &enerttl l,lontrover~>Y• J:t prevents 
i!la.Cih oont:rover!lly of apii!d<~>l :l.$tsuea from 'be1u~ in a atatE~ of' 
eompl.ete irrneva.noe to aU the otner oo.ntrove:r$ie·& of 
special ielsuea,. 
The ilHtve:ral apecia.l aontrt\verll!ii>OI about the gener4U 
eo11t.rov•u:·ey com be diBtinguiah:ed t'ro1n one a;nather by 
reference ta t.hEiir distinet IHlbjeets, eMh an :Lnue tlUI.t 
ea.n be. id.enti:t'i.ed as different :t'rom the. ottte:l.' p;o.rticula.r 
ifleues wb.ioh are the l!lllbJect of the other .Qont:Jt'overdes. 
The general controversy can be ditltingubheci from the 
i 
I 
! 
~ 
j 
several special eontrovtu.•des by ~he fact tha•t the ieeue 
in genual b its unityintt eub.;jeet, StH;h a. f:'IU'Iera.l oontro•. 
versy abo.ut an :Lsoue a.riees when the b<.Mii!C question about 
the ldn4s of ilileuu is re.beli, and wh~111 iuue1:1 are Joined 
abou~ wnetl:u1r the l!lub.;Jiilct of tllii\1 or tna.t I!Ji!eeiu.l Clontro• 
veray is or is not a ldn4 of. the general controversy. The 
eubjecta of the special eon trover lilies are involved in the 
~eru'lral controversy, but they are involved orilY inao:f'ar as 
they are a.t'fh•&ed as real or distinct iuuea which fM.ll 
under thG sub.;j EHilt of the tNeneral controversy. 
Like each Qf th.e epee:f.l:ll. cont rov&:r.•filieo; the general 
controversy ie one unit in the whole and not the who.le 
eontroverey. However, it if! through the general controv·ersy 
thu;t; the 111pedllt.l oontrovel'll!h& are relahd to <me M()ther. 
Beyond the 1eneral OQI'Itroveray t.bere is no other &ore ooq~ .. 
prehtUlfil i ve contreversy. .All the un:l.tf.l of controversy • both 
special and general• are contained in the one a.U .. eJ!t:braoing 
liiUbject. It is d1$nificant to refer to tb.O!I ~;ubJeet of: 
controversy. It is more preo:ble tQ apeak ot the oontrovera• 
ies abo\lt the subject, not the eontroveray a).;Qut the subjeqt; 
&Qeordins to Alilar. 
:ru,iltn'!:£ih&l M!I!U\! 
Dialectic eaucdved aa om underetandil:lg of tile ~•nwnp.. 
tion$ tu~AteEI'la.:ey to attain ob.;jeei,;ive trutb in rational debate 
hu a. role to l)la.y in philosophical otm traversielll aruL slloul.d 
! 
! 
1 
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1 t does in. fact• in ~Y intellect~a.l put suit wh.:l,ch 1a con• 
cerned with. ol>Jt~ctin tru;tb and. in wb.tch, therefore• agree-
ni1U1.t ie tht \iltimate &.oal !Jl.tld .diSI'il'eement ilil resfll.r1i!ed as a 
st<a.ge., and d.it~~pute as. a. means of reaching u,,.149 
we thinlt: thlil.t d:l.~~ol,ej:~t1Citi,l cla.rifie.a.Uon can be of 
llttbsta.nti&J. n:rvice to uhnce !ilnd iltator.r JJJlt:l.Y: or 
flffllJ!icia:t.,lr in then in~tHMICCtll in which the 'ifiiigree-
m.entlil that occur ~e phi.losophical in fttl':racta:r and 
have a. predominantly t.l'!.eoretical oa.st. . 
Cl>:nsidered from tile <Oepect of U!':re.etnent or dbagree .. 
m.ent required in theil' schm.:ee• a ph:!.losoph.iclii.l doctrine, 
like a sctli!lntifb l;heo:r,y of the enrpiriea,l lllciencee, h 
t~om.ethintl tW.t SSI!Htnt:ta.lly cl!!.lle for agreement or .tU.ea,gree .. 
men t • From the liltMne po:l.n t o.t' view, a. poem., as a r.•oe1n1 ;.toes 
nlllt agree or t'li&ag't'ee wit& tmlltlle:t'. Ji'Geta:~, a.s pGots, Q.g 
not a.sree ol' dieagrelll with (i)llfl iilnother'~ ••:r.o asll: wh.e ther 
:Ho.!ll&r a.nd Tolstoy agree• b to :inquire, not about the epic 
poet.ey of th• ;p.;!,M Md Ju AUJl ~5fll:Qi; bUt lil.bOtlt. tb.d:C 
ph.:l.l<>lllf:IP.b.ical oontent..lll!>l 
So. wi\b. l>'ell:pnt to 01.greemeut and disOI.greement, 
pllilosopby' &nd so:I.IUloe .stand tom;etllu as against poet;tW. 
:But ag:r\ilement lilllld di ea.greeme:n t do not oceur in the li!!>Wl.e w6y 
:tn philo.sopby Md. tCifllnoe. ~t'hey differ in tthe temporal 
-·------
p(l.tt~r:ns lilf.aani!!.~lent and ~u.s~gX'~~men't .. and in the .mem.rd~ 
of ~1'¢¢rul1nt 1md ~,uat:~.g:re~>.ltlii~~t. t'or ei\j;ih• ,. In the· ee:tem;cea 
coru:petent l!!e.io:r:ttintlll of t.h." lilai.ile ~.ll!Xl'lllZ:U~on• ,.l'lort'line in the 
~\'Vle field.•. ten.lii to. ~l'<ih1) a:oc;>~.t the pa;•obl<~~ls t<::!. be solved 
ar!.;t l!thi:Ju t the ptllil:1Up,peo;it~ona in sol vin~ th,e:ll,., According to 
Adl!llr. !:lxoo.:Ml i.;!.:i.l!ll!'igre'lll!lent \lillCUl'$ only between lil¢1entists at a 
J;113.:rtthulll!,:t- t~. fit$ ~td tb.e 1%' f.or~rl.t~merz* w'tlo ,l?O<>t,;a;;r.nd fewer 
faet$ at!Cl. . t.echttiqt<!!llfl 1 or did not lu;,ve .tl:~e· lM.'i.v~mtal!>e of .eer ... 
t!llo:!.n tt!eo3;•etic.lill d'I!VeloPJ'!lent~,. "Aiil betwetm a later. &nd 
earlier century • tm re a.X<.e Ull\ttally ~r.lcad diffe;ranO!ls of 
oPinion atbout U:lH1ful h.fpot.heflen t.~nd en.tewt.ain~bla th~;n»:ries. nl52 
In philOI$Qpby ~ op~'ozi te temporal ;pill.tte:rn .of t~:rae•n.ente 
a.nd dba~reernentl.l! jJ;, dbea:rnable• <~f:h~;;:re b eo~:~s:l.de:r<t,bla 
~ii.'GM>Olfl} M()llg p)l:i.J.cl~o:Plter<> li Vitog at ?<i~llll.y SEHJ~<.l'ated 
t$.!1!.:;w;. not onl;!r in tl'lei;r t'ormul.""ilion of thl!ll pertinent qw11s• 
t:l.o!~m, ~u'i; ab.o in ttv~i:r eonviotitm ~~s li~> tl~e .• tru~t~ ~newel'!11o ,.W.'S 
In :;e:i.llnee anli J11hilo0ophy the eotlaequenoell of a.g:ree .. 
~nt anrl cU.n~l'a~men t di:t'f'illl"o . 
In utenet~~ tne d:l.!i!agreemant ot a. b.t~r w!tll an 
•~rUer gene:ra.tion usually meiil.nlil the correetinn of priar 
fi!l'l"Ol'lil in Ol:'llliUV&.tion QJ: theory by J.Ut)i}$!:Jql.lllllilt dill!OI)VIO'l' .. 
tes Oli' torntul.a.thns; ~M"td thll! lii!UbstanUal, a.gr~HJ',znent crt 
Q:t>lltlll!llj)O:t'arbt~. irll.U.I.lates tl'l10-t the pl'ii'!Oi:r;>l@l.\1 and 
methods at a !lleienee ~tre well est~J~.bliA:~Ji.ed.J.54 
--------~-------
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::r:: 
= ~ 
J 
In a particular 'orancl:i of acientific inquiry the extent ot 
agreement li!.lllong the competent investigators •~nd the oris ta 
usually indicate~;~ its maturity and power to advance more 
rapidly. Agl'lHII'o!ent, even unanimity • i8 not regarded as a 
barrier to progl'eu. !n the philasophioe.l inves·Ugation of 
a basic subJect, the extent of agreement is not usually 
considered the sign of the maturity at: philosoph:l.cd thought 
on the subJect. D11illai'];re$mertt 1$ generally :r•egarded as tne 
mark of its competence and vigor. 
For Adler• disagreement is not inimical to progress 
in pl\ilQllH>,Phy only when it is obJ eetoi ve <&nd ol!i.pable of 
l'ational resoll.\tion, In that rempect, philosophy <md 
science diff'er in two \'lays that explain why dialectic oan 
contribute to the p:ros;ren of the one but not the other. 
Except for those instances in whiCh d.iaa.greements 
a.Jllll\1'1€1; liloientistll) are et:wtmti~o~.lly ph:l.loi'H.tPklioal in 
eha.:raete:r,(a) no special dialeotiea.l effort is re-
quired to identity ~he subJ ecte on wL'I.:I.Cb acientiatliil 
differ or formulatC>l the questions on wl:l:lch they di&ilil~>gree; 
and furthermore, (b) w:l. tl:l regard tG liiUOh questions, 
sOienUets Ul:lua.lly 111ettle their dift'eren1H1e by exper:l. .. 
Mnt or obeervatfgg ra.ttter than by controversy and 
rational debate. · 
A purely lllCientitic pnblem, for Adler, is one whiClb 
ca.n be t~Qlved exp$rimental1y by whatever obeerva.tiona.l 
techniques •11'111 obtain the lll.PGCiial data needed ttl> test com .. 
pet:l.ng hypotlHUlelll or tlleories. Within that ~S]ll'Uire of 
;"--
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:problel!la, tb.ere is l1 ttl.e .nncl ror .t'l.ideutioal work to 
indicate the elea.r oppoai tiou of eom]H'Iting tl'l.eoriee or 
.eypother:ua~>• or 1nake explicit the subject or. quel:'ltion to 
wr~ioll e:xperiaurmtation or furtller obtllflll"Vation would. l.la 
,. 
deeia:!.vely relevant.. When acientililtil d:l.ea.gree about a.ny 
l(lO 
matter tht.•t h auacepttble of experimerrt, tlle;r eon~;~truot ii.ll 
eXpl!!rim!lntt not a deln~te, as the beet avail<\ble llit!anr; ot' 
olarit'ying !lind aettlino't the iaaue. The very same r11ethods 
wttieh ecientista use t.o solve their prolllel00 1 they oan a.l<;o 
use to settle their t.Uaagreenumta when t::nnfronted witl'l eom .. 
peting solutions. 
Uow!ilver • in philosophical nllll.ti.ers, except in the 
instances in wl:tiott diaoipllla ado.Pt the l~mgu<~.ge ~~s well <>S 
the thought of their masters, d.H~leetie is helpful. 
(a) Gondderable dia.J.~otied llif'foltt 1~ needed to 
idanUfy tk!.e IHtbJ eetl.'l I.C\lld fti1"UJU1~J>te t1~a ques UQnlii a.i:lout 
wllioll pb.:Uoup,hera ll<!!.ll Pe ahl.lm1 to be in topical .,.gree~ 
lliEint IHI . tlleir d.ootrin<~.l dill.a.tJ;lt!iH<l~entl!l e<>n be mt,•d.e 
e:x:,plioit. il'u~thermare, (b) when philosophical bHH:tea 
are dholc!Vl!ired .and d4lltined.. ·tneir nl;lolution ia 
faoili tuted by <.U.Iil.leotiea.J. olarificati~m ot· Buell 
cox<trover~,;y a.a al:ce .. ey e.:datll implicitly .in the tra.di· 
tion at tnougnt, and, c;gll.:l.net. thi!i> ba.e.kgrotm<l., by 
carrying tM d.*' bate r;z~a1·d in r:;;s e;xpliei t o.nd rt~.tional 
a lllliUU'll!l:t' a.s po1111iible. 
When philosophers culgage in controversy, their 
roo thode ot' a,rgumenta.tion• togo ther with the iUa.teot:l.oal 
n1ethod of clarifying :such controversy, are not thenl!lelves 
c;-
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the primary methode of inquiry by which euh individu~l 
pb.iloaQpb.er lilitttilmpte to sol'lre the problema he ;poiHlil fox• 
hil'llli!leJ.:f'. Fo:t• Adler1 they a.r!l ii<.UXiliary ;pt•oeeduriHI l:>ella.use 
tlw primary me thode of ph !los oi;bio~:~.l inquiry do not tllem-
udvee euft'ice t'or tite conll;t:rue·t:i.on of con trovermit'lil I'll' the: 
conduct oi' rational d."'b&'te., 
Unlike eobnt:l.sta,. philo®ophex·e do not employe th.e 
same mem.ne to prouou.te thllili' :l.nquirhe and. to nope 
with the problema that result i'rom thl'l di vn·a ity of 
theories which emerge from thlilil' efforts • :~hill dit .. 
t'arenoe doee tlot beepel\lk an intellelltu/1!.:1 de;!:".i<Henoy on 
tile p11.:rt ot the p:b.iloeophe;rn ""e i.lolllpi!.red with fioient-
ia·t:s. :R<\$the:r it is li!QJlll>thing in the Vi!Ury nature of 
philosophy and in the methods of pn:iloeophioal inquiry 
which ~~lakes it more difficult to tell wnet.lle:r pniloso~ 
phers are anawertn~: the allime queatiQrw jj.i.)out the &alile 
object• and r<tO:rt ditt'icult, ool}!Siil!luently. to deternU.ne 
whether Oli not they disat{reiii• .1.51 
Adler do4<!s not want to give tJJ.e impreudon tl:U.'I.t he 
naa oversimpli:t'ied the ma.tter. bY presenting !))UCh a ahlil.rp 
distinction between science and philofilopey in tbe :vointa 
nltmtioned above, so he Ulu.mtl'l'litee th11 ll<>inta by preliHlllting 
a recent e:lQiii.rll.ple c>f ~· conflict :l.n scientific.: t;heoriee. 
Albert ll:inl\ltein and Niels Bohr adv!li.tll~ed a.p,p&ren"tly oonfliot-
i.l'li ttlenrielll lll:t' nature ~>nd our .knowledge of a. on the 
bl!l.ds ot' exx>erimcntal knowledse of the beha-vior of etil:l .. 
atOlllio :pa:rticleih 168 
------~ 
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If tb.ere watt a genc~tlae illsue betwt'llsn Eirmtein !imd 
HoM' about wMther everything in natuu bo.a tb.e deter• 
mi'l'l~.tte ch.araetel:'· required by• the law of QQll.t:radietion, 
that itl!lilUI h na·t euueptib.J.e of experimentll.l re!lolu-
ti{ln* Both mtlm .knew wall. the inllH!lCa;paole liJid:tathns 
of experimental reatuu·eh on suoatmuie pax·'l;icles t beoa.uae 
of .the way in wb.ioh the i:nat.rum!l)nts of ooeerva.tun · 
i!.ffeet the phenomena beinl$ Qbefi!rve.d.. Dut · tMy d.Ut'ered 
about how tb.e$e limitatio.tiS akiould l:#e interpt·eted with 
regard to the ultimo.te etructure of rea.J.i ty. since 
the$$ lim1.tations cwmcct be overcome Einstein tmd l1ohr 
cot~.ld look for further exJ,~erimenta.tion to resolve tM:I.r 
differen<Bilth They oa.n only ;;mgt:;.ga in' dhii!ul?llion, ::,a, 
they h11ve ~ 1~yd iu>:ee the dialectied ~ll'lthod 111i~~tt~ be of a.ome h0l;p • , · . 
li'or Adlllfr, tlltll neces~JIM'."~ tiling ia to raco8;nhe the 
clear dhtinotion between seien&ific prool~lll!l and ph1lo-
aophha1 J;lroi;lems l :problems <lt.rlf!WIIl:rQ.ble by expe:dmellt<~.tion 
and problEHiilll a.newera.ble by d(ljbate. .In t.hif!l way 1 scientific 
questions can be recognhlilt'i. 4i.S scientU'ic qUEili!tions even 
when :philosophere atl;elllpt to get :tnvolvli~<i in them ;;md 
pn:tlosopllical qu~a&!Qne can be reeogni~ed $tiS ;ph.iloilop.b:tea.l 
ques tionll! even when scientbts get involved. in tt.tem. :t'his 
ia especially liil',Portant for thoee inetartcea wh<m e"'eh group 
gets involved in 111aoh other'lil field on the fringes o.t: 
uientit'ic and pllilolilophica.l inq\tiry. 
Di;~leetie h ot' va.lue in defining baues and elarify. 
in~ disputiUI whex•eve;ll' there a:re phil.oaopil:!.oal pro\:tlema, 
not only t!loee which lie frankly in ,philof!opbieal terri .. 
tol'Y~ but «.lu those whieil occur in the. borderlands 
between philoMpl:\y and one of' the lll·CisnoE~a.li:iO 
l51lf'ln. .,1 ,~ 
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As Adler sua it, philosophizing not accompallied uy 
adequate dia.leotill!i!.l work gi ve!il philoeopey tk<e ~•ppeil.rance 
of being more like poetry and las~~ like acienoe tluln it 
really h. Whertever the agreements ••nrl di.eagre@men<ts of 
pb.ilosopherm are lett implic1 t o:r concealed• tb,e claim th.at 
pllilol'!opey, like l:SCienoe, is concernt!d witl:l objective truth 
b open to ohlil.llenge. 'fllose wh.o wiall to beli ttl.e plliloao~ 
pey can charge that the g:ree~.t philoeopl:l.ioa.l ayatel!la <u:e 
IIUIX'taly ,poetry., While Adler does not llh&J.re that l)Oili tion, 
he doe~~; maintain tll;;J.t "taken ~•a Whole!!•" two grel:l.t philo· 
eophical doctrines ~-e.g., neweyta and Whitehead's, do not 
illllliediately ocmtradi ct each otr1er IUI!II'e t:tLan do two great 
:poe~<~s. Jilut h& al.so contends tht.~.t inl'lofar aiil the poaitionlil 
tlley tliil.ke on pa.rt:l. eul<~.r :l.liH~uelil C~i<n be isola ted, they et'l.ll. be 
found to be in ll.grntnent or disa.gru:aent • Tile objective 
agreement or d:UBa.greel!lent 'lthieh h poasihla in phiJ.ollH'>b).ey, 
but not tn poetry • rema.:l.ne indiscernii)le w:l.tl1out the <t:PIJli• 
cation of dialectic to philoeophic~l discussion. 
l?h:l.loaopey' s dietinoti ve oh11.raeter is :t'ev<>aled by 
the f'act that. while d:l.a.leouc :l..s :t!la.p~Ueable to 
yoet;ry and negligible for science, it b both 11li:PPli· 
cable to :!>h:l.J.oaophy a.nd nlso :necelilflary f()l" ttle full 
aotl:l.evem&nt of pl:lil.o~~>opey•lll objeotivee. Tllis under .. 
standing of the role of dialeQtie bl thlll philoaophic.il.l 
enterprise as a. whole. b.dpa to correct tillil fa.ln i.fl~Qge 
f!Jf itse.lf t!:w.t pbilo!llophy lilo often p:res~mte, not only 
to its or1:fUs• ~rut in the lil-Pologet.ioa of its 
defender&. ·. 
l6l'th4ll .,. 7" ~·~ v-• 'ijl• 
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The genera-l o bjeoti n or tl:llll work of the Inl'l ti tute 
of Pbilosophieal Etu;;e;u·oh,. which Mortillllll' Adler he~tds, ill 
to •k:e em effort· to take stock of \lell!.te:rn thought on 
subJe:ota whioh h.l:l.ve been of contimlins :phtl,niH)phieal 
in1Hurest frolli the a.dvl!lrll; ot ,phil0so:pl:l,V in a.nchnt Greece to 
the present da.y. '!!here are five sentl!tNi.tl cl:le.ra.cter:l.at:J.os 
of 11111 a.pproa.ch to the st·udy of idea.th They a.:re: (l) non .. 
historisal; (2) nf.m•ph:l.losophie&l; (::!) !lon .. partise;nJ (4) 
a.p;pl'oj!;iJllately oonapr$Mns1VIil; and ( 5) slllf~limiting a.s to 
what can be found tn the written record of :pb:Uoeoph.ioal 
thought,. out gl.'ling bey<l!nll whli1.t can be explicitly :found 
ther~ by trying to exp:U.ce.te wltat is implied or only 
il!lpl:l.l;lit,.l62 
Obvioulllly 1 the uteri~:~.la being 11 tuild,e.(% Zll'lil l:liato:ri ... 
oQ.l in the ·lllenee tW. t the ma.j}o:i:' 4ooW!l(lnta in the litera-. 
ture of <tl:>IY tluio pb.ilowophh\a.J. ·sul::tjeot !~<>VII their da1ii:Ul 
and platUtlll in thlll hh tiU'Y of ·!;bought on the uuvJ t:~at. 
stud.Y 11? non .. nimtoriolil.l in aiui, .in the mtmse tillil.t it 
deliberately abl!ltl'~;t.cts the doC1.lt40nts from theb• M,storioal 
untext and ptltte:rn. It considers them as if they >'Hill'tl 
all contemporary • l'b.e d<lCU!lltilnts a.l'-e t:ret1.ted M rep;u ... 
aentative of tl!ie voice& &f theb' &uth.orl!l pa,x•ttcipa.tina 
__ , _____ ,_ 
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with o~e another in ··.~ <tetual.. dil!lii!unlil hrh 
l'lW I#.,Pl1ill'O&oh b n.on•pluloll!Ophioa;:l in the aenae tk~.at 
it 4oeifl Mt undlartaJte to de~lep a theo:r-.r af the idw& under 
li!t>l:'li.1:1.4~;~:rcation, or to defend. any. tl:leoey l!.l;a · t.rue. The pr;t .. 
W)flill'JI tnoU w ot a. philoeopbic!ll.l appr\l'l<'l;li!h is to develop or 
de:l.'cr.ui a theory llr,bout the subj e.et Wlder eona:Ldere.tion wt1ioh 
its «~JtJ,itHl'.lnt claims ia true. The priJll&ry moti vs of the 
ncm•phUo1ilopl:.1ca.l a.pproa.oh "ia to develop e iltpothelllia !!!<bout 
the eGntroveraieu i•aplieit in the literatur~;~ oi' & ph.iloso. 
;phha..l lintbjeat and to support that eypotlaesia by :reference 
ta the lletu~l dQ<tui'llenta ·that rlilp:relillettt :te4orded tl<ought 
about tlle ¢~ubjeGt.,"163 ·The d.istinethm ot'fered ia or1e Qon• 
enning non-philOi:!o:ph.iol!l.l truth abQu.t !>he bot\;1 or thought 
i tl'leU in. the li teratuu. and i;,he lJhilot~~olJhieal truth about 
the aubjtllet. 
'l'll.e non .. pa:rtiriHMl enaraateriatie .ot' the «.pl)roaeh 
me&ntl tlla. t 1 t til limi Md to twyins to preli!etit <J.l'l a.tHmrate 
or tl'ue pi<~ture of tha <ilont;rovei>aie~l implh.i t in phfd.o,. 
liloph!Oal li te:r10.tuu w!dle refraitling from taking p;•rt in 
sucl1 eontrovE~:rshll». It also means th<l. t a. al:tti!t«.ined effort 
to be ia.:pa.rt:lal :l.n its t:we&tllillln.t ot· all pointt~ ot' view a.nd 
to deal with tb.em :l.n <>n obj $1lt:l. VI!$ a.n<\1 11ii!Utral. lJUtl'ln.e:r b 
made.. It tl'hlil neith~;<r to favor nu:r ttl ~eJudioe ttte 
=;= 
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ph.Uosophfcill.l .poe:Uiorul ,dr 'ti€1!\\'llil .u .et..u,dies. 
111. ~tt~1llJ,'lting to eover the ,IJiw<'l$p of !t®!lltern t!lot~ght 
on m, fundalil.ental philo!lopl;lieal eubject• cu~:rent irv'luiry 
and litllltliUIHiioU i~~J illte$X'&ted With tM Wllol<~J t:radit.ion in~ 
llt:ritnd from the past, w:t th. eMh ~!i!f! of tll,~e ~J~vel,>.Praent 
reoelv:tng ·itill du(ll em:pha!!is in ~r. bii$l!O~:t(led ltiett<re of' the 
wholfh 'fo the ext.ent tbat the dtHlU~Ientill li<elected t'o:: etudy 
a.re r<~p:re2'entl!lti11'e ot' the l!la.jor or tt>olllt si~!'>ii':ic<>nt tY.pee 
of thel)ry, tb.ll! eux"\l'ey a.;pp:roaol~es Ute daai:red ~Oll!PX'!l'hetn'l~ve .. 
ness in a¢ope, and th111 uo.mprell(l!'ll!livenee$ of the iill'.udy ia 
&llPl'axilllr.tllld. 
·l:>inue no :flull f:ta.lllework of pi>ilttsophioal cont:r.o., 
ver&¥"· about a bawie ide~ al:r.ea(iy el!iil!lte, it oamnot be 
simply extrm.1;1ted :t'rol!l the l1 tera.t1.ll"e.. ':l.'l'l.e frM.t&Wo:r.k ea.nnct 
be l!l~u·dy :li'lllporta,d., it tl>UIIt be t·ormed by a y;rooeas of ~.rn&l.ll .. 
baing and elarU'yin~ whii!t ie mo:rdy im:plio1 t in th€\. exta.nt 
pllilolill).l!hical t.U.ver<>i ty. . a om . the philo<w:pl:li cal diverll i ty 
lii.bout !1l. pa.rtiouMl.r aubjeot in ·thlil 1it3:t"ll>~>U:rlll, Qons.truct:Lone 
are under·llt.tken :l:'or w!late11'01' ell'®ente ttf con.trov((lray are 
warrant€~<!. by t.ile evidenue or '11"HIW!il a.¢tually lllllld, ti!l.' IJQS1• 
tiona <.14tn.t!llly dehndell!.. s.'h~£~ 0%'1<Q.tn:v('5 qu(i!.U ty in ooM·!irue .. 
tiona liea in the way a cla:ritying reflection on what "'·l· 
rea.c.'ly elti~Jtl.l in tlla wol"l·d of thol.li$ht ia d.m1~, a.nd. not by 
tho add:!. 'Iii on of new doobiMI!l ol' theoriea to tholile pro-
;posed. "If ~nytll:l.ng is added, :it i~ undent-.nding of ·f~he 
diversity c>f opinions irt. the l;!.ght or wzl.icl~ on61 ~:~holild be 
_::::-::-
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form & c:r i tical judgment o t his own • "li!\4 
the word lldialeeticiitl'' de'*igna.tee for Adler, "the 
ta.sk of rendering an ol:>j active, :l.mpa.rtial• .:md neutrally 
:formulated repowt. of a JUMy.eided diuuuion."165 Dialec .. 
t:l.cb1u refere to «those wl1o play tl'u:~ role of observers and 
·.. 156 interpreters." D:l.a.loct:ic ie used t.a nli~Jll.!;~ "the method 
they elllploy 1n reconstructing the oontroversy about t'reedom 
th.a.t ie Ji)fii:rt;ly e:x.plioi t uti partly implicit in tlile litera .. 
ture. ,.16'1 . 
Ad.le:i.' e:Jtplicitl,y states tl:!.!li.t S<;>n:>e ill Wb,ioll .. he Ulil.llll 
the word.e iii! tlliite dJ.eaimilM~ from the aenec in wh:l.ch tM;v 
were uf!ed b;v xa.nt,, Hegel, and £ngeliii• He a.lno ~ekrii.Wtledges 
that his lln4~rstwdiug ot the di.a.leetioiitl flask ;';,lld the 
method of a.px•rtHll.eh, ·mile ueuing some l:'eiael!lbl<l.nce to the 
undc:i:'atlil.nd:l.ng Oct" dialectic in· the Pla:tonie dia.logueu and 
EUI:peoiilly to A.rhtotle'lil Tnie,, pos:ul11H1es important dif-
ferences autfic1ent fo:r.• an acknowlcdg;~ent tkAA t the words 
are being used in a f(pt~~:Q:I.a.l and :restricted sense. 
h ·La aJ.Iio evid.•mt th.a.'l> Adler' e ~.t~eaning of dia.lecti .. 
1 
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efforts to state fairly and illlpa.rtililllY ·the bsun whiCh. 
they tb.oupt existed between tb.em11elves and. other thinkers; 
and ~W.so by M.llltol'ia.na of tllouib.t who attempt to present M 
objeeti ve acQutmt o:t' the in telJ.fH'Itual diversity whioll they 
foi.Uld on ~» fundi!U!i\ilntal aubjeot and to reeonatruet the lines 
of controversy. 
Adler' a work U dhtincUve for it :rer>r(~tt;ents an 
exeluUvely dialeotical approach to the diiloua;e.ion ~;~t' '-' 
ba.s:l.ta suhject ll\nd a.ttlil!lpt~;; to enoora.pa1u in a sustained 
mannlilr the who.le sweep of that dimouuion. Ita only in• 
terest h in the rdatiQnsh:!.ps of agree.1uetrt. and diea.gree-
men t ttu:.t "ean be found among a wid a diVeni ty -of vie\!llil 
( es.cll oi' wllic b. ela.iu truth or imports.nce) t.ogether with. 
tlle eonuquen<1>111> tnut oM be diaeovtn:ed t~> fl«>w fro!ll such. 
l"ela.til'>n&hips • u168 
While the dialectician does not p<;;.rtioipi.>te in th.e 
diuuuion, he doee work to produce an llbJc,~etive a.nd 
Cl.11.rifying account of the di$OUIH~ion• ,\Ill Adler t;see the 
word dis ou&~ahn,. he~ ha..lll nh:l.fted the mean:!.n~ to refer to 
lilomethins that S&W a t:ow.\1 in tne doewnen1H> wll:I,Ph consu .. 
tute tlw litera.ttu:'e of ~ eui>Jeet like t'reedom or demoera.ey 
or God., 
--------
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In_ this .oatH~ ·t~ ·mo-ca!lf!·d •G.i.$<HUH~i0n" ext*J'n4.3· over 
llll'l.ny e~n'inu:tes. It invol.v<>n~ tew a.ot\U!.l eonveraa.t1ons1 
ot ev~m w:ritten exehangeB, lil;l'l,\ong it$ l1<>l'tiQiPlil.llta. · 
~!.*ill')se who come fl!U'lUr in tlle tempox·a.l apa.n of such. a 
diaeU$!!:1ou neoeaauUy ~ape&.k in i.gnorano.e of what thdr 
aucoeuora will ~ve to aa;y, and tbll!Y are sometimes not 
1\\oquainted with. t.he eont.doo·Uol'UI of all theb cont&IIt• 
por~rs.ea. Tholile who oome l.M.ter h.11.ve the ~dvarrt!i.@e of 
being in. a posi ti<l*'i to li!Pe&.k in tlw Ugh.t of wtw.t has 
already l>etm said on ttle li!Ubject, out tttey • too, &re 
. seldom eognh~~t of tll,e oontril;n,~Uon made ey tr•eir 
predeeelilsors.J.ti9 · 
!1.11 tbe above $€11l$6t thli di.eiJUl'l!JiOU ~Mil a Whole in .. 
vol:ves many pa.~·tioi:pants for wllo.a1 the whole diuuseiot< doea 
not ex:l.et. 1'1l.e dhetu~don 11.111 lil> whole oan. exbt o1d.y fol' 
those who h!i.Ve exaained the wrHten record and studied the 
11tost eignifioa.nt eontriootione that !lave IHiHiltl made1 a.nd who 
~ve a.l\'lsembletl and related tile docn.:ments the,t dea.l wi til a 
certain topic,. 11 '1'¥ua unity ot ·tb.lil wh.ob lh1.1 in the re.te .. 
vanee of its parte to a eo;l4!llon 1 llubjt~et of' c1it~oouE!eionii••J.?O 
:tn the dia.leet:i,oal <Miltl!H;X"uetion of a disctnH!!·ion em a 
partieull'l.r topic, .Adler ;:n1.mt ionl!l thre!ll ere<~.ti ve a.aoeata of 
the d1a.leetieal taak. 'l'he tii:'l;lt involves the aar:HllllPling and 
rela.ting of: (lo(ll.lmentil tluil.t d&lil.l wi t.h a. p&rtiotilar to pia. 
The oeeond er@a.'Uvll! aaJlleQt coneerns the oon~;~t:ruetion of the 
diUulllaicm !!),$ if' a.ll tile dili!putants were eontel!i.pora;ry,. The 
atttu1pt tQ find the implicit iM!d expH.ctt. ~reementll and 
d.:l.h.!Jil'eeme:nta cone ti tu hill the t~tird orea.U ve a.l1Jl)lil(lt. Tno 
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of wa.t :!,1> ~Mil'tl\li!.UY contl!.ined in tb,e writ ten d<?!IIW!!tlntm of 
the l.1 te;r~tur~. 
· fhe books ~nd otJler Cl.oct.uium.:lil> of lHerat:ll'e whic.tl 
con.tf!;.im th.e o»:l.nbns of var:l.ous a.uthor10 about til.$ partiou• 
lar ph:!.loBoi)hteal subJ eot oonliltitute the raw !l.li'l.teri~J.s for 
the die.J.ectici an. A ~eat deal of textu.~l interpretation 
Jlla.y be required of the ciia.lectioian ·to ol:rta.in the a:efined 
data he ne eda in the f' or!i.l of 11 the a.ru>wers eal'lh a.utllor ll~&kea 
to queationa whiob he himself pro,pound$1 a<H:G!lllJIJl.tlied by hia 
cr:l.tioism or refutation of thlil a.newerl3 to thOI;'J(;l questionB 
wh.ioh he attributes to other authora, and l'!ven so1lUilt:ttne!ll by 
his reje(rllion of the questiom.l other authore aak,..,l7l 
Data in this di!lll.eotio&l 5en11.1e a.re <.m<il.log:ous to the 
meaning of data in tlle (llmpirioal soieneiiHilo !n the emJ?iri .. 
cal soiencem. t.'le wo:r4 "data." t«ti'ers to the observed pheno-
mena.. It refers u ·f<ne observatione actuallY n!l!.de 'oy the 
seillntbt as a b~~nis t·or d,.:;veloping and testing a hypotne ... 
Ids • Even tho!Jih sdection e:f the. data :!.nv~;~lves etfol't for 
= 
the seteatist, they retain ·tne h' l'!ha:ra.cter a.s i.i vllln, relative i 
to thlil edemt:Ls II' 11 own bypothesil'l wltli.eh mw. t lJe :l.nvonted or 
made. 
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:1.1'1 the sense that they ~•re what he ha.s i'ound in the litera-
ture, in contrWllt to tkle conatructions that ~~e .llla.kes. Tile 
data for the dialectician are otner men•s th.oughts on a 
subject; th.lil llypothesia b hie own invention or con~;~truu­
Uon,. 
The di~lectician'a purpose in readinu and inter.P:tet• 
ing the doeU!llellts in the literature is to ohta.in n.·oul them 
the data he needs in order to construct tlle isMuea oi' a 
controversy and the topical agreements that underlie the 
doctrinal disagreements on the iseues. Ylhen he knows the 
opinions of a. number of a.utllore who ""re severally answering 
their own questions about a. aubjeot1 their oonoe!Jtions of 
H. its existenth.l rel&tionslli);le, and judglnents al:iout ita 
va.lue, ttl.en he is able to relate them., JUa ilypotheais wUl 
enable laim to .rela.te uy oollll1lOtlly ;.woeptable conceptions 
and questions that l'lil.iae iasuea a.oout the subjects, ami 
even to relate tile authors to one another !;l.\'1 .. partieip!m~a 
in a e ingle controversy or eet ot' oontroveraieo 1 a.nd to 
refer to thelll as 11a.rtiea to an ililaue• Qn wnieb they can be 
conceived of .ha.vini taken one or anothe:t: poaiti<~n. 
'J.'h:l.a process of orgard.dng t!llii data, by tne di<>leeu .. 
oian•a hypothetical construction~ leadlil to new i>Llld altered 
data.. "Aa aa.oll development in a. llypmthesia le.ada to further 
refinements and reorganization ot' the data. so in turn et:~.cn 
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lelll.ds to revidona in the il,Ypoth.esillJ.ff172 
The dialeotioit,ult for l~dlert h j,tUiiatent tru~t the 
VO\lidity of the nypothetioa.l oonstJ~ucHons is tea'ti!i.i>l.e by 
recourse to the recorded tnought in the documents of the 
Ht.eratare. 'l'hey are the u.ltim<.>&e source &J:~d oh,IH.lk• .i'ilo~·e~ 
over the diallll!otic<i\.1 oonat;~:uctiona are a.l.w~ym tenta.ti ve and 
of a hypothetical cha.:raoter, l.l.nd a.a auoh oapaille of crith 
oism, eorreotion, or reJection in t'li!.Vor oi' an alternative 
eypothlfli!:l.s which may seem to l:le itlore tert~>ble. 
'l'he dia:l.eoticiu usuJll.ll.Jf \leginli! wi.th a number of 
competing b:ypothei'HHI• shift.ing fr.om one to. anotb.er, 
and aometi!llfia oomi\lining the t·e.,t.ures of lllev.era.l.. 'linen 
one hypothesis is finally ~dopted, it is accepted with 
reservations kept alive by tiHl likelihood of' other 
pol!llllible i),ypot1tetHis. The most tlla.t can be claimed for 
the propoliiEHi oonatruotione is their s·~.tperior tenability 
in the light of the data. 8ut tile data. os.n always b'e 
otoe.lle~ed by other reade:rs ot' the .Literature v•ho 
''hear" th.e dise.ull!aion differently; and 11.ny hyl)Otbeais, 
no mat tor how pla.u.tlli ble A is alway a open ·t.o further 
testing and criticism.lrS 
The dia.leotioi~ 1 a aaaertions in expounding his 
h;ypothefli.a is not a repetition of t.he auert~ ons );)y the 
writers from ~Vhose work lle lieri vee the dat(~ otl which. his 
cypothetioal. oonstruotione are l:llll.!!ed. l~ot onl.Y &re there 
differenou in their le.ngu~es but in their aubjeots as 
l72l,2.i.j!., 
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opimion& a.bou t U.w.t subject, whereas the dialectician :i.e 
writing about the controvna;r t:tutt :l.a implicit in th111 die .. 
euea:i.on ot' a atai1JtHlt.1. and hie atatfiltllente asl)'ert the .l:lypo-
thetica.l oonatruetio.n of the diseueoion tlla.t he reg«.1•ds !'•~ 
rn one st!lnse. the authors s~ f11ueh n•ore than can be 
r111flected in the diii.l.lecticie.n•a const:ructiom;;. ~rhei:r 
aassrtio.ns reflliHl!.t tile whole texture of their tb.oughts on 
the aubj ect. :f.he dia.llllcM. oia.n h concern~Hi only with the tr 
•s;reea.uonts, dillllllil'llltllloe.ntlll, and opp¢sed argWI&enf<l'l. In 
a.no ther se:ntH~, tlle dill.leoti ci a-n sa;ra much more than :i.e e:x:-
pl.icitly stated in the wo:rde of the a.utilOl"ilt taken ein~ly 
or together. "Ji'ni"J.hel.y .iHU:llitUse their in't.ent.ion:;~ ~>.re I!H> 
different Md ileca.ulile their lii.!illierUonj]J a.re rlon-duplieativl!!l, 
the two kin•is of writing-.. pll.ilOIH)plliol!l>l ®d dial<;~oticu.l~· 
neceaea.rily auppleml!lnt ea.e,h ot~ter. n1'74 
'!/hen the dialectician fi<tds that authors wllo an 
ta.ldnl!l :part in the dil\louadon of a subject ~;~re sUont on 
some of the pointe in tile dieoul'H!Ihn, he cannot overcome 
tile l:l.m:l.tiation of hh metl1od. Il:e oantJGt go beyo.nd the data. 
a.nd imagine what h.ll c<mnot construet ae _o;;u-t of hili! eypotlu& .. 
sis. He oa.rmot fu:rnieh miqJairl!S a.nswe:rlil ttnless ~hey are 
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cle&rly implied by w~t tna authocs ~xqlicitly ~av. even it 
the controversy rema.ins fragmentary • 
Yet in the light .of intelJ.igible oontroverBy a.nd 
rational dflbate. wloioh are tile ultimate ideal "'t wnioh the 
whole dialectical effort aillllll 1 he can criticise the oontro• 
veray ile construota. p:rovi<ll.ed tililll iEI done without abandon .. 
ing dideotiod neutrality and without Judging the tlmtn or 
:falsity of. any phil;H:Hllphioa.l poei tiona repreel'.mtod in the 
If auoh oontroveraiee are det'icient in lll.ny respeot, 
the work ef i!llprovin[Jl tlle!ll must be. done by others. We 
believe that if the dia.leothal work h1.ts been ·.vell done 
a.t any given Ume, the J,lhiltH!lophers of suoi~t>quent 
generations will thereby be both stimulated and pre-
p&:red to carry the diseuuion further dtlt somewl1at 
illOre clarity ·!ij~ with a little better ohanoe of reach-
ina the truth. · 5 
l.II. IMPLICA.TI014S li'i.lR lliDUCl.i'.TIO.N 
:Philoeophical l?rtUlil'!!lfllil 
It if! Adler's oontamtion th.a.t from Dai.Hl&'"llet~ to 
John Dewey u..nd :llertr~md. Ru;uell, phUQeophieal inquiry has 
been directed toward tkte discovery of a ijn•w method" tor 
pllilosopey. This ae~~>rah f0r a new a<ethod iJ;J eymptoma.t.io 
of a deep concern about the apparent failure of philoaoplzy 
to make appreciable advances in the underetanding ot' l:lasie 
ideu or in the trea.t1nent of fun~ob~«umtal toJ)Iics;~, 
-~ 
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.From the eeventeentn g;mtury to t!'l4l! present. d~, 
the IHill:liHI of failure has become 1llore li!Ol"ld llll)re o.oute, 
a.nd has been accentuated by a eucceaaion of "new 
1nethodet" each of which in tu:rm't'ell shol·t of its 
promise. '!'M lateet epbodes in this story are mlo>rked 
by the reoll!nt rise and spread• fira t of pr¢gruatislll and 
then of positivism in the EnglisJ:l. .. s:pealdng countries; 
and or ,pklillf9ffnoloe;y followed by $Xistent1alieru on tne 
continent. . 
The eearol:l. nu.- the new noeth<Jd ill the f1flior.Y of 
PhilOSOl>h.Jr in modern Umes. 'fhe search for any operative 
factcu:· dU.rin~ the l&lllt three centuries to explal.in why 
phi.loeophel'<! became !'lo a.oUtlllly a.wa.re of, Md 1.10 desperat.e 
about, ·the l&ck of I!l'ogreu in phUoli>oph,Jf, turns to the t•aot 
t~t modern philosopners worked in a.n r.ge when the empiriot~l 
flciencem. exhibited outstQflding progl'e!ilfi> from century to 
century, even from decade to de.Qade, ~;J.nd at a eontinucyusly 
aeeellllra.ted rate. 
Adler• s concern h to ,point out that the tllistake 
VIM in expecting the delli:l:ed philosoph.iea.J. progress to 
result di:rl!llllt.ly from the metllodologi<la.l reforms without the 
sustained applica.ti<m of a. l!4ethod tor de&ling wi tb. the 
diversity among philosophers that wau inerea.sed. by the 
multiplication of new a.,pproaohes. '1Ji'or all its indiVidual .. 
ism,. philoao})hy ie a. aoQial enterpriru>. "1.?7 Beyond tnis, 
there was the illililt~ken U!JUIIlption that rJ!.iloso,phy and 
l761.l21.!!., p. 74. 
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n~111U'e and cta.uaes of pro~r$fils• and tlle rate at wl'!ieh it 
can be expected to occur.' GU<>a the IH'>lMl in <me c ... ee a.111 in 
the other.,' 
Adler diatingu.!mb.e!i between two ft>otors in philo-
sophieal k¥Jowlede£1il; (1) tnlil dlloisive data, and(;~) t.he 
achievement r;f tb.eoretiea-1 insigl'l.t by tiae develo.P~"~ent ot' 
l!ll)re eomprehensi ve tlte o:t'h$. 
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In philosophy the deeia:Lve d.:.ta o>re always tne eame--
the facts of oollll!lon experience. Tlle hrmu.lation ot' 
tlew thei.>riEUI and the improvellll'lnt ot' old oi'les oor·cai.nly 
oMs ti tute one oendition lilt' plliloaop.llio<ii.l progrelila, on 
·_w ~· .21: ·!!\ ~ exllat~~:l&.!!ll gne~!H!!I~ !d. t!fte yutii 
§bgut :Jllj.e 2lil.ieqts !/.t J2hil.Oill!i!l?hie~A1 a!U.U.• . l3ut such 
envi!:llo);llllent ineludes the Ji•IH.'Elhtenoe and proliferation 
of philcmo,phical errorlil u well as t.lllil inorea.tHl in the 
d.eposi t. of pllilosopl<Jioa.l t.ruth tru.1.t ia a.va.:Ua.b.l.e h 
the .lli.llllan race at a g:h'en time. lienee the progresl!>ive 
envelopment o:l.' philoso~hical truth by a multi,Plic~ty 
of doetriM8 mulil t be lllatch.ed by a. proe;reui n develop .. 
ill!lllt of d:talel'lt:l.oal trut.ll about their dinr:ai ty • · 'l'he 
controversies that underlie th.ia diversity mur;t be 
ex.Plici tl,y ut fortll aa the lJaek;flroimd O·f eontinu1ng 
ett'orts to ret~.olve basic inuee. if .PI<iloaoph:ica.l 
ditferencei! ;r.re ever to eontl•ibute 1uore to understand-
ing than they d<> to cimf'Usion. Suf!lta.in<ild dialectio&.l 
work is, therefore, the other condition of phUosophi-
ca.l progrefHil• m AU. .!lW1! .21: ~ S!W~J;iR,\!~ !!! l!!.t! 
ewtsu£ t !!! .iEUtU !fh~q}l .PM ,M ra!l\4e .l2;£ thf$ I'.!a:!ih!llil,l,. 
de ba.tjt_ ftt ll~i'l ~~A. :rnf 
Cont:rover.ay is most ·favorable to proa;rue in philo .. 
sophy • fQr Adler • when the~·e ia a gree.t va:riety ot clearl,Y 
dietinc.t th!ilo:ri.liUI on 11.ny iuue. Juet as the knowledgtll of 
only on,e side o:f a question :La not to undnet~:~nd the ieeue 
i 
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ble. It foUoWii'l that thill ,diveraity ot· opinion to be 
exa.mined dialectically should hardly be confined to pointe 
Q>:f view of contemporll.ry origin,. A regret·t01ole paroohialislll 
re11ults when m~y )ilQints of view• relevMt to the conte•a .. 
porary iiisues. l!!.l'e left uncon!lidex·ed or evtm. un.ll:nown j~.tst 
because they happen to b.a.ve been propoeed in t:ulcient 
llledievalt or RenaiesatHie times. Conversely, the neglect of 
eontempor~~.ry thought nsulte in an lllqUI.\lly rliilgretta.l>le 
provincialism. 
'!.'he l)osll ih!e progrliHls of l:lhilo!i!ophy • science, a.nd 
dialectic does not have foreseeable limite • As 111en eon tin~ 
ue to philol:~t'lptlize fro111 genl!lration to gener&'tion, and ~,~.e 
the diVflrsity of' views on any aubject grows more e:x:tent~~ive, 
the work of dillllectioa.l el~U":ification lli!llilt be continued and 
expanded. It ie Adler's hope.tb.a.t the 1.Usousl'lion o:f philo· 
sophical subj eots in wh:l.ol:l. the imp lid t eon·troversy rerll&.i:nu 
implicit can l)e transformed into one in wh.iall fruitf'ul 
debate based on the. dial:utica.l 1i!Xplica.tiorl and cl*llri:fica-
tion of the extent corrtroversy may l'J:I.'ing philosophy to its 
maturity in the future. '1The reason for this dl!llayed 
!llaturity may be tha.t philosophical prebleula are more 
different th~ou1 soient1fie problems, hwnanly s,,ea.king, if 
c== 
A presa:lna: contemporary problem concerns the Qondi .. 
tiona of in tellntual co.:ll!lluni ty in a aoo :l.ety that h oom• 
mit ted. to QUl turaJ. plura.lhm. As h.ii! v:l.ewe :1. t 1 tb.e extre;ne 
alternatives llluet oe avoided.. The extretne plur••lh.m of' 
ilumrohio divfn•sity whhl:! .a.lmost a.bolhhes intellectual 
community o:r th<i.t of :regimented eon:t'orllli ty which alatost 
abolishes intelll!'.otua.l diverai ty should give way to t1:!111 
condition of «~rJ.tMt\ G,ivex·dt.l! 2!. give:uj,~ 11'Li~hin tile 
,tt_amewor;!s .2! ,m intel,lutwu. 22/Y~Wm!t;z.,. ,,,tso 
What we want is not UlOU and. more di vere i ty out a. 
lfi vuei ty that h ;uore <.ttui more in tell i~i l;l.le. wr.u .. t we 
w~~ont is not "disagreement • in ttu> p"rely nag11t1 ve unse 
of a m~ert~ &b$enee of i.!liljl'illlil>JHm t but r&•ther tl}e mort of' 
dieagreel1Umt which conatitutelll genuine controversy. in 
whioh t.l:l.ere is a meeting 9f rlltrHls, Jil., Jo:tping f.lf ifiHll~es. 
and the oPt:>Oai tion of arguJnents that enli&ht!lllUl the · 
dit'f&renoel!i o:f' opinion ~<.n.d even. te.nd.r; to relilo.l.ve them. 
Disagreement may be taken as .a !$ign1 even aa ~ sign, 
of' freed.olll of thought. It llilil.Y be reg~c;rded l<!il .iml,in~ 
ptmaible to the purauit of .truth.. aut fox· that very 
l:'EHil.$On, it !ilhould tlot be ,,a.lulild for 11<.1~. own aa,ke i:Ju·t as 
a device taM easoellgno• fo.:r learning. Diversil;;y, dis-
agreement1 an'tLoont1'over~Jy lilhquld,. therefore, oe fliiUte .. 
ured by the intellectual good!! th,ey Yhld. T.llll!y are . 
fruitful only when mllln can learn lilOtt>etning from them..l(il 
Th!il e1npi:<ub b CJn ·the li\llderute.nding o:f' OOill•<lOnly 
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standings, agreements a.bout the i::H;l\Hiill on wllioh disputants 
diaa.grc:~e results in a meetin~ of minds. Their dJ.ffereneea 
are underi'Jt.ood while they do not share id<Sntiea.1 views. 
"The unity involved in intelleott.w.l oo!W~<Unity is unity of 
under& tandint~, not a unanimity of ~.~oesent. ,.l€12 
Pn\lgsopa gf Liberal, Edwmuon 
l!'or Adler, a liber;;t.l eduoat.ion ie one tl'uli.t concerns 
itself with the bade idillae of tlle West' a intell.eotual 
heritooge. The unity of the Western eivi.lbation does not 
lie in a common body of beliefs. efJ.pouaed in al.l epoona of 
Wee tern hi at ory and uni versa.lly share:~ d. trn:ough the vrea t 
tod$.1, but in its in·trioate <mel au..ny-ehi;;d di.aculn:ion of 
basic ideas over the centuries. A liberal education which. 
proceeds by reading and Uutu>sion llll.u;t be ccmvereant not 
only with the "~pl:l. tudll of' the whole recorded disotusaion 
of' these matters, it rnust also be aecotllp!!lniild by sol!le under-
Iii tanding of the agreetllen ts, disagree111en te, !Mld arguments 
tl'ul!.t co:tUltitute the controverllliee which 13,re to be fora<ed in 
that disculll:t~ic:ua. ul83 
Adler whhes phi.l.olilophy to perf'o:t'll'l ite educational 
role of liberating the lllind tro111 the dominant p:t•eJudices of 
-----·--
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teachers tQ escape fro.m the) do&~:m~Uam of indoctrination in 
whatever doctrines happen to 'be in vogue at the .tuoment. 
Teachers and students should be able to approach 
the :l.uues invQlvcad in the ooneidert;;.tion of fundaaumtuii.l 
ideas with intellectual detachment. But a.e they app-
roe.oh the diverl'>:l.ty of oonflhting view wHh em open 
mind, tb.ey should be intent on discovering for thelll-
aelves where the truth liee. This tlley can do in an 
intelligent and responsible :fashion only after tlley 
have aequ:l.red a olear understanding ~i4the inues emd the rationale ot' the oppQsing sides. 
Wh.ile the goal is to discover the corwnon ground 
which underlies differences of opinion and then to trans-
form their diversity into r~tional and intelligible 
controversy, the range of contemporary diversity is scare., .. 
ly ever re:present~:~.t.ive of the range of man's th:i.r1king over 
twenty-t'i ve centuries. "The study of :.t'uruihl.lllenta.l. ideas 
oemnot help being improved if it ie guided oy t1.n Qrdered 
sense Qf all the strains in the w.hole record of' human 
theught about them., .,lB5 
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CO:IU'.IUUSON Ali!D CONTliAST 
Ol!~ TID.'; TWO OONOEl?'.t'!ONS OF ME'l'HOD 
Since tlle c<>noeption of method for a.n inquiry into · 
f:reedlllm of i.lotn John Dewey <md MorUlll.er Adl~r bas been 
:preGented, this clmpter deals with tlle eomllariaon and oon-
trast of their conceptions Gf method for an inquiry into 
:t're edom. -
When the method e<~.ch wri tel' &dvooa.ted. for :inquiries 
into freedom W&e analyzed, the dU:t'erent lll.et~.ningiil of in-
quiry beea.me 11-Pl)tl.:t'ent. Inquiry into :t'reedo.m wo.a use.~d. to 
mean ( 1) aase:rtiona concerned with tlte truth about freedom 
;itsel:f'l ( 2) search for knowledge about ~>~.no tiler• a philot:~o~ 
pl:l.ieal ide~~~os about freedomJ ~md { :3) a$cHilrtion!ll about the 
tt-uth of a. "d iseulila ion" a. bel ut freedom. 
Dewey's instrument~list or pra~ma.tio philosophy seems 
to ot'fcu.• a. new m.ethod for arriving &>t an 'l.mderstanding of 
re~~oli ty :~md fr\\ltHlom. The boasted advantage of tile nllllthod~ 
ology that it points to real experience merdy indicates 
its comrn:l.tment to realism.. Dewey proposes a mtJtklod for 
arri vint~ 11.t efficient auertions at;! out realill.Y ruad freedom. 
Ife aearoheEJ for the byJ;Jothesb which moat et'feeti vE~ly 
--
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truth or the molilt. effective a.f;leert:ton a.bout freedQm in the 
lil i tua.tion. 
The ruethod for dealing <Vith the JphiloBophie«.l ideas 
ot' oth111r :pklilolllophere was an e;jl:tension of his expe:d;llenttl.l• 
ism and. instrumentalililm. In ;preatuaUng hi.s tb.eory of trutl:l0 
his epis temo1Cl!ltil!!a.l theory, or hill theory of f'reedom1 to 
mention ~ few instances. Dewey took note of previous 
philoaol'ihios.l theorin. Jie expresaed hilli underetand:Lnge of 
wh.a.t aome ps.st and contemporary theories maintained, re-
:t'utt:ld some of them to hb s<~.Uafa.otion, and replaced their 
theoriee with his own. 
lflllile he >llli!.Y not always have been ii:X,illicit in pre-
oilaely pinpointing previous theories or in ahowing wllioh 
philosophers ma.inta:tned these theoriea, he diti propose hia 
solutions ·to the problems lUI more valid, Hii.i whole 
approa.oh would. have been mlllaningleu it' il> wll!n a.aaumed 
that he did not think: that he understood th.dx- ideas on the 
subject., It' he did not a.rr.ive at the t:ruth concerning their 
ideas, he would nave been setting up straw arguaents and 
refut:!n~Jt theae, but not the posHi ons of tne ,philosophers 
wh:t ell he ela.imed. to be re pacing. '£he liruth or falwity of 
their stateutents would ue irrelevtont to llb aasertione. It 
oton be ooneJ..uded. that Dewey at least implh:l tly lll!.\inta.ined 
a corlee:ption of method for undert~tanding aesution& of otne:e 
I 
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Ylilt it can be <;>;rgued ;;;.gainat l)@wey that on the one 
hand, if he did not ;.mdet'ata.nd th.eil' id•~ae, hils ideaa were 
irrelevant in attelii.lpting to retutfl theirs and on the other 
. hand, if' he did a.r:dve at an understanding o:t' their id~HM> 
(ideas repr!'laent:a.ti ve or th.eir ideas and hence obj eeti vely 
so} • it follows that he went beyond hi.:!! own theory <>f in-
quiry. Jl'or l!l.n understanding of another's ideas, objective• 
ly :re;preunta.tive or tMb ideM or ·orutht'u.l.ly reflecting 
their pos.ition abo 14t a, subject of diseuse ion, ia not open 
to eontradictory mssertiona. 
In :re;ga.rd to dialUtioal lllethod., Dewey e.xpl~oi tly 
resoun.ced Hes;elianism and conf3idered elements of :Pb.ton!Q 
and Aristotelian thought to be jlt the ;rootl!l of pl:lil,oso:phi· 
cal contusion in modern thought., Elelllcnh of di~J.eetic 
in any of their tnoug.hte Wl'Htld !.mve bean l'epugna.nt to him,. 
He would not havfi conceived that hie new phUoeophical 
methodology could bear any ret~eHJblamiEIIil to their the o:ries. 
I 
I 
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J\.dler advoca.ted a nwt;l1od for &n inqtd:cy into fru-
dom, in tne unee of a metnod for arriving Ott tlle truth 
about freedom i tulr. Ellilosophiod method for Adle:r con-
stated in the intellectual identification ot' a subjeet of' 
collllllon experience and. tt1e rationul. analysil!l of the meaning 
ef the experience. 
Ad.J.!)r' & metbod :for dealin<~ wi tll thlll :philoao;phioal 
ideas or otb.er philosophers waa an ~.t.pglication of the 
identifioatioxl of tlte subj eet under considera.tion and tile 
question being asked about i't• ~h:hl pro():'>dure un;;~overod 
the meaning and definition of' the terms used. and J.$d to 
art understanding of the ide& exprll!eiHitd by tb.e writer~ 
:1-!:orUmer Adler a.uume!l that ide~s wtlicb a.athus t~xpr1n1s in 
their boob are underste.nd&b.le and tn~t in readin~ and 
thinkin~ about tneir wri tinge, hili oan underatand their 
ideas. He explicitly employed this tuethodology in The.~ 
£t.t ;!\'£1ll!i!d!8 to und.ersta.nll the philosop.hiQ&l ideas of tlte 
more lilign:l.:f'iaamt wr:I.Un of the bet twenty-f'ive hundred 
yE!ara a.l:!ou. t thlll eubJ eot of rreedom.. 
However~ he went beyond the understanding of' their 
ideas in h.ie dialectical construction of a. "discussion" 
a.bout t'nedom. 1!he unique feature of this aullthodology 
conSists in the construction of neutrally formulated 
hypotheses tested by the data, the literature on ttle 
=;-
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t&i.tllil) ¢ontrol the ~JYpotMsia or nypotheaea ( th~ neutrdly 
formu.lated constru.c'Uo:ns about :the ideas found in the 
literature}. He affirms the tentath'e nature l>f the 
.hypoth$ses bec.l!liUI>lle the dat~.l which they verify &re Clil.pti~ble 
of other !Joe a i l'lle diiiol<!!Qt:l.ca.l Collll.linliltione and 'Variation& 
depending on the a:peeit'ic partieipation in the dieou.eaion 
and the l'JJ~ture of dialectical diuourae. 
affirmed or denied, .Preoiaely beQ~uae tho truth ar t'lilllii ty 
~f the ideaa is a~;n.:~hlilwed. Unlike the deraonetrlil.tor who must 
pick true premililea to arrive at !1l. true oonolt<a:l.on. the 
dialutioillll h ind.Uil'~t:rent to trl!ll tx•utb. or :t'a.laity of tile 
ideas beca.uee the:re is no caused linl~ between the prEHJl:l.files 
and the conoluaion. 
TMre wae & striking simila.rity in the e.l.lllllllints oi' 
metllodolt}gy wlliett Dewey advocated for ph.:U.osoplliea.l inquiry 
into the effichnt auertionm {truth} oonoermng the elilej-Ht 
dialeatit:~al inquh:'y into tile tratll about m. di!Htuasion of 
freed!)lll• In both of thoiHi iru~tano$s 1 they proceeded to 
aBoertain the truth of their statement~> by tflt'erenoe t.o the 
I 
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oiw.ngeable character of the 4ataJ i.e •• the ponibili'ty ot 
new and different data, and both affirmed the tenability of 
the hypothesis in tlle light of the d&ta. The hypotlletical 
quality of the truth oi' their aesertions was shared by both 
thinkers. 
Wll:Ue some similarity waa found in e ome of the ele-
ments of the different methodologies described, it ie not 
being anerted without an awarenes.s that radically dift'erent 
tbings were bei.ng considered by ea.oh philosopher. Adler Wtl.S 
explicit that hill! dialectical method was being ueed to con• 
struct a. discussion of the subJect of freedom which was 
explicitly lil.nd implicitly eonta.ined in the l:l terature of the 
Wturt over the previous twenty-five centuries. He ex).llioitly 
!llQ.int&ined that tbe approa.ell wa.o not identical w1t11 a 
phi.losophioal approach to the eubjeot of :freedom. 
i,!oreover• Adler did not conceive that true philoso-
ptlica.l assertions about the suiJJ eot of freedOJn would he 
subJect to contrlll.dictory flux and. change. He w<Jultl h<o~ve 
granted that the mind of ll.lall has the pot en tia.li ty to grasp 
th.e truth about the suoJecrt of freedom, but with the undel'• 
etanding thlil.t a true auertion by man would be in the na·ture 
of a confortaity with real:!. ty, A true at!i.tement about the 
subject of freedom would not change from day to day, or era 
to era. 
= 
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si·on at: freedom wa.e th.eoretioelly O:Piilll to :!'lux wld change. 
Dialeot:!.o&l oomatruotions were free and reJM!J.ned so beoa.uee 
t~ey could not enoounttr tile limits o:t.' freedom; ioe., the 
objective evidence of neaeslllity that can be recognized as 
such by the rlli,nd i tseu. For dia.lecUcal conatru.otion 
exh!ts in the realm of dieoou:t•ae w.hiob. includes in its !Hit 
the possible ~nd actual. Dewey patterned all thought and 
truth about the I!!Ubj eat of freedom on h:i.a scientific con .. 
oeption of' inquiry. Hill instrumentalist tl'UHI!I.'.V .j.ed bh1 t~> 
regtil.rcl tne t:rutl:l about the subject .of f:r~edom as oonsiM;ing 
ot: eypotneats of relat:i. ve v-.:<.lue open to flux l11X!d change. 
:Dewey' 1!1 d~M.al of a.l.l necessity in rea.li ty invnlVee. logi .. 
?ally the denial of &ll li•d te of' in te.lleotut>l t'reedom. His 
intJt:rumenf#alillm .l.ibt!lratee ,lllind by denying all neee~H~ity. 
0n the issu.e of understMdir.g other pb.iloe•:>!)h.ers • 
id1UUl1 John Dewey and Mortimer Adln reaoh a. defi:ree of 
~:rt~ement. It is an almost trivial trutl'l that neitnu· tile 
wri.Unge of John :ner.vey nor those of l\!:ortiJ!ler Adbr !l.X'e 
la.olcing in instanoes in which they olai111. to understand 
ideas which otne:re h~ve e:x:p:t'f.HIIiiillld a. bout the !i!ubj e~t. Both 
did enga.g~ il'l pllU.oaophhing about tile ~ubject o.f.' freedom, 
and in I'IJ!lEIO:i.fi o tnsta;nces. directed tneb atte:nt.ion to otMr 
ph:U.oaopllet"ltl' viewe on the subject littl!l ll.filli!Uted thllir own 
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disagreement •. 
'flil agree or disagree to tally, in pEtrt, or not at a.h, 
with th.e ideas of another, tllere must be present the im:pli• 
cit assumid;ion tb.at the ideas of the pa.rt;v under eonsidera. .. 
tion are unde:rsto"d• If ·&he ideas are tlot understood, 
there would be no grounds t'or the assertion ot' agreeu!ent or 
diaagreement. It is not being a:f'Hrmed til.Ol.t in every 
instance in wh ieh authors l!.U\Y that they agree or dhai$l'lH!, 
they a.etually do. What ie being a!llserted is that botll 
John :n~~wey and Mortimer Adler claimed that they underetood 
the i<ha.s of other :philosophere~. What is illore t'und!!IJJH!tltal 
importance th.a.n any statil!tica.l t{tbulation of' insta.noes of' 
tlleir genuine und.erstanding which led to. agreement or die-
a.greement is .the theoretical assumption whioh ;:n.ust be ma.de 
to justit'y the ver:l.f'ica.Uon of the understandhlg e.nd. the 
agreement or diea.gree•aent. 
In regard to this aspect of me tb.od t·or an inquiry 
into treedom, in the fiHll:lse of a method for arriving ;:~.t the 
truth a:bout £>lt<>ther• s judgments abo~t freedom, it would 
see1n tlw.t Dewey a.nd. Adler logically wtntld be in agreement. 
Generie<J.lly, tMy would be in a.greer11ent thl.>t they underlilta.nd 
tile ideas ot' others, if they as!Hilnt to l.ll' diaal!mt from 
others' a.11sertions totally, in pa.:rt, or not at all. 
Even while agreement ia dhae:rnal:>le in their views 
on understanding another's idi\la.. ~ contrast is also evident, 
= 
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a.l.l. inqlliries were applied to , tlle unliernta.nding, of, another• to, 
ideas, , the wa.r:rant;ed, a.aser:tionll which 'liermina.ted the irlquiry 
would have been eonoeived of meriting hyt)othet:l.oal lilt&tua oy 
Dewey. Even, wnile &lllsigning the assertion lzypothetioal 
status, Dewey would have implicitly granted the :poa~Sillility 
of ta.tt.aining &. true undln•ettmding of a.notller•a idea on the 
eulilj ect. 
Ad.ler also would. ha.ve Illainta.ined the, pomnihility of 
attaining a truE! undereta.nding of another's id~~>a or! a. tottb· 
jeet. But it the idalil. ot' another w<As Mttmlly understood, 
if' tl1e truth ot' nia idea. was atta:l.ned, the ai'Hle:t·t:l.on would 
be true (confo:rm.irlg to tb.e :rebllity it eX.Ji)l'eBses). U' his 
ideas were not actull!.lly und.erat.God, tl'lt.li aiHl!ertion would be 
f.ll.lu (not oonf'orra:l.ng to the rei!J.li ty it expreinJee). 
It follows tlla t the, difhreneelll in apJ;Jroachee are 
not il:!.mply factual; :1..111 •• thllly are not dit't'eren.oe.a <~.rising 
trom a. d:!.sag:reetu.ent a.bout the fact, timt a.nother 1 a ideu.e 
e.~re undere tood or known, but ratlMHt that th,e dift'erenoea 
in their &,PJProaeh!IHil an alore theoret1.ea.l; i.e •• wh~.t doea 
:l.t 111eun when on !II lil'ta.tee that he under~J~tanda a.no tiler• s 
idea.e. 
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·. IV • CRITICISM: 
~ental doctrinal differences in the ide~s of John Dewey and 
aJrortimer .Adler. Both Jolln Dewey !Uld. l\!i:Ol'timer Adler con-
s ide red tb.elllll!el vee philosophers wl'lo were coneerned with tne 
truth, They both would be interpreted lils answering in the 
affirm.a.tive thad; tneir ide<~.s 11.nd judgments Wl/lre philosopl:!.i· 
cal and true. However, their ~»ffiralliltive answer to the 
queilltion esmnot oe construed ae agree~ent on tlldl' part 
about the defini tiona or meanings which they would have 
assigned to their conceptions of :ph.ilosof)hY and truth, 
John Dewey wanted to reconutruct philolilophy. In 
directing his attention to logica.l theory, it is oovious 
that he considere¢.1 h.imael.t t'a.milia.r with mome ,P¥'eviouel.y 
proposed logical theories. lie was not lilatilitted tm.t they 
expl••:l.ned logical :re~;~.lity 1:md &ttempted to reconstruct 
logioa.l theory which would a.dequa;tely aecount for .J.ogiotl.l 
redity. AIH1>uming tmt he explained the !acts about logic 
bl thinking, he presented hie own i~atrumentaliut theory e>f 
logic. His recanlllt:ruction of philosophy meant t.il.l'i rudical 
replacement of previous philosophicd ideas with his own. 
IUs :reconotruction of logical theoey re;preunted his con-
acptu~iz~tions about logie~l reality. 
Lo~ical tneory t a-ccording ·to John Dewey's undel'• 
standing of it, should be oonoernlid wi tl'l ·the certit'iaa.tion 
ce-
I 
~ 
I ] 
of :reflet:t:tve tU:I.ttk:ing.. Tl'l.e eertif'iC!il.tion ·.J>f refl!i!Qti ve 
thinking ia to be f'oiUld ·in th.G testin~& of bypottu1Ueal 
id~Hlfl in a prol:llema.Ue situation until a w;.>rrant!ild anee:r-
tion e:ffeetivl!lly te:rminatefl the aituaUou,. 
l'he Jiirinciple o:f Dewey1 s instrumentalism is the 
id.erlti.tio:•tion of the true with the praotiot,>1. This :p:re.-
auppous the rejeoticm of 11/.ll apeoula.ti ve ·r.ru·th and all 
neeeasiA;y in nature. Ma.n' s ;pur,Poae b to control and 
ma.ni.pula.te tllh potential world tl'irou~t;h his 1aethod of in-
quiry • Mant r; knowl•Hige :!.& only an event in this nature 
and ill.$ li/uah follo>V$ n<~tur$• a J.~w o.:r constant ex:parwion, 
flux, a.nd cba,nge. Knowledge itt equally variable an~i 
;relative to the n~;~t.ure it explores. Sinoe, aoc.or<Ur1g to 
llewey, scientific met.hod l:.as re:plll\ced. previous phi.loao;pni ... 
cal a.ff'irmatione of fixity with fluxt llli'Hl e·ternity with 
eh!il.ngl!i • t.ne logical conuquences of the denial of necelilsi ty 
in nature a.nd the espousinG of the relativity of knowJ.edglll 
biH)Oll1.11llil with Dewey the debae ing of the ~oal of the irlttlll• 
J.ect from the ptu•euH of ape<:-ul!i.ti ve truth to tlte role o:f 
a<l tnstrUlllent of production. ll<!wey brings man down t'rom 
thlii heil\llll ts ot' &peculfJ.ti ve truth ll.l'Hi eont':l.nea him in the 
realm or pX'actiC<ii>l things. :Sut I>ewey achieves thi~> oy 
denying all necessity in nature. 
In p:ro:peuain@i hie logi<Ul.l ·theory of. inquiry as li 
t:culil Gtle •~nd representative of wna.t a.etual:l.y lul..pperu.1• 
F-
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Dewey may have hoped to cUsp ens a with tl'l.l.d.Uional lllOt.a.-
physical considerations of ·&:ruth and being, but :1.t emu be 
a,rgued that lle bAs gr.atu:l.toue.l.y a.astu:aed the ;neta.physioa.l 
Justification for b.is thu:ry. Hili! doctrinal 0\liH.;e:t:tion that 
~t.ll ideas El.re hypoth.e.tioa.l is an ontological contradiction. 
If the tlltatellllmt ie true in a metaphYsical sensa1 then il.;e 
contra.d.~otion O!l!J:l.llot be bath true and false ir1 the same 
sense. 13ut if the jud~Emt tlla.t all ideas 04re not h.ypo-
thetica.;t. is also t:rue, then cont:t'IMJ.iotory nta.te1nents can 
simultantllonsly oe true and int.elleetua.l eoneill>te.noy be 
abolished. !f it 13 tru.e t!u~t all ideas al'& hypothetical, 
and 1 ts oontra.d:l.otory staternent thAt aU ideas a.re not 
hypothetica-l is t·allle,. then neitb.el' h h.ypothetieally so. 
il!oreove:t'1 if Dewey na.d ta.)r.en into lil.lilO()unt tradi~ 
t:l.onal. logical 01.nalysis, he would l:lJ"Vfb rea.lized tklat if the 
terms of a. pro;p0Git1on are kept constant and only tile 
quantity or qua.li ty va.:ried• when one statem<mt ie uni vera!i.l 
a.nd affirl'lla.tive a-nd t.be other particular and neglli.tive, both 
could not be true. Trw propositiona t11a.t a.tl. idea11 lil.re 
bypothetical and 11ome ideas are not hypothetical cannot 
both be t:rue. Indeed, Dewey proposed a dif'ff!rent ooncep-
tion of· the nature of logic<l.l tbem::y, but it eeemn to be 
aeriou.sly and .t<mdWllliUltally inooni!listent if it ia ofhud 
as & true tneo:ry concerning tile nature of lllgio<tl inquiry. 
It is on tile level of lUI:ltaphyeioal a.l!lewnptions tlul>t 
-
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the ,ra.t:j.onal, d,iffnenees in tne ap);l:roaollea of John D~?~weY 
a.nd Mor-Umer Ad.ler beeome more. pronounced• In add! ti on to 
the mt:~t&.);lhyliliCal principles of eutradietion,, Adler l;).ffi:rma 
the pr:l.noiplu of. id<>nttty, 1\!Uff'ioient reason• oauaa.li ty, 
and finality, which in b;l.a mind do no·t ohangt~~ from d<.>;\1" to 
day or era .to er1:0. T!1ne .meta.:phyeioa.l &.IHHtmpt.iona oonsti~ 
tut~.t. the unchanging a.e~rsum;ptior~s or ground :rules tor ration-
al th(!Ut;ht. ':fhey &l'e not r!lerely lugioal dhtinotions, but 
a.otua:Utiea,. He dQli>S not put llimeelt' in .'l:;he poeition of 
tllinl!iing t.ha.t there &.1'111 two mid111lil to nery question, that 
a, two c<;~ntriMiictory $idew both of which cou.l<l l:le equ111.lJ.y 
00rr~ot or true. 
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l:MPLIO.A.~IO~JS O:f 1'111il TWO COl~OltP.T:t ONS 
.. Ji'OR EDUC.A.UO!'I 
l'b.e ;relevano~ of p!lUoaQpnist•l ::i.l).!lla.s fot· eduo&·Uon 
may be <•p;:>r()aolled f:t:'OJ!! 1!11'\l'el'al )j)oints ot~ vhw. In a moet 
l'lhltl'ic.tO!d smttee., philoupey is just one o:t· tne ;,oo.ny aub ... 
. jec.tlil whioh o••n he ~li';udied in ~ollegea .a~td omivert>ities. 
Its lllef~ning ••nd :l.mptHtta.tuHl Witllin c,meeptiona of 0ducational 
system~; and iniiit.i 'ttttiqns vari~s. In a uwrlil pl'oi'ound WI;ff. 
tlte ph:tlosopilh!!l.l. !MHiumptions il!l oth.lill' dheiplinu Stloh .a.s 
medioine, le.w. hi~ato:ry1. eduaa·tion, illfluenc.& thil oonolusione 
of tlleue lil tudies •· P!'liloliH.Ipey 1ut tt;;r~;~ i~tto teacher education 
ootu·mes w.l:um :philosopb.~es ef education are presented• llis-
t.o:dee ot eduoational l;lieoriel'l ;ore C\lflilide>red• or philo111o~ 
p!tha.l l.'l.lllt~Ulllptions. of education pra!llthes a:t·e dhous<!ed. In 
a more profound we;.y a philosopi.t1 of eduoatiun reliltl.! JJpon a 
view or the world aild •uan. I 'I; :nste on. a oonoep·tior1 of tb.e 
na.ture of knowhdge, tt~e souroos of truth., and an eth:l.citl 
theo:ry, ea.ol:l catlllliii!tent; with. on,e anotber.. Just af!l po.Utica.l 
theory ira dll!l>endeat on eth:I.Qul ttlt!ory; 100 eduoationnl 
tr.uilory h dep~ndemt on prior k'h.ilo::H>,phic"'l asiiW!!ptiGns a.bout 
the »ature of ll'i!ll.n . .-.nd truth, 
lf education, or 10.t li!Ha.l.'lt one f'und!ll.mental ,s:oal of 
$duca.Uon, ·could lae dl!lt!orioed rMi! ttu1 deliberate at·~empt by 
e-
society to t'orro. ro.on in ter.tUs of an ideal, then both John 
Il~Jwey and Martirller Adler were concerned with educ<l.tion. 
Neither would have considered his idea.e on education 
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lacking in the qu&litiu by which they could h.a.ve releva.tu:e 
to education. Both would !lave their ideals tuen cogn:U.ance 
of \'tith.in an educational ech.ero.e. In addition to the time 
which each epent teaching formally in olaeeroome• the 
directions of t!ileir theoretical eoneideratione to eduqa .. 
ttoaal mat terlil at'f'ord a.eyle ·~>es timony to tlle ir de a ires 
along these linea. Grli\Jlted t.b.a.t both app:roaoned eduoation 
trom tneir philosophical orientatione, their notit,ns of thl'l 
ideal dU:":f'ered.. They both. ww1ted men wi tl:l. ,p.ililot~ophioal 
orientationa but their criteria :f'or realizing the id<lal 
varied. 
Dewey's presoripttolu: to provide tbfl means tor ·th.e 
intelligent solutione to the probleJOO vrhiob. oonf'r<mted men, 
his aeuoh t'or valid knowledge, his rejection oi' many 
philollopldtal problemliJ• and tile introdul)tion of hie answers 
tor the problema. these were !>otlle of' the elements wllioh 
constituted and motivated his proposals. 
While Dewey my not have intend<~d to build a eys-
tema.tie body of' tllou,sb.t the we;y Aristotle or Kant did• he 
did philoa.ophhe lon{!£ enough to have expressed his 
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cal proi:>lelllS. Wl:m. t wa.s more imvreni va w~10 the f ~:~.c ·t that 
he. presented a new method of philosoJ:lhhing w!tioh he f'elt 
could be applied to all .Philosophical eonsidera.t iona,. so 
that a. .ey111tlolm could be constructed and ,perpetually reoon-
structe.:t. l<'ollowini from h:h l)w.n <Jonoeption of thlol nature 
of r.el.\li ty ~d truth, the e'if<'U:'"'C.tl$.nging natu:re of. reality 
dei111:i,n<,l.ed the fi'YVer-ohangtng :t'orl!.ualationa of'. tiLe truth.. Hie 
em11ha.llili! on the ever-chomgin~ n11ture .of truth does give hie 
theory an appeara.noe of dynamtc qu;r;.li ty, but it eqUW.ly 
givee it the appea:re.xtoe of being relationistie and incapa-
;,le of functioning in ureaa of vit!.\.1 oonoern Md o:t ultimate 
value to many intelligent people. While ttle novelty of 
much of: Dewey' II! theory need not o!ll tienied, rHd tb.er cv.n the 
very traditional Qonnection it ~~:~.intlil.ina with rti,neteentb. 
century aoienUfh conceptions a>b111ut ·tnt'! nature Qf truth. 
Wlm t JJew•y meant by method wae eo lientr~T~.l to nh 
philouph:Lcal doCitdMa that ro:r hi.l!1 it not only becan1e 
the only method of vaUd knowledge but was even propoud 
as a new religious fai tn. In ~ivins the Dwight Harrin~>ton 
Terry Fotmdation l.eeturtHil on ftdtston j,u. the lo!l.lih.lt ,su:. 
t;ltbnqe, a.nd. I:ll;ll.oa.~, he exprall:lal!ld the new f\\ti th for 
Ttle mind ot' man iJS billing ha.bitua'liliH1 to a. new lllethod 
and idealt There ill:l but one sure road of aeoess to 
trutlt-~th~t~ road of patient, eo ... opera.U ve inquiry 
operating by means of observation, experiolent, reeorded 
= 
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While Dewey eone~i ved · Qf himaelf 1!4il a.n a.ntikabllolutint, he 
pro:Poeea a \lie thodology which ia. <>.blllolutis uo. lie presents 
tb.e ll.lethOds of aehnt:U'io inquiry as th.e only poasible way 
of at ta.in.ing valid knowledge.• . While 1/luah of DewEJ~yi s id<~as 
UettWd so new and dyna.~A~h,. his lll.beolutisti.o a.6ml.t!llpticme lllfld 
a.ssertionF.~ ue in l'I:U1lity ra.thet traditional id>Jaa. 
It :l.$ an Uiolll that tot d<ltollCJOl'aoy to funet:l.on there 
:bl m~e<l of truth. Dewey was eonvinoed that a g<rlfe:r:rA~nent 
whi.oh rfl;p:resent.!!IHi the people amd wniah would &<:It for thell1 
in thei)l' behalf bad to ha.vo oi tizene poeileSI!Hild e>t' intell~­
gence and uain~ that in'iielJ.igence in deterJuini:ng whlilt ought 
to be dl)t<e and in jud$ina; the w.~ol.u<a of w~t waa being p1•o .. 
po!!ied. Of oourae. tor J.)ewey the procea~> will be well. ;per• 
for111ed when tl:le (!it.:l.:aen poiHJii!ISil!lllll the f;oientifio spirit 
&nd &ppliea the eeientifio attitude in judging wh&t t.~ourae 
Dewey felt tha.t hill pllilOfllOJ?hical m~Dthod vma l'ele-
vant tow educa.thn ~nd Gapeo:l.&lly t•or educathn in a 
demoeraoy, The llOienU:fic a.tt.itude and the uhntifio 
ll1eth<Jd woulil oo the ultimate &.~riterili1o for the tor;~mthn of 
valid Ill'O !)J.ema and would. I!IUJiiJtly the valid an~~;·vterl.l. .;.6 he 
had lilli~<•n the ntaoenity to l'I1Hlonetruct explll:ti'ienoe. to 
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lilduca. tion,. 
Yet, in b.il!! undlil:rstanding of f'relildor••• Daw111;r 1 a basic 
ideas are not so novel in tbe bnuic dietinctione he affirms 
nor i,n the ;p1·oors he of'hrs tor th¢m. Hita novelty in doc-
trine is att.dned not by applicaUon of a new approach but 
rll\the:r by oowmi tmetrtn tQ his own y>revious ,pllilosophioal 
l!lpeculationl'l. Indeed, on the one htmd• his d-octrinal con .. 
ception of one ll'WilM freedom witl'l aevera.l aapeoto is novel 
as a dootrine; but on the oti'ler hand• it iiJ not novel in 
the li~ht of hh loiiO<"l doctrine a.IJout th.e 11 unitary 11 con-
oeption of (;ubjeot a.nd object, 
lil:ortill),e:r Adler' a idea.! for: t.he type of illrut which 
society should want t<1 p:t•oduco :1.& one who i•%m think in 1.1.11 
:fields or knowledge, one who otm 'under!ll tand the meaning or 
the truth in all fields. It ia M au~mm:ptiun ()f ,\dler1 u 
approa.ch to education that th.e raere accumulation Gf :t'actual 
infor1~.~a.tion 1s no subf.lti'l;ute for the syah.lllatio and ration .. 
d exposition of truth. ~~.nd. :realHy. lllduolll.tiii>ll is a pa:t'ti• 
eipa.tion in a eonverl'la.ticm aimed at truth. ·rne object is 
to ena.b1e the learner to take part in the oonvtu.•sation to 
understand any new idea or any new field tlw.t hi presented. 
Fornm.l education prepares hitll to be a member ot· the 
= 
= 
ea.Uo.n is liberal when it is concerned 1v1th the clauifi .. 
catiGn an~ reinterpreta,t:l.on qf' bat~~ie ideas .. 
Adle:rt a. prcuacription to :provide the meane for the 
intel.li~Jent solutions .to the problellllil which confront lllllln, 
his search for vo;l.:l.d. oollllllon knowledge• his reJection of 
sollle p.lliloaophieal prol;)llilllla, ood the introdueti()n of his 
solutions for the :p:roj,lems, thtilse \Ve:t•e some of the elements 
Which motiv&ted •Wr.td conetituted his p:ropoaa.h. His undn-
atl!l.ndi.ng of tl:.u~ n~ture of reality• truth• G>tlli inteJ.lec'l:ion 
!nf luenced h_il'il_und!!l:ratMdiniJ: of _tlut-distinl.'lt.ion 1:!<&-tween ·· 
empirical truth 111.r1d philoeopb.ioal truth, oetwe®n ~Srapirioa.l 
tact and philosophical fact, between the empirical sciences 
and phibaophy, and. the dimtinotions belavll)en natural reason 
and supernatural ta.i th. 
Mortimer Adler had hiEl conoeptione ii>bout the nature 
of re~;;,lity Md truth, J>ssu:t•trdly, J:u~ did not l'llilil1>:rict tne 
llleanina; .of thinkins: to ~e proceam qf the .Ptwdo41l.l 
scientists• nor to th$ solving of the prol>leJU.tio eUua. ... 
tiona as underl'.ltood by Dewey. liM did not begin to think 
when he beoallle mohnt:l.ff.c. Beo~a.uee lllan oM think, he ou 
~t.ln enG~e in philosophical thinking. This kind of think .. 
ini is "u ten tifi e" also. 'l'he :principles wb.io11 1t &flli!Ul!!<UI 
are valid ~nd d.emonstr&ble t.o :rea.soth Adler would contend 
tna.t if tl:aey were not valid• then the assumptions underlying 
140 
soientU'io investigation vwuld not be valid either. 
For e:xwaple., the science of medicine ooncerns i tseJ.f 
wi tl:l the health of people • but the exis tenoe of :patients as 
people is not medically proved or denied--it is silllply 
tiUUlumed• Consent is not required frotn an a.nin1al for an 
operation. but except for special extreme circumstances, it 
ie required from the buma.n pa.tiEmt. 'r'he consent and free 
will ot' the patient are not ecientit'ic but assumed ph.ilo-
soptl:i.cal aspects of the tuedtcal. praoti ces. 
A phi.Losophioal inveetiga.tion of ~" aubjeet, t'or 
Adler, is concerned wi ttl the :pursuit of' truth "'bout the 
au'bjeot itself. The subject itself is tile object of the 
philoaopl:lical invutigat:!.on. It is a know.l.edge of the 
a ubject thought about (the object ti.S intellectually appre-
hended). The truth of a plliloaophical atatelllent about a 
subject depends on ascertaining the facts .!~.bout it. A 
philosophical asl>ertion or dootrine1 when ·tru.e, gives a 
knowledge of whatever rea.li ties &.re the obj ecta of inquiry. 
Consequently, tile truth of' a philoeopitical statement oon-
cerning the subject depends on ascertaining the facts about 
the subject itself. 
A philosophical i.nvestigation of t'reedolll• Go,l, love, 
or any basic idea, for Adler, is concerned with tile rmrauit 
of truth about the sul:lj eet; f':reedo.tn, God, Ol;' love. The 
subject is the object of the philosoph.ical investigation. 
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freedom, God, or love ll!.s intellectually apprehended). The 
t:ruth. of iii. llllU.osopllioa.l statement llil:Jout the sul:Jjeot de• 
pends on aeoerta.ining the fa.cts a.hout tile subject t;hought 
a.bout. A pldloaophioal assertion or doctrine about free-
dom, when truet gives a knowled.se ot' whatner x·ealities 
are the obJects of' inquiry. Consequently, the truth of a 
philoaophil:lml l!tatement concerning the subject de11ends on 
the facts about the Slibject iteelf. 
A cl.ialeotical investigation about the dililcuseion of 
a subject, for Adler, ie C<)noerned wUh the purs1•it of 
truth about a diaoueBion itself. •.rne truth of a d.ialeoti-
ca.l statement del)enda on the fa.ots a'oout the di!i)oussion 
of the subject. ·rne dil!oueeion ie the object of the 
dialeotica.l investigation, It is a. knowledge of the sub-
ject diacusaed, 'l'he trutll of' a. dia.lecticl;il.l statement 
about a. discussion .depends on <J.SI.H1i:rtaining the facta about 
the discussion. 'J.'he dialeotio~J~.l. i'ormule•tion, when ·tru.e, 
gives a. knowledg!ll of the cont.roversies that t.mde:rlie the 
diversity of oonf.Ucting philosophioal doetrines. Con-
sequently, the truth of a. dia.leotil)d statement concern~ 
ing a. dili!eues ion of a subject depends on the t'aots about 
the diao U!Hl ion of freedom. 
For iJortimer Adler, there is a. ril\dicaJ. discontin• 
u.ity J:Jetween the physical and epir1tua.l reallllS. lilind ia 
1 
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essentially spiritual and cannot be reduced to, or under~ 
stood e:xe~lueively in termlll of',.materia.l thinge. iJ!!l.ll is 
dmll in nature. lie 1s a thinking anillll:l.l• The t'Mt that he 
hJ an animal is of' far less importan!le than the fact that 
he thinks. Alii an animal he can be studied empirically. 
The sciences of biology, psychology, sooi oloiy • and ~:~,nth:t'Q• 
pology can shed light on hie :physiologiCal responses and 
afford some insight into some aspects of hie individual and 
social behavior. Hut these are not the only or the basic 
things. Aa a. thinking being (tnan•s most important aspect), 
;proach. 
'.rhe pr ima.cy furHI:Iiion---Of-educatioll-iSc--held-tl)-~be-the­
developmen t of the mind for rat iona.l thought and intellec-
tual excellence. These are the chief goods from which al.l. 
other goode follow.. An approach to values muet be rational. 
Through clear thinking, based upon adequate grasp of truth, 
:fortified hy logic, the mature individual can determine for 
himself what is good, what is beautiful, and what 1e just. 
The ,Primary goal of' the eurrieulum should be designed to 
develop tne tllind Md ~o transmit tne cultural heritage. 
It b a corollary thil<.t liberal education must be 
sb.arpl.y divorced. from vocational iilnd other forms of" speoif•l-
i1led education lest it beoollte involved in considerationlll 
which make it impouiole for it to perform ite true !'unction. 
J 
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provided by indu:strhliza.tion .should pu.t the poae:l.bility of 
l.l.Cllievinei the goal ot uni verea.l liberal education within 
the realm of prt~.otica.li ty. Liberal education wilJ. precede 
lllpeoialiae,d education lest thf.l specialist be deprived of 
liberal eduoa.ti.on or the. abilitiy to oomtllunica.te wHh other 
men in any field of' learning. 
Adler's understanding ot' tne faa t ot' plurali<llll and 
the role of dial.ecti<l in ra.tional deb~1te W<M> r1;l<avant for 
education and upeoially t'o:r education in a. democracy. In 
a se!U1e• present diversity.a.bout a pa:rtieulal' at1bjeat ia 
only a. mocrocosm of tile pla.uraliatio maorocoslu in the West• a 
intellectu&l neritage, Alon/it dth tho !Hllealing irreducibil• 
ity of doctrines and views on every basic $Ubjeot 1 thex·e 
e:dsts in the western l:le:ri tage a unity o:t' rEllevance, a con .. 
tinuity of common themea a.n<t questions. Thill> dialectical 
unity ll!ilrvea to for1a tM inte.Ueetua.l tradition of tlle west, 
the tra.dit ion o:f' one eulture, in spite of ii~ll its doctrinal 
diverl!ity. 'l'he unity.in the W'eet•s intellectual community· 
is not one of a.uont but one of understanding, according to 
Adler. 
Adler is aware that pl'liloso:phiea.l d:l. vneity seems to 
h~J~ve been the splendid patriJllony ot thiloso;pey ·tb.rougn tne 
a.ges, thotJgh ®.t times certain philosophers were more influ-
ential tlmn others. While some plliloeophers ha.ve puehed 
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tr:i.buted at lealllt negatively to the progress ot philoeophy. 
The u11il tipl.ioation of various l!lysterue through t!llll ll.gu iut.a 
presented a spectacle of oontra.dictoty and feuding docrtrinu. 
but this >VIlW not done witnout opening new ina is:hts or pn~ 
eenting ®.·· displ.&.y of novelty. However. Adler did ol;l.ution 
that the mere <llUltiplic&tion of' philoao:I)X.ioa.l doctrines or 
the denial ~'f the rtH3pective vs.J.:I.di ty of some, lilore, or 
l!loGt of them, a.l~>o lends a.n a.ir cyi' cont'ueion and aomaterna-
Uori to the public ermrlii.Cter of' pllilosopb.io<~.l knowledge. 
Ara;umentaticn without a.:t·eas ot agreemen·~ becomes anarehy. 
The n10ed t'ol' so1ue internal conoen11us or eontrol a<nong 
ph.UosoJ,ih.ex·s them.selvee needs recogni tton. · The rational 
delu<mdlll or a r&.tie>nal in1a;uiry tauat be gi von priority llf 
eomsern les& i. ttill vi'Jry :-a.Uona.l cla.ime retUlmble cll.,price a.ntl 
its ret'Juta.tion be ruined;. There is tllG <l.artgei' that ita 
willldom ma.y fllouitd more like babble and non£H<~l1~<Hl, Ha critnia 
fo'L' credtmoe ma.y resemble whim and fashion, :prejudiae .and 
plillllllion~ 
· The implication for education then is th.at the ideal 
neaetH>itatea the a.warenee.s of' the variety of doctrines 
which oan be p).'estmtcd about a. pa.:t'tioul<.>r ~;~ui>jeot of tunda"' 
mental .impo:t·ta.noe as well aa of oontiilm,porary l.ntel:eat. The 
v;;.lue o:i.' the dia.leoticll.l a.p,proaoll ill ot illlporta.nofl puciSely 
because nf ito neutral:l. ty and doctrinal im,partiali ty. Ita 
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a subje(Jt with.out adopting any ot' them as true or better. 
· Hence if there il:l anything dis tinott ve about the 
neutra.li ty o_f _the d;ia.lectioian, it is __ onl;y _ that it 
pervades &V4U'f aspect of ills work, f'or an !liXOlusively 
dialectical approach to con tro_verUal ma.ttars lllUot 
a.voicl. part:l.eansh:l.p at every; point. 'l'he kind of obj ec-
tive trlltb whicll iS his exclusive preoccupation 1111 
dialect:i.Cl!A.lt not doctr"inal. Th!s re1llatns the <lase even 
thot~gh lli_s ultilllate aim may be to :l:'urther the pursuit 
of dootrinal tl'utn b;y presenting barJio issues in a wfJ:f 
that facilitates their resoluUon.li3'1 
Indeed, the eharacteriutio of "'n intelligent man 
would be the impartiality and detaoiment exercised in deal-
ing with views hostile to his own because thlil degree to 
which an;r partisan proponent of a. theory, in £1hilosophy or 
eoienoe, fails to sup pres II- plil.rtisanehip in s llating :rival 
tneories, to tha.t deiree he t'a.ils in fairness a.nd objecti-
vity. 
In AdliU.'' s mind, people m.ua t be educated to face the 
diversity of tl:leorie.s and doctrines that exist with.' regard 
to any l;lalilic idea. Teachers and students should oe able to 
apprGaeb. the .hmuee involved in tl1e consideration of t'undl-'0· 
menta.J. ideas with intellectual detachment. Tiley need t_o 
nave acquired a clear understanding of the issues and 
rationale of opposin~ positions~ 
A liberal education tha.t proceeds b;y reading and 
l87;a:ortimer ,\dler, ~ g! Jr'reed!l!!l, Vol. I (Garden 
Cit;y: DouQleday and Co.t Inc., 1~58), P• 6'7• 
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t:r.in.ation ·into ·~thaotever .l:uoppens to b~ aao<1Ulda.nt at tll>~~ 
mollllilnt, OI1Htaot proceed illl ignoranotll o:t· all the urains of 
the vtho.le record ot hW!l.an thought ii>bout a, suoj eot. The 
inte.Ueotual iHV!n•;;Hy to hill fa<::ed must not only have the 
;;;mplitude of the whole dl;>ouuion, but it xuust be a.coc•ll-
111'1.11.ied by some undets tanding of the. iii{i:reemel'lta • dia~:ree-
menta, and ar@iWlHlnts that constUutlil t.ue controversies 
wntch Ill:'$ to be found on tl:!.e auhj<llct of dit\H.li~asion. To 
solve tl:le problem of cu.ltural pluraliam and the ir>telleo-
tual ccm!llunity l'equirea, for .Adler, ~:~, diecove:ry af the 
oonw1o11 ground which undE~rliea differenoi,u; of opinion and •• 
transfor!ll&tion of their diversity into rational and 
intelli$ible controv~rsy. Tb.$ goal ie an u.ndex·sto.od. 
dinrlility or a divereity within the fl't.Wewo:~:•k of an bttel· 
lectu;;~l cm!lllmnUy • In tl:lh wa;r • dh!ilgi'elihllent honored ae a· 
sign of 1':t'eedom b also a. meanl\1 to learrling,. so an 
education h:r freedom !il.nd for the love &nd understanding 
about free doll! are the oondi tiom; of free doll! a.lil we.U a.s tl:le 
result~:! of :f'reedoll! and must be• !il.ll\ong othel' thinge 1 an 
education ~&rounded in the pl'opu U~>EI!$ of la.ngu«Lge. 
Fox· Adler• the oit:l.zt~n n!ll~,id.S intellutu&.l tra.inin@; 
to understlll.nd the itHlues which are l:H:IiHg pror)Ot~IIHi and til(! 
nature of tlle &rgumenta used to support each ie~".ue. He 
wants a eiti:.Hlnry int'<:~rmfld ah<:mt a widlll range o:f' poa<~ible 
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is reached. 
Because the n$ture of the dialectic method ie such 
that i tena.blu the person eonaoioualy e;np,loying it to under-
stand. pluralistic points of view• it does sum to be an 
appropriate instrument for education. Education in ~ demo-
cracy cannot ignore the plurality of' philosophical doctrines 
preeent in eo t!Ui.l:lY runduental matters but should accept the 
responsibility of reruiering tile deba.te of' iliHmee intelligi-
ble. 
Dewey's pragmatic methodology, ba.aed on its own contra-
dictory. as eWIIpt ions, and Ut1t tree from serious ooj eo tiona, 
does not 1a:eat other theories with fair impartiality. In~ 
stead of presenting an impartial understanding of other 
doctrines, it prejudges them. Adler• s dialectia tuethodology 
in explicating divern philosophical 0pinions without pre-
judging them seemta more suitable :for the a.iala of education 
in a democ:rG.cy. Indeed, it would be suitable. for MY sys-
tem of governmen.t which. would value truth above indoctrina~-
tion or power because it provides th.e means to r:o.r:ri ve a.t the -----! 
ve.ry radioa..l. a.uumptions of' confJ.ic t 1~ tll.eories. 
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Paul r". SchUpp ed.i ted a series ot' books titled, l'hta 
;Lib:ran 9.! J.~vina l!ll.U.geoph.ers. Volwue I of the series wrw 
devoted to the philosophy of Jonn Dewey. As the rliiwle of the 
aeriea indiea.tes, one of the objeoti iTfH> toot Sehilpp lloped 
to aebieve wall! to give several philosopl:leu tlle opportunity 
to present their views about a particular 11 ving pllilosoptu~cr• s 
philosophy and to afford llilll the opportunity to t&kll note of 
their views in a reply IHHUJ.Y• 1'he volu~ue devoted to Jorm 
De\vey oonta.ins a ehoi't biogra.phy of' him life• written by his 
daughter with hh part:l.eipl~t.1on, The voluml!l l.illso contained 
the ,'Jlost GOlllplete bibliograpl:J;!r ot' Dewey' 111 writings up to 
tha.t time and IliH'lai bly to the preeent. In the light of the 
above t'a.cte, as well as the more general a.oquiii.intanoe ot 
professional educ<~tors wi tll John Devt\iy rather than with. 
Mortimer Adler, it seeme<l. reasonable to prepare a. sketch of 
Adler to round out tile reader's understa.ndini;i of some de-
1;1,\ilS of hie life and to offer a bibl:l.ography of lll!lillY of 
bii'l books ll'h.ioh have been published. A reader un4l!equdrrted 
with Dewey lll&Y easily refer to the work mentioned above., 
Adler wae born in lfew ·rork City, on December 28, 
1902.188 Hie father, Ignatz, was a jewelry ealeema.n and hie 
1963)' 
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111otb.er, Clar!sliltt.l (i.ia.nl:leim) ,. was an ex .. eoh.ool te&ehe:rr. In 
a middle.;.ela.se neighborhood o:t' uptown M:anilattan, he did not 
find uhool too difficult and develo;ped a taste f'o:r wead.ing 
and rei"lel\ltivo thinking• IndiCative of his preeoo:l.ousneu 
mad philo~a<>ph!Ga.l interest b an inCident wtl.ioo took ;plMe 
when he w{l>s fift~Jel'l.i wo:rkia&; al'l a copy boy for the ~~ he 
read in John stuart Mill's autobiography that the lilnglish 
. pidlosopher hu read Plato before he was t~m., 'l:'lds p:romp .. 
ted .Adler to <b.'aw a pa.y a.dvanee to buy l?lato•s Republio.llall 
In 1920 he entered Columbia Uni ve:rrui ty. He 'took 
John Er~akine' s General Ronorlil Cl)u:t'.lllth It was a tJg:rea.t 
books" oour~ae though not ao called. It out acrou hard and 
:rast li!ubJeet diriHliplines. In time., he (lt:iUlU.I to tea.oll tl:te 
Honore <Journ• and some of tl:v!l fMOUII! studenh in hill i'irst 
elafHr were Whittaker Oha,aiben, Clifton Fa.dinu.m, and Lionel 
Triiling. While te~Aohing the Honors course, he wae !ii.lso 
instructor of pl!lyohology at the uniVersity. 
In Adler's und.ergra.dua.te da;ya at Columbia, John 
Dewey was an eminent profeuor in the ,philosopey department .. 
:!:!Wen then they had. differences of opinion. At a riluting of 
the univ•u·sity plliloeopny elu'b, Adler delivered a paper. 
John D~~Wey was one of bbl profeuore a.t the time a.nd had 
I 
i 
I 
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eo~fi t.o iihe l!ltl'let~n~.; As .tis! reported th.e J.nc;l.dent, •wv 
when Adler q~.tOt\114 tro.111 one of Dewtty*ill :plil.esagel!ll .and colll!llent• 
ed, "There il!J fJI\Ii"i>~inly 110thing of' the lov.e ot' God. in this 
utterance," Dewey got up io say, "Nobody is etOi!lg to tell 
ll!e how .\!> love: God,u ~nd wal.k.ed out. The lllil.t"lil.ll!S~ent enmed 
to ha.ve been mutuG,l;. Adler 1 ·.vb.Ue a filtud.ent in Dewey's 
el.aea, di,d l!Jil!lld letters to hilt prot'ea!Hlr pointing o~;~t what 
he oamaidfu•ed. ·t.o be ina.dequacies in hh. prot"eaMr' a lec-
tures. :Dewey wal\1 gracious cnlQUgh to r11ul.d the letter$ in 
191 t~la.sa f1,r e. time. 
In l\127 • Adler' a work oalled ;Qip.leQUJl wm.a p.ublished.. 
His u:x;-profeuo:r reviewed the work for. JI!:!U.!.!lt!l.in April oi' 
the next year. l92 ;Dewey conct:~ded thtl>t the work, "is eon~ 
oe:rned with a.n illlportant pa:l:'tioult"'r prolalelll• the conduct 
ot fruitful dia:.pute, of :l.nhlllllotu$1 eonnreation about 
some que.stion in eontroVIUi'liiY <'~X' at lel\i.lilt in doubt,. 11193 He 
SU!llll1$d. UJ,l h.b M'ticle with the compl:l..!lientaey sta.te;aent thlilt, 
":8oth ll!.re evidence ot' the growing vitaJ.ity and independence 
on the part of the ;ro~€Jer .American ph:l.loeopllewfll. • • whiclh 
w:J.lJ. fltf;!.nd t!:l:'itica.l eo.!liPatison with the. ]:;eat European 
~ ~--·------
.190~. 
l9llq,:l.g.., :P• 7e.. 
l 92JGbn l:lewet• "Tilings Thought, Oonverlilatioi'l1 " i'iatiO!h 126;4501 AP:ti~l 180 1.9~6;• 
193~ •• p .• 450, . 
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Along W1.1\b. th~ compli~Jlertta.t'y chlil.:t'iii,(lter ot' the (;l,t;ove · 
a&~lllrtio~a, t.lle. me.j or J?Or.tion of Dewey' s review <Mmeia ted 
ill pointinl§ out w:M.t appea.red. to him t.o. be seriolUl dif'fi· 
oultiea ~u Adler' a 'f{or~. Dewe;v was so O()nvinced that the · 
statue of' f.mpirioal. .or eoien:l;if.io theory w~s unoutu.in at 
t:M.t tj,me, and that px·oper e~;'lpirioal inquiry would solve· 
dJ.a,leotical :l.nquJ.rin t tha.t he took Adlt'lr to ta!!.k on both. 
aeooants. 
While hie ex .. t~rofesaor could not a.coe11t the under .. 
eta.nd.in~ .ot' dia.le.otio w·hioh Adler eoneidered the tll.ollt ill!M 
poli'tatlt preiHHlta.tion oi' the work, Rol:le:rt .Maynw,rd .Hutehin~?, 
the a.eting deal). of t!w Yale Law School, wu im.prelll~•ed enough 
to invite Adlil!r to vi ~iii t him. 'l.'he :t'rhndtJh.ip whioh was 
lilparked then had oontiaued t.ill the. p:re~JE~nt and <ii.tH'lolli&ted 
the!lt in lllltllY lllUtuu Ullde:rtlllltinge. 
In 1927, Adl,er took on t,b.e rtH.liJGU&ibilit.iee. of matri-
mony with. Helen j'3oyntolll, daughter of ""n J;Hinoh manufa.otu:r~ 
tUI'f Pol!lsibly .with a IU!Gd to augment hit> i!H!J.a.r.r. aa wdl li>il 
t9 give an outlet to l1hl dyn®lie ener~a, hf!l tllntsht PillYCholo~a 
e.t City College 0f New York1 leotur¢~d at the Peopl.e•s Inoti .. 
' 
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Director of the People' Iii Institute from 1927 to 1929. 
When Robert .Hutchins oeoamtl president of the Uni-
versity of Ol:!ioago, .Adler went with him. He taught there 
from 19:30 to 1952• While there, he taught a course calJ.ed 
"The Philosophy of I.a.w •" 
While 1J:ort.imtu: Adler did not establish a .laboratory 
nhool• ilia edtun~Uonal ideas were d~velo:ping along hUI!lan .. 
istie linea. He wt~~lll interested in lelll.rning more about the 
subJect he taught, not only its rudiments but ita tnore 
t'undalllental nature !ll.nd llisller levels as well. It liieems a.a 
if he tried to e:Jtemplity in hie tea.cliing the conviction that 
a. limited pruent!iii.thn of the ma.terial in a field does not 
accomplish much to stir ·t:ne i!llll.gina.Uona of the pupils, 
wllile one tba.t ia riehly b;roa.d will help the learner tG 
ma.eter ea,tn.•l.y all the preliminary euentia.le and reach out 
to ouo.!!le: ll<ore completely alive• lllln1Sitive, emu·geth, an.d 
ze&ttul. 
Although Adler did not make use of "audio•visual" 
materials (in a. narrow and teetmol.ogha.l eense) • he did 
!:>ring the full f'Oroe or hilll pneona.lity into hi$ lectures 
v.nd uminare. 'iVitnout attempting to retlllll.ke replioas or 
himeelt in his students, he di.d bring the richneel'.l of his 
e:Jtperienees and intellectual insights into ilie cl&saes. His 
insistence on cla.ri ty and refinement o:r thought were of 
paramount imj)orta.nc~. Hie own &Wiil.l'6neslll of' thl!l nature of 
:ra.tiona.l deb&te, whioh neoesllita;tea the unQ.era·tanding of 
controversy to consist in the dispute of issues by argu-
llll'mtt~ f'or Md against, in addition to h:l.l'l re81.l:l..aation of 
the funda.mtmta.l premie.PI'l implied a.nd assumed in auolA an 
underata.nding• were. shared by him wi'llh hia pupils. 
'l'his desire to posaeiHl Md to be posmeli!ued by truth 
is a do(ll:l,naUng cnaracte:ristic of Adler's personality. If 
one ca.n ~>a.in some inferential insight into the Socratic 
method from Plato•a Di@1l 0gues and interpret th.em in the 
light of a 111killed cross-examination whlllln questions C1.l'fl 
asked with deliberate prfunedi ta.tion ~nd determination, one 
can visualize Adler employing the same Socratic technique 
It wlll.s durin~; the time tll~>.t he w~a on the faculty 
of Chicago Uni versi i;y that he wrote several of hio booka t'or 
selective critical audiences and one for a wider audience. 
The yea.r lli/35 111aw the publication of' Slrill!lil• t,a.w, .!!!Lrul ;a,ooi!l 
Elai_!nce, oo-a.utb.o:red with Jerome Miobaelt in which they 
attempted to point out the Philosophical assumptions of· the 
social seiencem. His ;QiMrw&rt;ic!!i!, ao .. authored with Maude 
Phdpa Hutohint~a published in .1935• poin·t>ed out the limi ta.-
tions ot' the st!il.tistic!U lll)l;lroaoh in l!Ulll!Wering or attempting 
to solve philosophical prol>leme. Two years later his treat-
ment of aemtlletio theory ap1;•>and in tb.e puolication of Art 
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.1oru1 !:fugenq~~ The next ;rear• in ~ ~ I£a.a ~ .Q;t.: Ma.n, 
he presented a general exposition about the oon!ilequencea of 
:platonism and positivism in psychology and explained some 
of the false pb.ilosophilla.l assumptions which Jrreud and 
other psyonoana.lyats had made concerning the nature of ma.n, 
The same yea~, he presented his critique of the rational 
proof's for the existence of God proposed by st. 'l'bom111.s 
Aquinas. 1'b.is was published under the title, u. 'J:ho.ma.e 
~ ~ gent;Ulilll. m.s .full({ lS! lj,ead .! ~ook :publiahed in 
1940 beca.me a best aeller e.nd helped to give his name 
national publicity.. -The-same yliial'--Witnuaed- tl'Ull appear~ 
a.nee sf a leu popular but more erudite wor.l>:1 :&;ro blems;, .Q;t.: 
T.b.om~sta: ~ E.r29lei!i gt' Species.. A JL~aJ,eqtie ~.!£orals: 
1'QW!!r4. ~ k'sumAAttsm .2f. Politiga:!; A:hilo!lop;t'!J!'. was i~Hiuetl 
in 1941. How ,iSl. ~ J1boy! \'j'Qr !IW1 fef!:ce emerged from 
publ.:l.ca:t:.ion in 1944. 
When Williwl Benton l:leem.me afUli&.ted with the 
Encyclopedia Brita.nniclll. and desired to publish a aet of 
the Great Books, Hobut ;H:utehinlll was appointed. editor ot 
the proJ eot and Mortimer Adler the auocia.tlh•eH3.itor of 
the Grllla.t J}oQka of the westnn World• Adler .wa.e editor-in• 
eh.iet .of the two-volwna index of the work ealled Ihe grea~ 
;td.eas: A l}yntopi(ion. Adler coined. the word ayntopioon 
which.. li te:rally means collection of topi<ll!lo Tiley represent 
the most significant topics treated in the books of the 
I 
J 
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p~a refexena.es to the relevant ~aasages where they are 
d.boueaed hy the autboru .ot·. the oolleetion0 :Eseh toph ie 
introduced by fat eeB&y and is Q!lalyt.ically <U. vided. How-
ever, the. lll.S.terial 'for the topic o.:>mes fa;oom the .. utllors 
liU'l.d euta a.eross the subject fiW.tter of b.hto:ry • psychology, 
phys;l.ee, lJaetry • fiction, ph:l.loeophy, i!l.nd tlleolo!g • This 
work engf~g<ld a great dea.l of hia attenti•;m f'roDJ. 1945 to 
19 52.. It probably nu been the ruest montu!l.enta.l at· hill 
director. 
of \'ieste:rn thouGht on aubjeet~r~ wi'doh lll#.ve bliHiln of oontinu .. --
i~ philosophhll>1 in1Hire~;t from the advent of ph.ilotiHl,phy in 
ancient Greece to the present dOt.Yo 
This undel!'taking c10.n be oon:;;t:rued ae an outgrowth. 
of Adl.er•s previous work on the §:vnjiopiq,2.n. It is lla.eioa.lly 
a.n ana.lysh of philosophical literature from the penpec-
ti ve of the «i:teat ideas. Its ntore fun~ntal ba.eie may 
lle traci'ld h ~rtili1er Adler• s undarllltand.ing o:f the nature 
of Jmowled.ge, liU'l.d truth, tlte meanin(S of !lhilot;Jopby and 
uienoe1 a•.nd the function of dialectic in hurruii.n understand• 
ing. Deca.u!:!e of the releVIil>noe o,f fX'elildonA tQ lllOdern lii'e, 
freedom Wall chosen IMI the fi:ret idltH!l. t;o be treated., In 
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lw5a. Vo.i.ume ! of The ~~~a if Fn<>d!!& was pubJ.inh.ed• :tn 
l9t>l,. Volume II of the. study was published. VolUllle I oon .. 
sisted .. of two bonks or llleetions. JSook I concerned itself 
with a pnl!lent~Uon of the 'nature and method of tl1e dialeo~ 
tioal enterprise. 'The nature of the wnterprise wml ~n 
t~ffort ta t..'\.kf:l stock of Western thought on the auuject of 
f3."eedoll11 wioh lli:l.s been of continuing phil.oeop!doa;l interest 
from the advent of ph.ilolllophy in anei ent ih'eeoe to the 
prfileent da;y. It W/il.S not a. hUto:~.•t of ideas nor even a. 
tres.tment of the history of' ph.ilosophioal thought about 
freedom. 1'he method ot' the en terpr:l.!i!€1 W~J~.Iil to a.p1;roaol:l the 
li tera.t~re on tllie i dcu~~. from t.he s tandwo:h~t of liln observer 
rather thli\l'l a pa~:tici:pa.nt in the ph.UoliH>phio~l discussion, 
Book U p.r ell!ented th~> d.iahot iolll.l t~xa.minatioll of the di· 
verse oa:noept.:tons of f'reedQm. Volume II, 'which. OQntained 
llool! III .of .tlle study• oonta.i:ned a dia..leotical ex.amination 
ot' the co:ntroveruiE!s about freedom. It p:reliamtl.ld a f'or~. 
tion 'Of the iasuel!l whioh were being dill!Ouea·ed and liM 
argumenttl t.ha.t constituted each of 1lhe oontrove:t•eiea. The 
central tzy'potheflfim, wllioh wa.e eon:t'irn!~d b'f the eonelll;ption!ll 
all the ~tt thol'~ tu1.d of :t'retr~41om1 Will.$ th.at a IIIaH ill fru who 
hal\l within himself thlil ability or power to make what he 
doe!~~ hie own action a,ncl what he Mtlievea il.is own property. 
Sin.ce l953• .ll.dler h~;,a also conduert.ed Executive 
Selllina.:re dt!l'ing the summer ltlonths a.t Aspen 1 Oobra.du. :ll'rom 
j 
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lw55-l956, under his leadership, similar seminars were held 
at Island Steel in Chicago, The Executive Seminar of tho 
Institute for Philosophical Research now operates under his 
direction at the Inliltitt!te'a center • .His Great Books 
seminars in Chicago ltave celebrated tlleir nineteenth a.rmi-
versa.ey. A Ulllil<U' program has l:>een oonduoted since l958 
in san Francisco. Mr. Adler over the course o£ years has 
given numerous television a.nd radio talks and public lec-
tures on a variety of subjects. 
The year 19!58 saw, in addition to ·t.ha. publication of 
I,he ~ of ;!j!;teedollh tt1e birth of two other works. Adler 
co-authored lit! Clt&lit!!llist Manifee1q with :Louifll o. Kelli!t'l 
and The UtvQl:!!t~o.n l!! E4,ug£;LttQ.P.. wltb. Milton s. Mayer. 
Since then• in 1961, l;b.e new C§Qi:l\aliiilt, also GO•aUthored 
with Kelso, and his own G4ea.t ld.erag t!:.9.!ll Gnat .~oojl;s, in 
1962, have \leen pu.bl:l.lilhed. He and Robert Ill •. Hutchins 
ucently co .. authored two volumes oalle<l Grea;; ;tdeas lQit~. 
Volllme I wa.e published in 1961 a.nd Volume II in 1962. 
The Institute for Philosophical Researoh has been, 
iiJ preflef!Uy • ll.lild in tends in the future to be engaged. in 
employing the sallie lllethod and purr;;uing the eame objective 
in attempting to clarify ideas on love, progress, Justice, 
property, and othe:!l ideas ba.eicl to the 'l!eat1 a intellectual 
t~aditiona and lite. 
If Mortimer Adler' a idea.a !l>re viewed in the light of 
1 
tl'!.d.r :rel~Va\'lae to cont empol'ary .oonaiderat iona oooa.a ioned 
by li£r. snow's delinel;ltion of the two eulturea, ·t;M eoientif· 
io lll.nd the hullll'l.nistic, a goodly portiotl of his ide~>a a.re 
illumir!a.ti.ng. Hirl ideeoo treatine tl:l.e natul'et ooo:pe, and 
limitations of scientific inquirY and the nature, aOG.Pf:\ and 
lim:!. t&tione of pb.iloeophio inquiry were· years a.ll.ead of oon-
teall?or;:n·y interest in ·the ilubJ$ot+ 
The work that Adle1''a institute ha.e been doing con• 
firms that the r~<.tiona.l proctHHl of inquiry competent to ad-
vanee l!lan 1 a Jmowledge of' ·fl.llld&.illental truth, i.e., pll:l.loso-
pb;y0 has betm. att~illtt#d to by the exieteMe of philoBopllioa.l 
ill!sues debated over the aourse of ·the last twenty•i'ive 
centuries. 
As a eo:rol1a:cy1 t,h.e work of the i:nstitu te would 
deny th• v&lid:i.ty of an Msum.ption whioh. vn:n~1d trelll.t the 
eli versi ty of pk>Uoeot)hiCa.l wri Ungs and thinking. as indica .. 
tive of the impoe!i!ibil:l.ty of :t'ational debate. Aciler wou.J.d 
like to ue pllilosopll.ers uaa.k:e tl:l.e eft'ol't to more thorouglllY 
supply the a.rgwaents and eoun·te:r arguments which exht and 
whililh eiifhe:r have no't J;;eon dhpute.d at all or hm.vlli been 
inadequately disputed<! 
